CA Unpub Decisions

Rock Anthony Rowland appeals the trial court’s order committing him for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO; Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.). Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s order. We affirm.

Maurice Lateich Harper (defendant), an adult, gave a sexually-explicit letter to a 12-year-old girl, Leah B. (Leah). Among other things, the letter expressed defendant’s desire to “take [her] under [his] wing to lead [her] to success” and alluded to “a method that can make that ass huge in which most guys like.” Defendant referred to himself as “daddy” and promised that “[b]y the time [she is] 18, [Leah will] be making lots of money.” Defendant challenges his conviction for pandering by procuring a minor under age 16; his claim is that the letter did not expressly encourage Leah to engage in prostitution as opposed to modeling, dancing, or some other non-prostitution activity. We consider whether, under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, any rational jury could find proven the charged pandering by procuring offense.

H.H. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings declaring his son Jordan H. a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and disposition order requiring H.H. to participate in a counseling program. The court found that H.H. and Jordan’s mother, I.S., had a history of “violent altercations” that placed Jordan at risk of serious physical harm and abuse and that I.S.’s mental and emotional problems endangered Jordan’s health and safety. The court placed Jordan with H.H.

The juvenile court sustained allegations that J.L. received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) and declared him a ward of the court (Welf & Inst. Code, § 602). The court placed him home on probation with terms and conditions. J.L. was ordered to report any change in address and complete his GED.
J.L. and his mother met with probation regarding a planned relocation to Colorado. Probation agreed and both J.L. and his mother signed an Interstate Compact agreement. They moved to Colorado. Later, J.L. moved from his listed address to a different location without notifying probation. Probation attempted to contact his mother at the listed telephone number on file but she did not answer and there was no means of leaving a message.

M.D. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), and disposition order removing her 12-year-old daughter, D.B., from her custody. M.D. argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding. We affirm.

The father of a minor girl appeals from a juvenile court’s jurisdictional determination grounded on a finding that the child was at substantial risk of sexual abuse because the father had sexually abused her half sibling. The father contends no substantial evidence supported the finding. We affirm.

Defendant Derrick Bartulio appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty of violating one count of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d), battery with serious bodily injury, and one count of violating section 245, subdivision (a)(4), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. With respect to count 2, the jury found that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Douglas V. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to provide a unanimity instruction. We affirm.

Appellant A.F., a juvenile, was in a car with two men. Police stopped the car and ordered the occupants out. One of the officers then saw a loaded 9mm handgun on top of the center console. The juvenile court denied appellant’s suppression motion. It sustained felony charges of possession of a firearm and live ammunition, and found the gang enhancements true.
Appellant contends that the police lacked probable cause to stop the car, and the statements he subsequently made were taken in violation of Miranda. We affirm the denial of the suppression motion. The claimed Miranda violation was forfeited by appellant’s failure to raise it below. Nonetheless, we conclude that there was no violation.

Nicholas Alspaugh stole items from a drugstore and attacked two citizens who tried to stop him from escaping. A jury convicted him of robbery and battery. Alspaugh argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence that would have supported his claim in connection with the battery conviction that he acted in self-defense. We affirm.

Dr. Mohsen Kheradpezhouh appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fagan E.R. Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Philip J. Fagan, Jr. on Dr. Kheradpezhouh’s claims for breach of written contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Fagan Medical Group and for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence against Fagan Medical Group and Dr. Fagan. On appeal Dr. Kheradpezhouh contends the trial court disregarded triable issues of material fact and committed plain legal error, requiring reversal of the judgment as to all four causes of action. We affirm.

Batsheva Cohen appeals from (1) an order granting Constance Sullivan’s request to renew a restraining order against Cohen, and (2) an order denying Cohen’s request to renew a restraining order against Sullivan. We affirm the orders.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appeals from the order denying its special motion to strike Christopher Goleco’s first amended complaint for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 et seq. (whistleblower retaliation) and for failure to comply with an order of the State Personnel Board (SPB) awarding him back pay and lost employee benefits as a result of his wrongful termination by CDCR. The trial court ruled neither of Goleco’s claims, although related to his underlying lawsuit, arose from protected speech or petitioning activity within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16). We affirm.

In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Javier Pellecer and codefendant Wayne Gray (Gray) were charged with two counts of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 2 & 3). Defendant was also charged with being an accessory after the fact to murder in violation of section 32 (count 4). Codefendants Gray, Jerry Wilson (Wilson), and Leon Panting (Panting) were separately charged with murder in count 1.

This is Donald Ray McCardell’s second appeal following a jury conviction for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). In his first appeal we reversed the judgment and remanded with directions for the trial court to grant a post-verdict motion by McCardell to represent himself and to allow him to file a motion for a new trial. (People v. McCardell (Aug. 24, 2015, B255006) [nonpub. opn.] 2015 WL 5004879.) McCardell filed that motion, arguing that his attorney provided ineffective assistance and that the prosecutor committed misconduct. The trial court denied the motion, and McCardell appealed again. Because the trial court did not err in denying McCardell’s motion for a new trial, we affirm.