CA Unpub Decisions

T.D. was 14 years old when he shot and killed Chaz Bettencourt during an attempted carjacking. (People v. Diaz (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 538 (Diaz); see id. (Mar. 20, 2018, F071348) [nonpub opn.].) He eventually was convicted in adult criminal court and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. (Diaz, at p. 541.) Before his judgment of conviction became final, changes in law with respect to the charging of juveniles in adult criminal court required that the matter be remanded to the juvenile court and the criminal convictions be treated as juvenile adjudications. (Initiative Measure, Prop. 57, § 4.2, approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) eff. Nov. 9, 2016; Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) (Senate Bill No. 1391); see Diaz, at p. 546; see also People v. Superior Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, 368.)

T.D. was 14 years old when he shot and killed Chaz Bettencourt during an attempted carjacking. (People v. Diaz (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 538 (Diaz); see id. (Mar. 20, 2018, F071348) [nonpub opn.].) He eventually was convicted in adult criminal court and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. (Diaz, at p. 541.) Before his judgment of conviction became final, changes in law with respect to the charging of juveniles in adult criminal court required that the matter be remanded to the juvenile court and the criminal convictions be treated as juvenile adjudications. (Initiative Measure, Prop. 57, § 4.2, approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) eff. Nov. 9, 2016; Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1) (Senate Bill No. 1391); see Diaz, at p. 546; see also People v. Superior Court (T.D.) (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 360, 368.)

The Kern County District Attorney filed an information on February 24, 2021, charging defendant with criminal threats, a felony (Pen. Code, § 422; count 1) and possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to commit an assault, a misdemeanor (§ 17500; count 2). On May 12, 2021, after a two-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty on both counts. On June 8, 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reduce count 1 to a misdemeanor under section 17. The trial court then proceeded to suspend imposition of sentence on count 1, placed defendant on two years of probation, and ordered defendant to serve one year in jail as a condition of probation. As to count 2, the trial court imposed a 180-day jail term to be served concurrently with the jail term on count 1. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 9, 2021.

On March 26, 2020, two officers were escorting defendant between sites at Corcoran State Prison. Defendant was handcuffed behind his back and was being led by the two officers. Almost immediately, defendant slipped out of one officer’s grip, then lowered his shoulder and forcefully struck the shoulder and chest of the other officer, slamming him against a wall repeatedly. The two officers eventually managed to force defendant face down to the ground. One of the officers suffered an injury to his hand that required two surgeries. The other officer’s back was hurt in the struggle. Both officers required extensive time off work because of their injuries.
On September 28, 2020, the Kings County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with battery by a prisoner upon a nonconfined person (Pen. Code, § 4501.5; count 1) and resisting arrest (§ 69; count 2).

Defendant Conrad Wood was convicted of five offenses surrounding the kidnapping of and domestic violence toward Jane Doe. He was sentenced to a total term of 12 years’ imprisonment, including an upper term on count 1, and he was ordered to pay restitution and various fines and assessments. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in imposing restitution, fines, and assessments without assessing his ability to pay, (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to imposition of restitution, fines, and assessments on appropriate grounds, (3) his sentence must be vacated and his case remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567’s (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b); and (4) his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for the trial court to exercise the discretion newly granted as a result of Assembly Bill No. 518’s (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)

Defendant sexually molested the minor victim for many years until he divulged the molestation to a school counselor; defendant was arrested.
On August 28, 2018, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with a lewd and lascivious act upon the victim when he was under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a); count 1), a lewd and lascivious act upon the victim when he was 14 or 15 years old and defendant was at least 10 years older than he (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 2), and sodomy with the victim when he was under the age of 18 years (§ 286, subd. (b)(1); count 3).
On July 15, 2020, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts.
On August 12, 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of eight years on count 1, plus a consecutive eight-month term on count 2 and a concurrent eight-month term on count 3, for a total of eight years eight months in prison.
The same day, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

This factual summary will focus on those facts necessary to resolve the issues defendant raises in this appeal. On August 3, 2019, a neighbor of defendant’s called 911 to report she heard people shouting in a nearby apartment. Responding to that phone call, Officer Meng Xiong encountered K.H. At trial, Xiong testified K.H. appeared distraught, and that her left eye was swollen shut, she had dried blood on her nose and there was a large handprint on her right cheek. In a video recording of the conversation at the scene, K.H. told Xiong that she and her boyfriend, who she identified as defendant, had argued. K.H. stated to Xiong there “was a lot of yelling going on and I ended up on the floor.” K.H. told Xiong that defendant may have punched her in the face as well as tackled her during the argument.
Officer Jose Ruiz also responded to the 911 call, and also recorded his conversation with K.H.

