CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Joseph Scott Stone asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

K.M. (father) appeals from an order denying a petition for modification of existing orders in juvenile dependency proceedings concerning his son, Ke. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant T.B. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughter, A.W. (child). She contends that the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights, codified at Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.

T.G. (Mother) is the mother of seven children currently ranging in age from three to 16 years old. The children were removed from Mother’s care due to Mother’s mental health and substance abuse issues, domestic violence in the home, and general neglect of the children. Following a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petitions true and removed the children from Mother’s care. On appeal, Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, and dispositional findings removing the children from her care. We reject Mother’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Bankers Insurance Co. (Bankers) appeals after the forfeiture of two bonds pursuant to Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306 for Charlene Antonett Jefferson’s failure to appear on two separate criminal cases: Riverside County Superior Court case Nos. RIF1500196 (Case I) and SWF018295 (Case II).
Jefferson failed to appear on both cases and the court declared a forfeiture on the two bonds. Bankers filed timely motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail (Motions to Vacate). The People of the State of California (the State) filed opposition. While the Motions to Vacate were pending, the court entered summary judgment on the bonds in Cases I and II. Thereafter, the Motions to Vacate were heard but no party provided evidence that summary judgments on both cases had already been entered. The Motions to Vacate were denied.

This matter relates to a proposed development in the Highland Hills area of the City of San Bernardino that has been pending in various permutations for decades. Plaintiffs and appellants The Inland Oversight Committee (IOC), CREED-21, and Highland Hills Homeowners Association (HOA) filed the present lawsuit in 2015, contending that proposed changes to the project violate the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code § 21000 et seq. (CEQA), and certain provisions of the Water Code. Real party in interest and respondent First American Title Insurance Company (First American) is the developer that proposed the changes at issue. Defendant and respondent City of San Bernardino (the City) approved the changes under an expedited procedure for minor modifications.

Shahrokh Mireskandari sued Joseph Scoma, M.D., for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), and wrongful disclosure of medical information by a provider (Civ. Code, § 56.10 et seq.), based on the medical advice and opinions Scoma provided to a disciplinary tribunal in London, England, as part of the tribunal's formal proceedings involving Mireskandari. The trial court granted Scoma's special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16), after ruling both that Mireskandari's causes of action arose from Scoma's constitutional right of petition in connection with a public issue and that Mireskandari did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claims.

Following a jury trial, defendant Lionel David Carpenter was convicted of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)), inflicting corporal injury on his ex-girlfriend (§ 273.5), and criminal threats (§ 422). The trial court sustained two strike allegations (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12) and sentenced defendant to 50 years to life plus 4 years.

Defendant Manuel Alejandro Guzman sexually abused his girlfriend’s 11-year-old daughter. A jury found him guilty of two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child who is under the age of 14 years. With respect to one of the counts, the jury also found defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the child. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 10 years in state prison for these crimes, plus a consecutive eight-month term for an unrelated DUI conviction in another case.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion and violated his federal constitutional rights by admitting evidence of three uncharged offenses committed against defendant’s former girlfriend; (2) the trial court also erred and violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1191A regarding the proper use of such evidence; and (3) the cumulative prejudicial effect of these assertions of error re

Defendant Kao Lai Saephan, a convicted felon, unlawfully possessed a shotgun and shotgun ammunition, and he did so for the benefit of a street gang. He contends we must reverse his convictions and enhancements because (1) the trial court erroneously admitted his prior admission of gang membership that was obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); (2) insufficient evidence, including testimonial hearsay, support the jury’s gang enhancement findings; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct unlawfully shifted the burden of proof. He also asserts sentencing error.
Except to correct an unauthorized sentence, we affirm the judgment.

For each conviction of enumerated drug offenses, Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 imposes on defendants a criminal laboratory analysis fee not to exceed $50, and section 11372.7 imposes a drug program fee not to exceed $150. This appeal presents the issue of whether these fees are subject to additional penalty assessments under Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000. The trial court added penalty assessments to the criminal laboratory analysis fee imposed on defendant Zack Uriah Moore III, after his conviction of section 11550, subdivision (a), for being under the influence of a controlled substance. In a published decision, the Appellate Division of the Nevada County Superior Court concluded neither section 11372.5 nor 11372.7 was subject to penalty assessments. (People v. Moore (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10 (Moore).)

J.B. (father) seeks extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s order bypassing family reunification services for his minor children Ali.B. and Ale.B. and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13), 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452, 8.456.) Father contends that the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings were fatally undermined by its consideration of prejudicial inadmissible evidence. We deny the petition.

Defendant Donnell Lamont Shell was charged with 17 counts in relation to events occurring between December 8 and 9, 2016. It was also alleged that he suffered a prior strike conviction, and that some of the offenses involved the infliction of great bodily injuries. Defendant pled no contest to one count of injuring his cohabitant, one count of abusing a child, and one count of hit and run driving resulting in property damage, and he admitted a prior strike. In exchange, the prosecutor dismissed 14 counts and agreed to an aggregate term of seven years in prison. The court imposed the agreed upon sentence of seven years, consisting of the low term of two years for injuring a cohabitant, doubled due to the strike, plus three years for the great bodily injury (GBI) enhancement. The court imposed concurrent sentences for the child abuse and hit and run counts.

The question before us concerns exit orders issued by the juvenile court when terminating its jurisdiction over four-year-old Ava.
The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) detained appellant Danielle C.’s (Mother) two children after an incident on April 30, 2016 between Mother and her 17-year-old son, Christopher, involving a shotgun in the family home. On April 17, 2017, the juvenile court took jurisdiction over Christopher and Ava, on the grounds that the environment of Mother’s home endangered the children and Mother demonstrated a limited ability to provide appropriate parental care. The juvenile court then terminated jurisdiction as to Ava and granted sole physical custody of Ava to her father, Joshua Z. (Father). In terminating jurisdiction over Ava, the juvenile court issued exit orders to the family law court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4.