CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Richard Compton, Jr. appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend in favor of defendants City of Los Angeles and Sandra Brito, an employee of the City (collectively, the City). The trial court ruled that plaintiff ’s causes of action were barred by the six-month statute of limitations under Government Code section 945.6, subdivision (a)(1) , and plaintiff ’s allegations were insufficient to invoke equitable estoppel.

Ollie Jonathan Stewart appeals a judgment after a jury convicted him of residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1), attempted residential robbery (§§ 664/211; count 2), residential robbery (§ 211; count 3), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 4), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5), kidnapping to commit another crime (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 6), attempted carjacking (§ 664/215, subd. (a); count 7), and criminal threats (§ 422; count 8). The jury found true the allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury for counts 5, 6, and 7 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon for counts 5, 6, and 7 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to life with a possibility of parole plus 13 years in state prison. The court imposed restitution and parole revocation fines of $400 each. (§§ 1202.4, 1202.45.)

Kai Schneider sued Ralphs Grocery Company (Ralphs) and American Guard Services, Inc. (American Guard), among others, for damages arising from an assault against him by a third party outside a Ralphs grocery store. The trial court granted defense motions for summary judgment on the ground that Schneider had failed to establish a triable issue of fact with respect to causation and that the moving parties were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Schneider appealed. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Jessica Hernandez appeals from a judgment of conviction for kidnapping to commit robbery and carjacking, contending the trial court erred in denying her Batson/Wheeler motion. We affirm.

Defendants Keith A. Fink & Associates (KAF&A), Keith A. Fink, and Sarah Hernandez (collectively, defendants) appeal from the trial court’s order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. Plaintiff Claudia Finato (plaintiff) cross-appeals.

Aaron Rosen (Rosen) appeals the dismissal of his third amended complaint (TAC) after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Alex Lavitt (Lavitt) and Gooseneck, LLC (Gooseneck) (collectively the Lavitt Parties). The main issues in this case revolve around Rosen’s claims to half the proceeds from the sale of a carwash as well as his claims that Lavitt interfered with two of Rosen’s real estate investment opportunities. In this appeal, Rosen has submitted inadequate briefs and we deem his arguments waived.
We affirm the judgment.

The trial court concluded all the allegations in plaintiff Raphael Irving’s lawsuit arose out of protected activity and did not have the minimal merit to withstand defendants’ anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion. Plaintiff appeals; but by failing to present meaningful arguments, he has forfeited them. We affirm.

Kentral Brim appeals his conviction, by jury, of possession of a firearm by a felon. Legend Brooks and Semaj Foreman appeal their convictions, by the same jury, of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. Brooks was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury acquitted Brim on the assault charge. It further found that Brim and Brooks had prior felony convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), that Brooks and Foreman committed the assault for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)), and that Brooks and Foreman personally used handguns in the assault (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)), causing it to be a serious and violent felony (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 667.5, subd. (c)(8)). The trial court sentenced Brim to a total term in state prison of four years. It sentenced Brooks to a total term in state prison of 16 years eight months, and Foreman to a total term of 15 years.

David Robb appeals from a judgment entered on two written settlement agreements he and Julie Robb had negotiated related to their dissolution proceedings. David contends no contract was formed by the two September 2015 settlement agreements and that the trial court therefore erred when it entered judgment pursuant to the terms of the two settlement agreements. Because we conclude that the parties did form contracts when they entered into the settlement agreements, and because the parties agreed to waive their appellate rights, we dismiss the appeal.

Craig E. Reeder, a retired inland pilot, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate seeking to set aside a decision of the Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo, and Suisun (the board) denying his application for a pension. The board found that appellant failed to satisfy the final two of the five eligibility requirements for a pension specified in Harbors and Navigation Code section 1164, subdivision (c), which reads as follows: “Except as provided in subdivision (d) [which is inapplicable], an inland pilot shall be eligible for the pension provided in Section 1163 if the inland pilot meets all of the following requirements: [¶] (1) Held a license as an inland pilot and served at least 10 years in that capacity after January 1, 1987, or has attained 62 years of age, whichever occurs first. [¶] (2) Retired after January 1, 1987. [¶] (3) Is at least 60 years of age. [¶]

In this cross-action arising out of an underlying collection suit, cross-complainants and appellants C.D. Rowsell (Rowsell) and Bosonda International Ltd. (Bosonda) (collectively, appellants) seek a declaratory judgment on behalf of themselves and a putative class of American Express credit and charge cardholders that the arbitration provisions in their cardmember agreements are unconscionable and unenforceable. The trial court denied class certification on the grounds that (1) Rowsell was not an adequate representative and did not have claims typical of the putative class, (2) individualized issues would predominate regarding whether the arbitration provisions were procedurally unconscionable and the requested declaratory relief was necessary or proper, and (3) a class action would not be superior to individual actions. Because we find the trial court’s decision rested on improper criteria and erroneous legal assumptions, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.

A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of forcible rape. Defendant challenges the upper term imposed on the principal count, arguing that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court’s dual use of facts both to support consecutive sentences and the aggravated term. Finding no deficient performance or prejudice from the lack of an objection, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Sean Patrick Melody of two counts of first degree robbery in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 211; 212.5, subd. (a); 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 4 and 5), but accepted Melody’s principal argument at trial that he was not the robber who held a gun to the victims’ heads, finding the alleged personal use of a firearm enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)) not to be true. (All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) When the jury could not reach a verdict on count 3, assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), the trial court declared a mistrial and thereafter granted the People’s motion to dismiss the count. At the close of evidence, the court also had granted Melody’s motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2 alleging kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), finding the movement of the victims incidental to the robbery. Following the jury’s verdict, Melody in a bifurcated proceeding pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a probationer (§ 2

S.G. (Mother) had unresolved mental health issues and a history of abusing drugs and neglecting her five-year-old son N.A. that led to the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) removing N.A. from her home. After over 18 months of reunification services, services for both Mother and Father were terminated and a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing was set. Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting additional reunification services and increased visits with N.A. The petition was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Mother appealed after her parental rights were terminated. On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying her section 388 petition without a hearing because she met the requisite “probable cause” to trigger an evidentiary hearing.