CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Steven Anthony Yslas appeals from a trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Health & Safety Code section 11361.8 (Proposition 64). We affirm.

M.N. (Mother) is the mother of 11-year-old S.N., six-year-old G.N., and three-year-old E.D. The children were removed from Mother’s care due to physical abuse by Mother, domestic violence in the presence of the children, and the sexual abuse of S.N. and G.N. by Mother’s boyfriend and E.D.’s father (M.D.). Following a contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j). The court also removed the children from Mother’s care. Regarding S.N. and G.N., the court placed the children with their father C.N. (Father), the nonoffending, noncustodial parent, and dismissed the dependency as to them. The court also changed physical custody of S.N. and G.N. to Father pursuant to section 361.2.

Gary Valbuena (Valbuena) as Trustee of the Jimmie and Angela Valbuena Private Revocable Living Trust (the Trust) sued (1) Ocwen Loan servicing, LLC (Ocwen) ; (2) the Law Offices of Les Zieve, a professional corporation (Zieve); (3) Homeward Residential, Inc. (Homeward); (4) Karen Smith (Smith); (5) Vicki Pospisil (Pospisil); and (6) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase). Valbuena brought causes of action for (A) violating the Homeowner Bill of Rights; (B) aiding and abetting; (C) slander of title; (D) declaratory relief; and (E) injunctive relief. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. Valbuena contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrers. We affirm the judgment.

In an interpleader action, cross-defendant and appellant, Angela Kennedy, appeals from the judgment entered against her and in favor of cross-complainant and respondent, Law Offices of Marc E. Grossman (Grossman). Kennedy contends the trial court erred in striking her answer to Grossman’s cross-complaint and entering default and default judgment against her. Kennedy also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to vacate the order on September 2, 2016, entering the default judgment awarding Grossman $21,034.30 plus interest. We reject Kennedy’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jason Holland repeatedly molested his daughter (Doe) for several years until she finally told her mother about the abuse at age 16. On appeal, he argues we must reverse his three convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child, committed when Doe was 12 and 13 years old, because there was insufficient evidence he “used force or duress to accomplish the penetrations.” We conclude the record contains sufficient evidence of both force and duress, and affirm the challenged convictions.

A jury found Jada Christai Maddox guilty of one count of assault with a deadly weapon and found true the corresponding allegation that she personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. The trial court placed Maddox on formal probation for a period of three years.

Barry Robbins (Barry) and his former wife, Melissa Robbins (Melissa), executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into a judgment. The MSA contained a paragraph pertaining to spousal support that stated in relevant part, "It is the express intent of the parties that spousal support and the Court's jurisdiction to award spousal support shall terminate in all events on 9/1/16." The spousal support paragraph also provided that, upon the effective date of the MSA, the trial court would "be immediately and forever divested of jurisdiction to extend jurisdiction for spousal support."

Defendant Jorge Luis Cachu was convicted by a jury of one count of dissuading a witness by force or threat (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) and one count of felony vandalism (§ 594). The jury found true the allegations that defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life in prison for the dissuasion conviction pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(C), which applies when a gang allegation is found true and a defendant is convicted of “threats to victims and witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1.” (Ibid.)

Defendant Michael Sayer appeals from an order denying his special motion to strike Wang Shiu Hsia Huang and Tuu Cherng Hwang’s (together, Plaintiffs) complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). Sayer, who is an attorney, asserts the court erred in denying his motion because Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on his protected activities of advising and instructing a client. He also contends Plaintiffs’ conspiracy cause of action is moot. We affirm the order.

In 2010, after a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment against Hrayr Shahinian and his corporations, Skull Base Institute and Skull Base Medical Group, Inc. (collectively, respondents), on George Ralli’s claims for medical malpractice, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court awarded compensatory and punitive damages. We affirmed in an unpublished decision. (Ralli v. Skull Base Institute (Feb. 28, 2012, B225675) [nonpub. opn.].)

Defendant-siblings Destiny, Donald, and Daven Trotter appeal their convictions for attempted burglary. Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their Romero motions. Destiny and Donald assert that the trial court violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in sentencing them to 40 and 35 years, respectively. Daven argues his 9-year sentence should be reversed because the trial court improperly admitted prior bad act evidence regarding a similar attempted burglary. Destiny and Donald also assert that the abstracts of judgment should be amended to reflect 154 days of presentence conduct credit. We agree the trial court erred in calculating Destiny’s and Donald’s presentence credit and direct the superior court to modify the abstracts of judgment so that each receives 154 days total presentence conduct credit. We affirm on all other grounds.

Gershon Randolph (defendant) challenges one of his two convictions for second degree robbery. Specifically, he argues that the evidence did not show any use of “force” or “fear” in the robbery he challenges. We reject his claim that the evidence of force or fear was so weak that no rational jury could convict him of robbery but agree with him that this is such a close case that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included crime of grand theft from a person. We accordingly reverse and remand his conviction for this robbery, but otherwise affirm.

Defendant Janice Harvey appeals her conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant contends that (1) her fair trial rights were violated when the court inadvertently provided and then quickly retrieved two instructions and a verdict form on the bifurcated prior convictions proceeding, (2) her due process rights were violated when the court instructed the jury on flight, (3) insufficient evidence supported the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements for prior convictions, (4) her right to trial by jury for the enhancements was violated, and (5) she lacked sufficient notice of the enhancement allegations. We reverse two of the enhancements, remanding only one for retrial. We affirm on all other grounds.

Plaintiffs Chang Kok Ahn, Jeong Kang, Brando Jeong, and Olive Rhee (plaintiffs) filed a complaint alleging wage and hour, employment discrimination, and related claims against their alleged employers Hollywood Enterprises, Inc. (Hollywood Enterprises) and Mina Lim. They later added Song Hwan Hong, Edward Koo, and appellant Alex Cha as DOE defendants. Cha was an attorney representing defendants Hollywood Enterprises, Lim, and Hong in this case, and plaintiffs added him on the theory that he had also been acting as their employer or a joint employer. They did not otherwise amend their factual allegations or claims.
Cha moved to strike the claims against him pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied the motion because the claims against Cha did not arise from any protected activity Cha undertook in his role as an attorney related to this or any other proceeding. We agree and affirm.