CA Unpub Decisions

Jose Buscaron Herrera was discharged from his job as a delivery driver with Datalok Co. after the company claimed he was intoxicated while at work. Herrera filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. The Employment Development Department (EDD) denied the claim, finding that Herrera was terminated for misconduct and therefore ineligible for benefits. Herrera appealed that determination to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB). Following an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the EDD’s determination. Herrera appealed to the CUIAB panel; the CUIAB affirmed that decision and rejected Herrera’s claims that the ALJ was biased against him and the hearing was unfair. Herrera then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The court conducted an independent review of the administrative proceedings and concluded that the ALJ’s determination was supported by the evidence and that the proceedings were conduc

After appearing on the Dr. Phil Show, Plaintiff Matthew Barasch sued the host and broadcasting station, CBS Television Distribution, as a Division of CBS Studios, Inc. (erroneously sued as CBS Television) (hereinafter referred to as CBS or defendant). According to Barasch, the gravamen of his complaint was that “ ‘he was defamed as a mentally ill attorney on Dr. Phil’s television show, despite representations from producers that his claims of cyber stalking would be investigated and objectively presented on the show.’ ” This appeal followed an order granting defendant’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion. Barasch also appealed a subsequent order requiring him to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees.

Defendant Etienne Natale Urruty was placed on probation after he pleaded no contest to two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of possession of ammunition by a felon. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash a warrant to search his home and his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. We affirm.

Preston Alexander Smith (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)) and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), and pleaded no contest to false impersonation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3)), with an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jerry Esquivel Rodriguez was convicted by a jury of stalking. (Pen. Code, § 646.9. ) He was sentenced to nine years in prison, consisting of the aggravated term of three years for the stalking conviction, and 6 one-year consecutive terms for each of the six prison priors found true by the court. Defendant makes two arguments on appeal: (1) the stalking conviction is not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) one of the enhancements was improper because the crime on which it was based was reduced to a misdemeanor. Defendant’s first argument has no merit, as there is substantial evidence. Defendant’s second argument has merit, as the People concede. We thus affirm the judgment, but remand the matter for the limited purpose of striking one of the enhancements and the resentencing of defendant.

This is an appeal from judgment in which defendant Joseph Francisco Dropko challenges the trial court’s calculation of his presentence custody credits. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to grant him custody credits for time he served in a Nevada prison for an unrelated crime after the Sonoma County Superior Court requested a hold be placed on him for crimes charged in this matter. We affirm.

Anil Sagar appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. He contends a sentence enhancement imposed for a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) must be stricken, because an enhancement was also imposed for a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Because the trial court stayed the section 667.5 enhancement, we will affirm.

The juvenile court adjudged appellant E.H. a ward of the court after it found that he had committed second degree robbery with the use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury, and assault with a firearm with the infliction of great bodily injury. The juvenile court set E.H.’s maximum term of confinement at 22 years.

This case comes to us after attorney fees proceedings following remand. In Sadr v. Sabet (Apr. 5, 2016, G050493) [nonpub. opn.] (Sadr) we reversed a postjudgment order denying attorney fees to cross-complainants, cross-defendants, and respondents Saeed Sadr (Sadr) and Zohreh Jadali (Jadali) and directed the court to award reasonable attorney fees to them, apportioning them if appropriate. (Sadr, at p. 3.) On remand the court awarded Sadr and Jadali $121,400 for attorney fees incurred in the trial court (trial attorney fees) and $19,800 for attorney fees incurred on appeal (appellate attorney fees).

This action arises out of a dispute concerning the governance of St. Mary Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of the East, a California nonprofit religious corporation (St. Mary), which was created under the authority of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of the East (Ancient Church). After a dispute arose between St. Mary’s board of directors and the Ancient Church’s hierarchy, a bishop of the Ancient Church, under the authority of the Ancient Church’s patriarch, removed the board of directors, terminated their memberships in the church, and appointed a new board of directors.

Defendant Tony Lewis, a state prison inmate, was charged with indecent exposure in connection with an incident in which he masturbated in front of a female correctional officer. Following a trial by jury, defendant was convicted of one count of indecent exposure, in violation of Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1. In the same proceeding, the jury found true that defendant had a prior conviction for violating Penal Code section 314, which elevated the charged offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, and found true that defendant had a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e).) The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years in state prison, doubled based on his prior strike conviction for a total determinate term of six years.

Appellants Phillip Lee Wagner (Phillip) and Rachel Ann Patch (Patch), siblings, were convicted of several crimes arising from an altercation with employees of a store. Their brother, Jerry Wagner (Jerry), who is not a party to this appeal, was also involved. Phillip and Patch appeal, claiming (1) they were improperly convicted of both assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury arising from the same acts, (2) there is insufficient evidence to support their assault convictions, and (3) instructional error.
We agree Phillip and Patch were improperly convicted of both assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury arising from the same acts. We reject their remaining contentions.

Defendant and appellant Ilyssa Sierra Smith is serving 16 months in state prison after pleading guilty to attempted vehicle theft with a gang enhancement and a strike prior. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Matthew Lyons Low was charged by third amended information with five counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code , § 288, subd. (a), counts 1-5), and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a), count 6). A jury found defendant guilty of all counts. A trial court sentenced him to the low term of three years each on counts 1 through 5, to run consecutive to the middle term of 12 years on count 6, for a total of 27 years in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The People subsequently pointed out that the court erred in imposing the terms on counts 1 through 5 pursuant to section 667.6. Thus, the court corrected its error and resentenced defendant to the middle term of six years on count 1, one-third the middle term (or two years) on counts 2 through 5, consecutive, plus a consecutive middle term of 12 years on count 6, for a total of 26 years in state prison. We now affirm.