CA Unpub Decisions

S.G. (Father) is the father of five-year-old son W.G., and one-year-old daughter P.G. The children were removed from parental custody after then seven-week-old P.G. sustained a non-accidental fractured femur and bruising to her face. The mothers were offered reunification services. However, the juvenile court denied Father reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), after determining it was not in the children’s best interest to offer him services. Father challenges the court’s findings and orders denying him services, contending the evidence demonstrated reunification services were in the children’s best interest. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.

In July 2016, defendant and appellant D.K. (minor) admitted that he committed an assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and that he received stolen property exceeding $950 (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). In return, minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on formal probation on various terms and conditions of probation in the custody of his mother. Throughout his probation period, minor committed new offenses and violated several probationary terms and conditions. Minor eventually abided by the terms and conditions of his probation, and in February 2018, minor requested that his formal probation be dismissed and his records be sealed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, arguing he had substantially complied with his probationary terms. The juvenile court denied minor’s request, and minor appealed.

This opinion constitutes this court’s third time addressing this case. A jury found defendant and appellant Carlos Dubose, guilty of (1) first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) ; (2) carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)); (3) robbery (Pen. Code, § 211); (4) kidnapping for purposes of committing robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)); and (5) fleeing a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). (People v. Dubose I (March 25, 2014, E054926) [nonpub. opn.] [2014 Cal.App.LEXIS 273, *1419] (Dubose I).)

Plaintiff and appellant Randall Burgess appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate in which he sought an order reinstating him to his position as a teacher at Coronado Unified School District (District). Burgess contends neither the Education Code nor District's collective bargaining agreement with the Coronado Teachers Association permitted District to place him on involuntary administrative leave without following statutory suspension and termination procedures, which require a charge of misconduct followed by an opportunity to address those charges in a hearing. He maintains the trial court erred when it reasoned he did not meet his burden to show District's action placing him on paid administrative leave was an illegal suspension, violated the Education Code, or did not follow the collective bargaining agreement's procedures.

Defendant Damon Ray Gregory appeals a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, but not guilty of the allegation that he caused great bodily injury during the commission of the offense. He contends the trial court erred in denying his two motions to replace counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 and in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472 regarding contrived self-defense. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Anthony Alonzo Foye guilty of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and misdemeanor domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury that he had committed an uncharged act of domestic violence in violation of his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process. He further contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. Finally, he argues the court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALCRIM No. 332 (expert witness testimony) and CALCRIM No. 303 (limited purpose evidence in general). Because we find error but no prejudice, we affirm the judgment.

In an attorney’s collection action against his former clients, the clients cross-complained for fraud and breach of contract, alleging the attorney misrepresented his labor law expertise when negotiating the retention agreement and conducted settlement negotiations with the opposing party in order to drive up fees. The attorney moved to strike the cross-complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), arguing his actions in negotiating the retention agreement and entering into settlement negotiations were taken in furtherance of his rights of petition and free speech. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the attorney’s representation of the former clients was not protected activity. We affirm.

Defendant Trevail Gray was convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664), three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of resisting an executive officer (§ 69). The jury found true the allegations that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate and premeditated and that they were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true various allegations that a principal used and discharged a firearm in the commission of the attempted murders. Defendant admitted he had suffered a prior serious strike conviction and had served a prior prison term. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 147 years to life in prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

After an incident with sheriff’s deputies, Brian Pickett died, leaving his partner, two biological children, and his partner’s child, A.G., whom Brian had raised and held out as his own child. In the subsequent wrongful death action, the trial court held that A.G. lacked standing to sue, and entered judgment against him. With apologies to Sigmund Freud, biology is not destiny. We reverse.

When a screenwriter submits a script to a studio or individual with the power to get the movie made, under circumstances in which it is understood by both parties that compensation will be paid to the writer if the script is used, an implied contract to pay reasonable compensation can arise. If the movie is made and compensation is not paid, the writer may have a cause of action for breach of that implied contract. (Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 739-741 (Desny).) In this case, plaintiff brought a Desny cause of action, alleging that defendants used his script to make a movie without paying him reasonable compensation. The defendants responded with a demurrer and a motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)

Plaintiff Evelyn Sumo filed a wages and hours class action alleging that Torrance Memorial Medical Center had violated Labor Code provisions governing overtime pay and meal periods. The complaint also alleged a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code, §§ 2698 et seq. (PAGA) seeking civil penalties for these statutory violations. The trial court denied class certification, concluding that Sumo had failed to establish common issues would predominate over individual issues.
Sumo appeals the court’s denial of class certification under the “death knell doctrine.” Torrance argues the doctrine is inapplicable because Sumo’s PAGA claim remains in the trial court, rendering the order nonappealable. We agree, and dismiss the appeal.

Shirley Queen appeals from the dismissal of her case after the trial court sustained Mission Community Hospital’s demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court correctly determined that the claims were time-barred; we affirm.

Defendant Aris Nazarian appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Ararat Yousefi following a three-day bench trial of claims arising from an alleged partnership between the two men. Nazarian, who is representing himself in this appeal (he was represented by counsel in the trial court), argues that the judgment is contrary to the evidence presented, and that the trial court failed to address certain issues. His appellant’s opening brief, however, fails to cite to any evidence, and fails to support any of his arguments with citation to the record or legal authority. Therefore, we find that Nazarian has forfeited his arguments, and we affirm the judgment.

Adrian Schabbing appeals from a protective order issued pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (DVPA)). He raises two issues: (1) that an applicant’s burden of proof should be “clear and convincing evidence,” rather than preponderance of the evidence; and (2) he was denied a “fair hearing.” We affirm.