CA Unpub Decisions

The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the trial of defendant Jason C. Edwards (Edwards) on two counts of oral copulation and two counts of lewd conduct, all involving his girlfriend’s two minor daughters. Shortly before the retrial, the prosecution offered a plea deal in which Edwards would plead guilty to one count of lewd conduct, serve a prison term of six years, register as a sex offender and possibly be subject to commitment as a sexually violent predator. Defense counsel replied to the prosecutor that Edwards was unlikely to agree and did not communicate the offer to Edwards. At the retrial, the jury convicted Edwards on all counts, and the judge sentenced Edwards to 38 years to life in state prison. The parties agree that defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective representation when she failed to inform him of the prosecution’s plea offer, but dispute whether there was a reasonable likelihood Edwards would have accepted the plea.

The juvenile court denied mother D.R.’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to reinstate family reunification services and terminated her parental rights over her two-year-old daughter P.M. (minor). Mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to reinstate family reunification services because mother’s progress in maintaining sobriety showed it was in minor’s best interest to give mother another chance to reunify. Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights and freeing minor for adoption because the beneficial parent-child exception to the statutory preference for adoption applied. Finding no error, we will affirm.

Defendant Lena Maria Ordunez pleaded no contest to buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle with a prior conviction and admitted a prior conviction allegation. The trial court sentenced Ordunez to a “split sentence” of three years, with two years to be served in county jail and one year of mandatory supervision, as called for by her plea agreement. The trial court also ordered that Ordunez pay $3,300 in victim restitution. The trial court stated orally that codefendant Anthony DeAnda was jointly and severally liable for the restitution award. The abstract of judgment reflects that the restitution order is joint and several, but the written restitution order does not.

Following a jury trial, defendant Silverio Lopez Perez was convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, false imprisonment, and dissuading or attempting to dissuade a witness by use of force or threat of force. He seeks reversal of the dissuading or attempting to dissuade a witness conviction on statute of limitations grounds. He also contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of prior domestic abuse and in denying a related motion for a mistrial. We shall affirm.

Cynthia B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s May 2018 dispositional judgment removing her two daughters from her physical custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, 361; all statutory references are to this code.) She contends, and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) concedes, SSA did not adequately investigate the children’s heritage under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) For the reasons expressed below, we agree and will conditionally reverse the judgment.

Plaintiffs Rod Qumsia and Viviana Solitro Qumsia (plaintiffs) allege that defendants Wilmington Savings Fund, FSB (WSF) and Selene Finance, LP (Selene) (collectively, defendants) lacked authority to foreclose on plaintiffs’ home because several assignments in the loan’s chain of title to WSF were void. Relying on judicially noticed public records that confirmed WSF’s rights in the subject loan at the time of foreclosure, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. The trial court found that plaintiffs’ sole evidence in support of their void transfer theory, the declaration of William J. Paatalo, was inadmissible, and that there was therefore no issue of material fact as to defendants’ interest in the subject loan at the time of foreclosure. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Charles B. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his modification petition requesting reunification services and terminating parental rights over his now seven-year-old daughter, A.B. He contends he established the requisite showing of changed circumstances and best interest pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, subdivision (a)(1) to warrant an order for reunification services. He further contends the termination order was error because there was insufficient evidence A.B. was adoptable and the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Christopher Jhonte Goodie asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded, arguing defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. We affirm.

In 2009, our unpublished opinion in People v. See (Dec. 18, 2009, F055800), affirmed the judgment of appellant Lavang See, who had been convicted of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1) & § 187; count 2). He was 16 years old when these crimes occurred. He was initially sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement.
However, following Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, appellant was resentenced. On September 21, 2016, his LWOP was reduced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) with an additional 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).

The trial court granted respondent Isaias Lopez’s motion to vacate a 2010 conviction on the ground that Lopez entered a no-contest plea after his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of the plea, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to effective counsel. The People filed this appeal.
The parties agree that a motion was not the proper vehicle for seeking this type of relief, and that it could be granted, if at all, only via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lopez maintains that we should deem the motion he made in the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and should affirm the relief granted as if it were habeas relief. The People argue that, for procedural reasons, it would be error to analyze the trial court’s order as if it were habeas relief. They also argue that, on the record developed in the trial court, it would have been error on the merits to grant habeas relief.

After spending an evening out at a nightclub, defendant Manuel Mendoza Vargas ended up asleep on a living room couch in an apartment where his brother-in-law’s girlfriend, her 16-year-old daughter and her 15-year-old son lived. Defendant later entered the 16-year-old victim’s unlocked bedroom and raped her twice. He was charged with two counts of rape by force (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) (counts 1 and 3), two counts of rape by threat (§ 261, subd. (a)(6)) (counts 2 and 4), first degree robbery (§ 211) (count 5), criminal threats (§ 422) (count 6), dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) (count 7), and dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)) (count 8). A jury convicted defendant of all eight counts and found true the burglary special circumstances allegations attached to counts 1 through 4. (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(4), (e)(2).)

Appellant Alyssa Renee Gonzales caused a traffic collision in which the other driver was killed. After being given an indicated sentence, she pleaded guilty and was convicted of (1) grossly negligent vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated; (2) driving under the influence and causing injury; and (3) driving without a license. When entering her guilty plea, she reserved the issue of whether count 2 is a lesser offense necessarily included in count 1.

On February 2, 2014, an amended complaint charged defendant and appellant Randy Johnson with two counts of oral copulation with a child under age 10 under Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision (b) (counts 1, 4); one count of sexual penetration of a child under age 10 under section 288.7, subdivision (b) (count 2); three counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under age 14 under section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 3, 5, 6); one count of possessing child pornography under section 311.11, subdivision (a) (count 7); and one count of exhibiting or publishing child pornography under section 311.1, subdivision (a) (count 8).

On September 21, 2016, an amended information charged defendant and appellant Timothy Cline with robbery in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 221, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), count 1); making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 2); and burglary (§ 459; count 3). The information also alleged that defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the three offenses (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.5, subd. (a)); had served seven prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); had one serious prior felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and had an out-of-state prior conviction (§§ 67, subds. (b) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).