CA Unpub Decisions

After sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the court entered an order dismissing with prejudice plaintiff Faye Myrette-Crosley’s complaint for damages arising out of the threatened foreclosure of her home mortgage by defendants OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest) and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. (Ocwen). On appeal, plaintiff asserts numerous procedural grounds for reversal, but fails to adequately assert any argument addressing the merits of the demurrer or the sufficiency of her proposed amended complaint to cure those defects. We find no merit in plaintiff’s procedural arguments and, particularly since this is plaintiff’s fourth lawsuit against these defendants involving the mortgage, we find no error in the court’s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

Appellant, Jerit Devon Aaron, was charged with, among other things, robbery, sexual assault, attempted first degree burglary, first degree burglary, and two counts of dissuading a witness. The cases were consolidated, and Aaron was convicted of all the charges. He argues that the crimes were of a different class and that the consolidation denied him a fair trial. Aaron also moved for acquittal on the first degree burglary and attempted first degree burglary charges, and both counts of dissuading a witness. He contends it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for acquittal. For the reasons stated below, we find that consolidation of the cases was proper, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and sufficient evidence supported Aaron’s convictions for first degree burglary, attempted first degree burglary, and the two counts of dissuading a witness.

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 28, 2018, be modified as follows:
On page 2, first paragraph, after the sentence beginning with “We will further include information about . . . ,” add the sentence: And we discuss defendant’s “contentions and the reasons that they fail . . . .” (Id. at p. 120.)
On page 3, first paragraph, after the sentence beginning with “Following a pause in the proceedings . . . ,” add the sentence: Defendant answered affirmatively when the trial court asked him whether he understood his rights on a probation violation and whether he was giving up each of those rights.
On page 4, second full paragraph, replace “108 days of actual credits and 208 days of conduct credits” with: “108 days of actual credits and 108 days of conduct credits . . . .”

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of multiple lewd or lascivious acts (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). He argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of 15 years to life on both counts 3 and 4, that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by repeatedly misstating the standard of proof, and that defense counsel provided ineffective counsel by failing to object to that improper argument. Defendant asserts that if this court rejects his other arguments, he must be resentenced to a determinate term on count 4.

Linda Hong sued Jin Ha for unpaid rent on a space that Ha had used to sell vitamins and other products at Hong’s Fullerton spa. Hong also sued Ha for her alleged part in a conspiracy to divert funds owed Hong from a Korean land investment. Ha then sued Hong for money due on dishonored checks – and that was all she sued for. Her complaint contained no other causes of action and no claim Hong owed any money on a loan agreement. After a trial to the court, the judge rejected both of Hong’s claims against Ha, but awarded Ha $33,000 against Hong, ruling that her complaint really stated a claim for breach of an oral loan agreement. He calculated $33,000 was the amount due on that agreement. Hong challenges all three determinations on appeal.

In July 2015, Jin Ha filed a claim with the California Labor Commissioner against Linda Hong for unpaid wages. The matter was heard by the commissioner on November 1, 2016, and a written order awarding Ha $129,147.08 was entered against Hong on December 14, 2016.
Hong filed a written appeal of the commissioner’s order on December 21, 2016, pursuant to Labor Code section 98.2. But she did not post a bond with her appeal. An appeal of a commissioner’s order goes to the superior court for hearing de novo (§ 98.2, subd. (a)), and Hong’s hearing was set for March 16, 2017.

Maria Flanders (wife) appeals from a family court judgment after trial. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the res judicata effect of a prior order and imputing income to her. We determine the trial court acted within its discretion in imputing income to wife, but conclude the court’s earning capacity figures were not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on the issue.

The Waterfront Community Association (the Association) appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment after granting summary judgment based on the statute of limitations in favor of PLC Waterfront LLC and Christopher Homes, Inc. (collectively, defendants) on the Association’s construction defect claims under the Right to Repair Act (hereafter sometimes the “RRA” or the “Act”). (Civ. Code, § 895 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted.) As we explain, the Association’s bid for categorical tolling of the Act’s 10-year statute of limitations during a builder or developer’s initial control of a community association is without merit, and we therefore affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jimmy Leon Jeff appeals from his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)).

Appellant Ruben Castillo argues only that his conviction for receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), based upon his possession of the items stolen during a burglary for which he was convicted (§§ 459 & 460), must be reversed. The People concede and we agree. We reverse the conviction for receiving stolen property, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Jeremy Dantwan Allen, of corporal injury to a person with whom he was in a dating relationship (count 1; Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), simple battery (count 2; § 242), and forcible rape (count 3; § 261, subd. (a)). Defendant later admitted suffering a prior conviction for cohabitant abuse. (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of nine years four months.

Appellant F.D. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to her daughter, N.D. (the child). Mother contends the court’s finding that reasonable services were provided should be reversed because the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) did not comply with the court’s order to facilitate conjoint counseling. She requests that the matter be remanded for the court to ensure that DPSS complies with the order for conjoint counseling. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant John Howard Wilkerson fled officers in his vehicle as they attempted to stop him for running a stop sign and a high-speed chase ensued through residential areas. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of evading a peace officer with wanton and willful disregard for the safety of persons and property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 5). In a bifurcated proceeding, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant admitted that he had suffered one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). In return, the remaining prior conviction allegations were dismissed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Somporn Guy pled guilty to one count of cultivating marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, count 1.) In exchange, a trial court dismissed a possession of marijuana for sale charge (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, count 2) and granted defendant 36 months of probation, under specified conditions. Subsequently, the court reduced count 1 to a misdemeanor under Proposition 64. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.8, subd. (b).) On January 1, 2017, Penal Code section 1473.7 went into effect. It permits a defendant to challenge a conviction based on a guilty plea where prejudicial error affected the defendant’s ability to understand the immigration consequences of the plea. (§ 1473.7.) Defendant filed a motion to vacate her conviction under section 1473.7. The court denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion by denying her motion under section 1473.7. We affirm.