CA Unpub Decisions

The opinion filed herein on August 22, 2018 is modified as follows:
The first sentence in the first full paragraph on page 14 is modified to read: “There was also substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mitchell and Jeffreys were not acting in concert, or that Hill did not know that they were doing so.”

The People petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order granting defendant Richard Lee’s Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss 24 counts in an information alleging securities law violations, and to enter a new order denying the motion as to 12 of the counts. The People contend that the court erred because sufficient evidence was presented at the preliminary examination for probable cause to believe that defendant’s transactions with the victims involved securities within the meaning of Corporations Code section 25019, and that defendant committed two counts of fraudulent practices in connection with offering to sell securities (§ 25541) and 10 counts of offering to sell securities by means of false statements or omissions (§§ 25401, 25540, subd. (b)).
For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing 12 of the counts involving securities law violations.

Defendant Juan Manuel Rosas pleaded no contest to evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and driving while having a 0.08 percent or higher blood-alcohol level (§ 23152, subd. (b)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years’ probation. The court revoked probation after defendant was arrested and entered a plea for driving under the influence in a different case. After finding defendant violated his probation, the court reinstated probation with the addition of several terms.

Defendant Carlos Cazares was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), driving while having a 0.08 percent or higher blood alcohol content (§ 23152, subd. (b)), and driving with a suspended license (§ 14601.1, subd. (a)). The court also found true the allegations that defendant had suffered two prior felony convictions within the meaning of sections 23550 and 23550.5. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of two years in prison.

Christopher Allen Strand appeals from a 76-years-to-life sentence following his convictions on three sex offenses. He contends the trial court prejudicially erred by sustaining the prosecution’s objection to questions his attorney asked two defense witnesses. He further claims the prosecutor’s misconduct in closing and rebuttal arguments impermissibly reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof. For the reasons stated below, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.

Petitioner Amber D. (mother), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services at a six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(1)) as to her now 11-month-old daughter, E.D., and setting a section 366.26 hearing on September 27, 2018. Mother informs this court she has been in custody and needs more time to complete her court-ordered reunification services. We conclude she failed to assert juvenile court error as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, which sets forth the content requirements for an extraordinary writ petition. Consequently, we dismiss the petition.

Alleged father Jesus L. (Jesus) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to Ana L. and ordering her placed for adoption under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He claims the termination orders should be reversed because the juvenile court failed to comply with the placement preferences of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Because Jesus lacks standing to challenge the placement order, we will dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Carlos R. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services to him. He contends the juvenile court erred when it deemed him an alleged father, instead of a presumed father, and erred in denying reunification services even after elevating him to presumed father status. We agree the juvenile court erred and the error was prejudicial. We reverse.

Defendant Juvencio Ramos, Jr., was convicted by jury trial of attempted burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 459). The trial court found true the allegation that defendant had suffered a prior felony strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The court denied defendant’s Romero request to strike or dismiss the prior felony conviction allegation under section 1385, and the court sentenced him to two years in prison: the midterm of one year, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to strike the prior felony conviction allegation. We affirm.

Appellant, Jesse Bryan Behill, was convicted by jury trial of attempted voluntary manslaughter and several other crimes arising out of an incident where he fired a single shot into a residence. He received a 17-year two-month sentence including a 10-year firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
On appeal, he contends his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction must be reversed on the following grounds: (1) the court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to amend the information midtrial to change the alleged victim from a specific person to a group; (2) the court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury must unanimously agree which person the defendant intended to kill; and (3) the court prejudicially erred by giving, over objection, a special instruction regarding the intent requirement of attempted murder.

Plaintiff William Fitzsimmons and his C&A Living Trust sued the County of Kern (County), the Kern County Code Compliance Department, and Amanda Raber, a code compliance officer, for damages resulting from a nuisance abatement action, where the County removed various items of personal property from plaintiffs’ real property. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s ruling to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm.

In 2013, a jury found appellant James Willis Johnson not guilty of first degree murder for the death of his infant son (the baby), but convicted him of the lesser-included charge of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1). It also found him guilty of (1) assault on a child under age eight with force likely to produce great bodily injury and resulting in death (§ 273ab; count 2); (2) willfully causing or permitting a child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury or death (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 3); and (3) misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4). However, in count 3, the jury found not true the allegation that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the baby (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)).

Respondent Dawn Grovhoug sought a civil harassment restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 against a former coworker, appellant Jay Jasper. The trial court granted Grovhoug’s petition.
Jasper appeals the order, arguing that insufficient evidence established the necessary elements under that statute. He fails to include a transcript of the relevant proceedings in the record he has provided to us. As we explain, we presume sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s order and affirm.

Defendant Sonora Estates, LLC, appeals from denial of its motion to compel arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).) The trial court gave several independent reasons to deny the motion to compel, one of which was that Sonora Estates had failed to carry its burden to show the existence of valid arbitration agreements. On appeal, Sonora Estates fails to challenge this dispositive finding. Accordingly, we affirm without addressing Sonora Estates’ remaining contentions.