CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97. Having reviewed the record as required by Wende and In re Kevin S., we affirm the judgment.

Objector Robert C. challenges the renewal of appointment of conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5,000, 5350 et. seq.). He argues case-specific hearsay was improperly admitted in violation of his constitutional rights under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) and that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to such evidence. He also complains the grave disability finding and special disabilities imposed were not supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm.

This appeal arises from the dissolution of redevelopment agencies. The Department of Finance (Department) and the state auditor determined that promissory notes a former redevelopment agency made to its sponsoring agency, the City of Lakewood, did not qualify as enforceable obligations that would survive the dissolution. The officials ordered the city to remit two payments on the notes it received from the redevelopment agency.
The city and the redevelopment agency’s successor agency challenged the Department’s and the state auditor’s decisions, and lost.

Jack Jackson appeals from an order denying his petition for reclassification pursuant to Proposition 47. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Proposition 47 did not apply to appellant’s conviction. Appellant contends the trial court’s interpretation of Proposition 47 was erroneous.
Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting that this court conduct an independent review of the record. Having done so, we affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition.

M.F. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, which asked the juvenile court to reinstate previously terminated services to reunify with her son S.D. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her petition without an evidentiary hearing because she made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances such that reinstituting services would be in S.D.’s best interest. The juvenile court has since terminated Mother’s parental rights over S.D., however, and Mother has not appealed that rights termination order. We consider whether there is any effective relief we can provide Mother in light of the unchallenged termination of her parental rights.

The surety on a subdivision performance bond brought this action for indemnity and breach of contract against the indemnitors under the bond’s indemnity agreement. The trial court granted the surety summary judgment. We affirm.

After defendant David Brandon purchased an apartment building (the Memorial Trails property) in Texas from No Mas Tomas, LLC, he defaulted on a promissory note he owed the LLC for part of the purchase price (the seller financing addendum). Plaintiff Thomas Mitchell, a principal of the LLC, sued defendant in his individual capacity for breach of contract, seeking contract damages of $253,974.99, and on common counts.
Following a court trial on stipulated facts, the court found for defendant, reasoning that plaintiff lacked standing because the contract was between defendant and the LLC, and there was no proof the LLC had assigned its rights to plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by not issuing a statement of decision, and by finding the money was not owed to him. We affirm.

In the underlying arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator dismissed the claims asserted by Abel Sandoval and Jesus Nolasco, concluding that they failed to demand arbitration within the applicable limitations periods, as determined under the arbitration agreements and Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.12. Sandoval and Nolasco noticed an appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to vacate the dismissal, which is not an appealable order. We conclude that immediate review of the denial is appropriate and treat their appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, but deny the petition.

Alejandro Jimenez appeals from a judgment after the trial court found him guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), and found true allegations that he committed murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)).

Plaintiff Judy Berglund appeals the dismissal of her complaint against Ulara Rogers, alleging tort claims for extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with economic advantage. Berglund is married to Rogers’s former husband. Berglund alleged that Rogers sent her a letter threatening to pursue criminal charges against her in South Korea, under a Korean adultery statute, unless Berglund paid Rogers $700,000.
The trial court sustained the demurrer filed by Rogers without leave to amend. The court found that Berglund’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, Berglund contends that she adequately alleged a continuing course of conduct and therefore that her lawsuit was timely. Alternatively, she argues the trial court erred in denying her leave to amend.

An information charged Heriberto Quevedo with one count of assault with intent to commit rape. (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)(1).) A jury found Quevedo guilty of the lesser offense of simple assault. (§ 240.) The trial court sentenced Quevedo to three years of probation and ordered him to register as a sex offender under the discretionary registration provisions of section 290.006. On appeal, Quevedo contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the registration requirement because the trial court failed to make the necessary findings to support the requirement and to state them on the record. Quevedo also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the registration requirement.
We hold that the trial court made the necessary findings, those findings were supported by the record, and Quevedo forfeited his challenge to the adequacy of the court’s statement of findings by failing to object on that basis during sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff Gregory Geiser filed petitions for civil harassment restraining orders against defendants Peter Kuhns and spouses Mercedes and Pablo Caamal, after defendants demonstrated at plaintiff’s place of business and in front of his residence in an attempt to prevent the Caamals’ eviction from their home. In response, defendants moved to strike the civil harassment petitions as strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-SLAPP motions). After plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his civil harassment petitions, the trial court awarded defendants attorney fees as the prevailing parties on the petitions. The trial court denied defendants’ attorney fees on their anti-SLAPP motions, ruling they would not have prevailed on the motions.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s determination that defendants were the prevailing parties on the civil harassment petitions and, alternatively, the calculation of the attorney fees award.

The Sohagi Law Group, PLC, Margaret M. Sohagi, Nicole Hoeksma Gordon and Lauren K. Chang; Office of the City Attorney of the City of Pasadena, Michele Beal Bagneris, City Attorney, and Theresa E. Fuentes, City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents City of Pasadena and City Council of the City of Pasadena.

Following his plea of no contest to transportation of a controlled substance for sale and evading a peace officer, defendant appeals from the sentence and other matters occurring after the plea. In the trial court, he argued his prior drug-related convictions no longer constituted qualifying convictions under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c), due to a change in the law effective January 1, 2018, and this change in the law applied retroactively to him. Counsel for defendant has filed a brief setting forth the facts of the case, but advising the court under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, no issues were found to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was notified by his counsel he had 30 days to file a supplemental brief with the court. No supplemental brief has been received. Having reviewed the record and finding no arguable issues, we affirm.