CA Unpub Decisions

L.S. appeals from the order of the trial court denying her motion to set aside the civil harassment restraining order issued against her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) She contends she satisfied the prerequisites under the attorney fault provision of section 473, subdivision (b) mandating relief. We agree and reverse.

Pete Allen, a former detective with the Burbank Police Department (the Department), appeals from a judgment denying his petition for administrative mandamus. The City of Burbank (the City) discharged Allen for misleading investigators about his knowledge of a suspected unlawful use of force by another officer. Allen filed a writ petition seeking reinstatement, arguing his misleading statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of his rights under Government Code section 3300 et seq., the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA or the Act). Specifically, Allen asserted the Department interfered with his rights under POBRA by telling him the Act did not apply before interrogating him on matters that could lead to punitive employment action, such as discipline for failing to report another officer’s misconduct.

This family law proceeding began 10 years ago when appellant Nina H. filed a petition against respondent Marcus M. to establish his parental relationship over their son. The parties agreed to custody and visitation, but disputed the amount of child support. The issue of child support was tried more than five years later on December 19, 2013. The trial court announced its findings at the end of the trial that day and ordered respondent to pay appellant child support arrearages from October 2011 through December 2013 and prospective child support beginning January 2014, and to pay appellant’s attorney $15,000 in attorney fees as a sanction. The trial court ordered appellant to submit a judgment within 90 days, but made its orders effective immediately. Less than three months later, respondent filed a “request for order” to modify the amounts of child support and attorney fees the trial court had ordered on the ground the orders were based on an incorrect calculation of his inc

The underlying action began in September 2012 when Shagen Galstanyan and others sued respondent Robert Khodagulyan, appellants Saeid “Steve” Aminpour and Gadi “Kevin” Emein, Freydoon “Freddy” Esmaili (Esmaili), and related entities concerning the alleged fraudulent transfer of a car wash appellants had owned and sold to Esmaili. In April 2013, respondent Khodagulyan filed a cross-complaint against appellants Aminpour and Emein, as well as Esmaili, FAFB, Inc. (FAFB), and Glendale Colorado Investment, Inc. (collectively, cross-defendants) to recover $480,000 Khodagulyan had loaned to appellants. Esmaili and FAFB had assumed that loan, secured by a deed of trust on the car wash they bought from appellants.

The underlying action began in September 2012 when Shagen Galstanyan and others sued respondent Robert Khodagulyan, appellants Saeid “Steve” Aminpour and Gadi “Kevin” Emein, Freydoon “Freddy” Esmaili (Esmaili), and related entities concerning the alleged fraudulent transfer of a car wash appellants had owned and sold to Esmaili. In April 2013, respondent Khodagulyan filed a cross-complaint against appellants Aminpour and Emein, as well as Esmaili, FAFB, Inc. (FAFB), and Glendale Colorado Investment, Inc. (collectively, cross-defendants) to recover $480,000 Khodagulyan had loaned to appellants. Esmaili and FAFB had assumed that loan, secured by a deed of trust on the car wash they bought from appellants.

Defendant Tamaria Dawayne Lacy was convicted of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a relationship partner and sentenced to nine years in prison. Lacy contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike a prior serious felony conviction, brought pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.

Manuel Alejandro Hernandez petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus asking that we vacate the trial court’s order that he serve an additional 14 days of incarceration for violating his probation. We consider Hernandez’s petition as a petition for writ of mandate, and issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to vacate its order imposing an additional 14 days of incarceration, and to issue a new and different order after exercising its discretion.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted respondent H.C.’s application for a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, appellant C.C., under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). The restraining order, which is for a period of three years, also protects the parties’ minor child, who was 12 years old at the time of the hearing. The court also awarded legal and physical custody of the child to respondent with supervised visitation by appellant.

Defendant Anthony Bouchereau appeals after a jury convicted him of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)) and hit and run resulting in death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)). The jury found true an allegation that defendant fled the scene of the crime (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)), and the trial court found true an allegation that defendant had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years in prison: a six-year term for the gross vehicular manslaughter conviction, a five-year term for the flight allegation, and a one-year term for the prior prison term allegation.

Defendant Willie David Menchaca appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw his no contest plea to the charge of committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision and will therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Scott Charles Sturk appeals after a jury found him guilty of two counts of aggravated kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)), four counts of forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of spousal rape by force (§ 262, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)), forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)), attempted lewd conduct on a minor (§§ 664/288, subd. (a)), and communicating with a minor with the intent to commit a sex offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a)). The jury also found regarding seven of the forcible sex offenses that defendant kidnapped the victim to commit a felony sex offense. (§ 667.8, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to serve two consecutive life terms plus a consecutive determinate term of 43 years in prison.

Louisa M. appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to each of her three daughters, P.A., age two, R.A., age three, and J.M., age seven. We affirm those orders because the juvenile court was well within its discretion, particularly in light of Louisa’s poor visitation record, in determining the “benefit exception” of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply.

Joshua R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s March 6, 2018 dispositional judgment removing his son Jackson (born May 2013) from his physical custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (d); all statutory references are to this code.) He contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s finding at the disposition hearing he posed a substantial danger to Jackson’s physical or emotional well-being if the court returned Jackson to father. We agree with father’s contention and therefore reverse the court’s dispositional orders.

In February 2017, defendant Tin Quoc Phan pleaded guilty to identify theft with a prior identify theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(2)) and acquiring access to credit card account information (§ 484e, subd. (d)). Defendant also admitted two prison prior allegations. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Consistent with the stipulated sentence in the parties’ plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to five years in county jail, with execution of sentence suspended pending the successful completion of five years of formal probation.