CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Jason Kane and Christopher Simrak (collectively, plaintiffs) sued their former employer respondent Schear, Inc. (Schear), alleging various employment-related causes of action. Following trial, a jury rendered special verdicts in plaintiffs’ favor on most of their claims. Over plaintiffs’ objections, the trial court entered Schear’s proposed judgment as the final judgment and denied their motion to set aside and vacate the judgment, and enter an amended judgment consistent with the jury’s special verdicts. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with plaintiffs the judgment was not supported by the jury’s special verdicts or the uncontroverted facts. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

After the court denied his motion to suppress evidence, minor G.O. admitted he violated Health and Safety Code section 11364, subdivision (a), by possessing a pipe used for smoking a controlled substance. The juvenile court placed him on nonward probation for six months. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a).) Minor contends the court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the discovery of the pipe was the result of an unlawful detention. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Gabriel Williams Aldave of possessing methamphetamine for purposes of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), false personation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3))—both felonies, possession of heroin (§ 11350, subd. (a)), and narcotics paraphernalia (§ 11364, subd. (a))—both misdemeanors. In a bench trial, the court found true three separate enhancement allegations regarding prior narcotics convictions (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)); one in 2013, and two in 2015). In addition, the trial court found true two prior prison commitment enhancement allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Finally, as to the methamphetamine possession for sale conviction, and because of his prior narcotics convictions, the trial court found defendant ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(11)).

A jury convicted defendant Nga Thuy Tran of four counts of pimping (deriving income from the prostitution of Jane Does One through Four), and one count of pandering (procuring Jane Doe Four for the purpose of prostitution). The trial court imposed a prison sentence of five years and four months.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in two evidentiary rulings (the exclusion and admission of evidence). Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to timely disclose exculpatory evidence.
We find no prejudicial errors and affirm the judgment.

Reunification services for appellant Brandon F. (father) were terminated. After termination of reunification services to father, the juvenile court granted a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and allowed father’s minor son, B.F. (minor), to be placed with maternal relatives living out of state. Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant F.B. is the mother of E.O, a special needs minor. After E.O.’s two and one-half year old sibling, G.O., drowned in an apartment pool, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of E.O. Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to uphold the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (f), and the juvenile court erred in removing the child from her custody pursuant to section 361. We affirm.

In an amended information filed February 21, 2017, defendant was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 2), sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 3), possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 4), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 6). The amended information alleged a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) to count 1; a prior conviction for a controlled substance related crime (see Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)) as to counts 3 and 4; enhancements for committing counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, while on bail or on own recognizance (§ 12022.1); two prior strike convictions and two serious felony convictions.

Appellant Stephen Ernest Proper was convicted of count I, fleeing a pursuing officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3; count II, evading an officer against traffic in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.4; count III, transportation of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a); count IV, possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 11379, subdivision (a); count V, transportation for sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 11351; count VI, possession for sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 11378; and count VII, possession of injection/ingestion device in violation of section 11364, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted a prior conviction for violating section 11378, and was subject to an enhancement pursuant to section 11370.2, subdivision (a), and Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).

In this matter we have reviewed and considered the petition and the record. Real party in interest has filed an informal response at this court’s invitation. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

Defendant and appellant Elvis Armando Martinez-Tuck appeals from the superior court’s order denying his request to strike a prior prison term enhancement from a sentence imposed upon defendant in 2011. The superior court had previously reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 the felony upon which the enhancement was based. We conclude that Proposition 47 does not apply retroactively to previously imposed prior prison term enhancements once a judgment of conviction attains finality.

Two years after plaintiffs and appellants, Imre Cziraki and Gizella Cziraki (plaintiffs), purchased a vineyard and winery from defendants and respondents, Vincent Cilurzo and Audrey Cilurzo, the County of Riverside issued a citation in 2006 for illegally operating the winery without a permit or an approved plot plan. Plaintiffs delayed filing the instant fraud action against defendants until 2013. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground plaintiffs’ action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellant John De Light appeals the dissolution of his marriage to respondent Laura De Light and the orders made pursuant to the dissolution. In January 2008, the De Lights were married in Iowa. They eventually moved to California for John’s work. On April 25, 2013, Laura moved back to Iowa taking S.D. (born March 2009; Child1), and L.D. (born January 2012; Child2) (collectively, the Children), without advising John. She moved in with her parents and then filed for divorce from John in California. John filed an ex parte application to have the Children returned to California. That request was denied and divorce proceedings ensued. John appeals the trial court’s numerous orders entered both before trial and from the trial.

In this cold-case murder prosecution, a jury convicted defendant Leonard Terrance Woods of the murder of Judy G. committed some 24 years earlier. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12202, subd. (b)(1).) He appeals, contending his conviction was tainted by multiple instances of governmental misconduct. As we shall explain, we find certain of those actions amounted to no misconduct at all. But some unquestionably did. Even so, the remedies Woods seeks—chief among them, dismissal—remain unwarranted because on this record, insufficient prejudice appears. Since Woods received the fair trial to which he was entitled, we affirm.

In this cold-case murder prosecution, a jury convicted defendant Leonard Terrance Woods of the murder of Judy G. committed some 24 years earlier. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12202, subd. (b)(1).) He appeals, contending his conviction was tainted by multiple instances of governmental misconduct. As we shall explain, we find certain of those actions amounted to no misconduct at all. But some unquestionably did. Even so, the remedies Woods seeks—chief among them, dismissal—remain unwarranted because on this record, insufficient prejudice appears. Since Woods received the fair trial to which he was entitled, we affirm.