This case arose from the sale of a complex containing a gas station, carwash, mini mart, and taqueria through nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. The borrowers brought this action against the buyers of the property, asserting that the equipment associated with the property was personal property and did not pass to the buyers in the foreclosure sale.
The borrowers litigated the case for years on theories aimed at recovering personal property. The matter proceeded to bench trial five years after the inception of the case. During trial, the borrowers sought to add causes of action aimed at invalidating the transfer of title to the real property in the foreclosure sale. The trial court denied the borrowers’ request to add wrongful foreclosure and quiet-title-to-real-property claims to the operative complaint. The grounds for denial were unreasonable delay and the fact that discovery was conducted in relation to disputed personal property interests only.

This case arose from the sale of a complex containing a gas station, carwash, mini mart, and taqueria through nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. The borrowers brought this action against the buyers of the property, asserting that the equipment associated with the property was personal property and did not pass to the buyers in the foreclosure sale.
The borrowers litigated the case for years on theories aimed at recovering personal property. The matter proceeded to bench trial five years after the inception of the case. During trial, the borrowers sought to add causes of action aimed at invalidating the transfer of title to the real property in the foreclosure sale. The trial court denied the borrowers’ request to add wrongful foreclosure and quiet-title-to-real-property claims to the operative complaint. The grounds for denial were unreasonable delay and the fact that discovery was conducted in relation to disputed personal property interests only.

A jury found defendant and appellant Sergio Marquez guilty of first degree premediated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 1); discharging a firearm at an inhabited and occupied dwelling (§ 246; count 2); assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3); corporal injury on a former spouse (§§ 273.5, subd. (a), 243, subd. (f)(10); count 4). The jury found true that defendant personally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury in the commission of counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of count 3 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); and that defendant caused great bodily injury in the commission of count 4 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

Originally charged with first degree murder, defendant ultimately pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192), admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (b), 667, subds. (a) & (d)), and admitted that he was a principal who was armed during the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)). The parties agreed that the preliminary hearing served as the factual basis for the plea. In accordance with the plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to an 18-year state prison term.
While defendant was serving his 18-year prison term, he filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, finding defendant had not established a prima facie case for resentencing, as he was not convicted of murder, but manslaughter, and based on defendant’s conduct set forth in the preliminary hearing, he was either the killer or a major participant in the killing.

On July 17, 2020, the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the two-year-old minor alleging he came under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court through section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c).
The petition alleged an episode of domestic violence two days prior when mother blocked father from leaving their home and grabbed his hair. Father responded by hitting mother in the head, leaving a cut. He also pulled mother out of the car causing cuts and abrasions to her arms and shoulder. As a result, father was arrested. Mother and father did all this in front of the minor. Mother stated she “blacked out” during the altercation and did not remember what happened.
The petition alleged the home (which was a camper) was hot, filthy, and filled with hazards for a small child.

In February 2012, defendant entered a no contest plea, stipulating to a 30-year sentence consisting of five years for carjacking, doubled under the three strikes law, and a total of 20 years for four prior serious felony convictions—battery with serious bodily injury in 1989, making terrorist threats in 1994, second degree robbery in 1995, and second degree robbery with personal use of a firearm in 1998—pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). (Statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.)
In January 2021, the Secretary of the CDCR (Secretary) sent a letter to the trial court recommending recall and resentencing of defendant pursuant to the former version of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (former section 1170(d)(1)), which authorized a court, at any time after receiving a recommendation from the CDCR, to recall an inmate’s sentence and resentence that inmate to a lesser sentence.

Decedent died testate on May 20, 2019, in Placer County, and Downs is serving as the administrator of her estate. Decedent owned a house in Lincoln, located at 682 Courtyards Loop (hereafter “the property”). The property was appraised at $372,000 at the date of death. According to Downs, the estate has additional assets valued at approximately $69,172.
The estate has two secured creditors. The first is Wells Fargo. Decedent purchased the property by taking out a mortgage secured by a deed of trust encumbering the property, and Wells Fargo is the current beneficiary of the deed of trust. The loan is in default, and a notice of default was recorded on December 18, 2019. As of June 2020, the total amount due on the loan was approximately $338,000. Decedent also owes Matadors approximately $29,000, secured by solar panels and related equipment affixed to the property. There is also a $40,059 federal tax claim against the estate.