CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, Fair Political Practices Commission (the Commission), brought administrative proceedings against Frank Burgess for allegedly violating section 87100 of the Government Code, part of the Political Reform Act. (§ 81000 et seq.) The Commission ultimately concluded Burgess had violated section 87100 and imposed the maximum $5,000 fine. (§ 83116, subd. (c).) Burgess then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court granted the petition and declaratory relief, but denied injunctive relief. The court ordered the Commission to set aside its decision and order and dismiss the administrative proceedings against Burgess.

Defendant and appellant Richard Garcia III entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to kidnapping (Pen. Code , § 207, subd. (a), count 3), child abuse resulting in great bodily injury (§§ 273a, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (d), count 4), inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse, resulting in a traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count 6), and child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b), counts 11-13). He also admitted he had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). Approximately five months later, defendant moved to withdraw his plea. Following a hearing, a trial court denied the motion. The court then sentenced him to a total of 21 years in state prison in accordance with the plea agreement.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Oscar Vegagarduno, of elder adult abuse likely to produce great bodily harm (count 1; Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2; § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and assault with a deadly weapon (count 3; § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of two years of incarceration consisting of the low term of two years on the count 1 offense and concurrent terms on counts 2 and 3. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred by failing to stay the terms on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to section 654. The People agree imposition of sentence on one of the counts should be stayed, but not on both. The judgment is affirmed as modified.

In March 2010, defendant and appellant, Amanjit Kler, acquired a trustee’s deed to two adjoining real properties, Parcels 1 and 2, at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. In 2011, plaintiff and respondent, Inocencio Solis Yanez, sued Kler, ultimately seeking to quiet title to Parcel 2 and to reform a 2006 grant deed to Parcels 1 and 2 that Yanez and his wife executed in favor of two buyers who later lost both parcels in the foreclosure sale.
When Yanez and his wife signed the 2006 grant deed, Parcel 1 had a house on it and Parcel 2 was a vacant lot. Page 1 of the grant deed included the legal description and the assessor’s parcel number (APN) of Parcel 1, but not Parcel 2. However, Exhibit A to the grant deed included the legal descriptions of both parcels. Between 2007 and 2009, Yanez built a house on Parcel 2, thinking he still owned Parcel 2. Yanez also paid the real property taxes on Parcel 2 until October 2010, when he did not receive the tax bill for Parcel 2.

On November 9, 2016, the family court issued a three-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against defendant and appellant, M.B., based on the application of M.B.’s son, plaintiff and respondent, B.S., pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) The DVRO protects B.S., his girlfriend, and his two children.
In this appeal, M.B. claims the family court abused its discretion in issuing the DVRO, because no evidence supports the court’s implied findings that M.B. perpetrated any acts of “abuse” against B.S. or the other persons protected by the DVRO. (§ 6203 [defining abuse for purposes of the DVPA].) B.S. has not filed a respondent’s brief. We affirm. As we explain, substantial evidence shows M.B. committed acts of abuse against B.S., his girlfriend, and his two children. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the DVRO.

Plaintiff and appellant, Deborah Ellis, brings this lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure and related claims against the bank that foreclosed on her home. Ellis also sues the trustee who conducted the foreclosure sale under the deed of trust encumbering her home. The bank at issue is The Bank of New York Mellon (Bank of New York), and the trustee is The Wolf Firm, A Law Corporation (Wolf). The trial court sustained both defendants’ demurrers to the first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend, and it entered separate judgments in favor of each defendant.
We conclude the court properly sustained Bank of New York’s demurrer without leave to amend and affirm the judgment in its favor. As to Wolf, we conclude Ellis failed to perfect an appeal from the judgment in Wolf’s favor, but even if she had, the court properly sustained Wolf’s demurrer. We dismiss the appeal as to Wolf.

Defendant and appellant Valerie Latrice Roberts was charged in a 77-count indictment, which included charges of human trafficking; administering stupefying drugs to assist in the commission of a felony; knowingly and willfully executing a scheme to defraud the Medi-Cal program administered by the Department of Public Social Services; and the fraudulent taking of money from In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS). On October 13, 2016, defendant pled guilty to six counts in the indictment and was sentenced to 10 years. The execution of sentence was suspended and she was placed on three years of probation under various probation conditions.

In this action, cross-complainants and appellants, George and Patricia Striegel (the Striegels), through their revocable intervivos trust, the Striegel Family Revocable Trust, dated October 19, 1991 (the Striegel Trust), sought to quiet title to an easement by prescription for ingress and egress to their unimproved, five-acre parcel in Cahuilla Hills (the Striegel Parcel), over a dirt roadway or “access route” traversing seven other parcels. Cross-defendants and respondents, Gregory A. Swajian and Dawn M. Swajian (the Swajians), Bighorn Development, LLC (Bighorn), and Marie Befeld (Befeld), owned six of the other seven parcels. Following a bench trial, the court denied the Striegels’ prescriptive easement claim and entered judgment in favor of cross-defendants on the Striegels’ cross-complaint.

Nadya Goldfreed was convicted by a jury of one count of corporal injury on her spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5) and one count of the lesser included offense of spousal battery (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (e)(1)). On appeal, Goldfreed asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred by denying her request to impeach the victim with evidence of his purported domestic violence directed against her. Goldfreed also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asserting that there was no evidence that the victim had a motive to lie. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kory Jon Penn was charged by amended information with assaulting victim Tyler M. with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (i.e., a knife) (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1); and with assaulting this same victim by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 2). The amended information further alleged that defendant in count 2 personally inflicted great bodily injury on Tyler (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); and that he had sustained a serious prior offense (§§ 422, 12022.5, subd. (a) & 667, subd. (a)) and two prior serious and violent felonies for purposes of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A) & 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)).

Defendant Kory Jon Penn was charged by amended information with two counts of inflicting upon Jane Doe (K.D.), who at the time was in a dating relationship with defendant, corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), counts 1 & 2); and with one count of false imprisonment by "violence, menace, fraud, and deceit" (§ 236, count 3). The amended information further alleged that defendant in count 1 had personally inflicted great bodily injury on K.D. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and that he had sustained two prior serious and violent felonies for purposes of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A) & 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)).

Gavin Laird appeals the denial of his motion for expungement of his DNA sample from the state's data bank following a reduction in his conviction to an infraction "for all purposes" under Proposition 64. His appeal raises an issue of first impression: when an offender whose guilty plea to a felony marijuana conviction is later reduced to an "infraction for all purposes," does the redesignation justify expungement of his previously collected DNA sample from the state's database? We conclude it does not and affirm the trial court's order.

In November 2011, plaintiff Tyler Farmer brought this representative action alleging a single cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, §§ 2698 et. seq.) (PAGA) against his former employer, Labor Ready Southwest, Inc. and its affiliated companies, TrueBlue, Inc. and True Blue Enterprises (collectively "Labor Ready").
Farmer died in July 2013. After learning of Farmer's death, Labor Ready filed a motion to dismiss the case in the trial court. Nine days before the hearing on the motion to dismiss, proposed intervenor Michael Hull filed a motion to intervene in the action. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order in February 2017 granting the motion to dismiss and stating, "Nothing in this ruling prevents proposed intervener Hull from pursuing his own separate PAGA action."

Mother of the minor A.R. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26 & 395.) Mother contends the juvenile court and the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family, and Adult Services (Department) failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We affirm the juvenile court’s (order) judgment.