CA Unpub Decisions

Gerald Montgomery filed suit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the County of Los Angeles, multiple County departments, and several Wal-Mart and County employees. In 2012 the action was dismissed as to the County, and that judgment was affirmed by this court in 2014. Wal-Mart was dismissed from the action in 2014. In 2016, Montgomery attempted to reopen the case, obtain default judgments, and obtain sanctions against Wal-Mart and its counsel. Montgomery appeals the court’s rulings denying his requested relief and has also moved for sanctions against Wal-Mart and its counsel in this court. We conclude that many of the orders challenged on appeal are not appealable and find no error in those that are appealable. We also deny Montgomery’s motions for sanctions and his other requests for relief.

After a hospital released him from an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold, Robert Markman petitioned for legal restoration of the gun rights he lost as a result of the hold. Markman appeals after the trial court denied his petition. We affirm.

Defendant James L. Pledger appeals from an order denying his petition under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126), for recall of his sentence imposed for conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon. Pledger contends a defendant is ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 for being “armed with a firearm” during the commission of an offense only if the arming is tethered to an offense other than possession of a firearm by a felon. He also contends a defendant is disqualified from resentencing only where there is a “facilitative nexus” between his possession of a firearm and the underlying offense. Finally, Pledger contends the superior court erred in requiring the prosecutor to prove Pledger’s ineligibility for resentencing under Proposition 36 by a preponderance of the evidence, instead of beyond a reasonable doubt.

A jury convicted Debra Carr of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). Carr contends the trial court erred by failing to give an instruction sua sponte on the relationship between a citizen’s arrest and self-defense and by giving an instruction on contrived self-defense. We affirm.

Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy and United Food and Commercial Workers Local 770 (collectively, the Alliance) argue a municipal zoning ordinance that applies to projects that “create or add” 100,000 square feet of floor space also applies to projects that “transform” that space. A zoning administrator in the Los Angeles Department of City Planning rejected this argument and renewed a conditional use beverage permit issued to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for a store located on South Normandie Avenue. The zoning administrator determined the Normandie store, which already exceeded 100,000 square feet when the City of Los Angeles approved its “Superstore Ordinance,” did not become a “Superstore” when Walmart remodeled the store’s interior without “creating or adding” 100,000 square feet of floor area.

Spouses Paresh Vora and Neeta Paresh Vora appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of their action against Bank of America following a demurrer that was sustained without leave to amend. We affirm the judgment.

Annette Lashay Thomas appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after a jury found her guilty of robbery, carjacking and kidnapping to commit robbery, contending the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence, her counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to those comments and the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct on simple kidnapping as a lesser included offense of kidnapping to commit robbery and instructing on flight as evidence of a consciousness of guilt. She also argues the court erred in separately sentencing her for both carjacking and kidnapping to commit robbery. We modify the judgment to correct a sentencing error and, as modified, affirm.

In this juvenile writ proceeding, Michael M. (father) seeks extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order declining to provide him with reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing with respect to his young daughter, Z.M. (born August 2017). Specifically, father argues that the juvenile court erred in denying him reunification services pursuant to subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(13) of section 361.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and failed to make any explicit findings with respect to subdivision (b)(16) bypass. Father also avers that offering reunification services to him would have been in the minor’s best interests. Although father correctly highlights numerous procedural errors in the juvenile court’s bypass determinations, we conclude that the court’s underlying decision in this case to forgo reunification efforts with father was amply supported by the evidence. We therefore deny the petition.

Acting in propria persona, Paul Hamilton filed the underlying action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against S. Arana, a correctional officer at the prison where Hamilton is an inmate. During pretrial proceedings, the superior court declared Hamilton to be a vexatious litigant under California’s vexatious litigant statute, Code of Civil Procedure, section 391 et seq., and ordered him to post security before proceeding with his case against Arana. Hamilton did not post security, but he did file a notice of appeal from the court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant. Thereafter, the court dismissed Hamilton’s complaint with prejudice and entered judgment in favor of Arana.

Appellant Thomas Alemu, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandate filed by his parents, which sought to overturn a decision by the Oakland Housing Authority (Authority) to terminate his housing voucher. Because Alemu has failed to offer any cogent legal arguments for why the court’s ruling was incorrect, we must affirm.

Appellants Delia Chiquette and Angel A. Aguilar seek review of an order denying their contest of a trust executed by their mother approximately three years before her death. The superior court ruled that appellants’ contest was time-barred because it was brought beyond the 120-day period allowed under Probate Code section 16061.8 following the notification sent to them under section 16061.7. Lacking an adequate record that demonstrates error, we must affirm the order.

After a jury trial, defendant Alonso Ruiz was found guilty of making criminal threats and actively participating in a criminal street gang. On appeal, he contends that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by admitting testimonial hearsay statements offered by the prosecution’s gang expert, contrary to People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). We agree that error occurred, but it was not prejudicial. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

Hamlet included “the law’s delay” on his list of life’s burdens. The freeway accident underlying this lawsuit occurred over 10 years ago, and the parties to this appeal, Mayra Alvarado, her son, and the California Highway Patrol, are still disputing whether the CHP bears some responsibility for it. Nor is it likely that this is the end. This case may well be put once more before the California Supreme Court, as it was in 2013.

Petitioner Patricia S. (mother) in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s order terminating her reunification services following a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) in June 2018 and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her now 14-year-old daughter, Nadia. Mother asserts she is challenging “all allegations.” However, she fails to identify any grounds for juvenile court error. Consequently, we conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452 and dismiss the petition.