CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner Nicole B. (mother), seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her reunification services as to her now one-year-old daughter, K.C., at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) and setting a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan of adoption. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding there was not a substantial probability K.C. could be returned to her custody by the 18-month review hearing. We deny the petition.

Appellant Rayell Olivia Carson appeals from her conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)).

When two of S.S.’s younger half-siblings were found wandering near a busy street unattended by any adult and the family residence was found in an uninhabitable state, the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) initiated a dependency proceeding on behalf of S.S. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Amanda G. (mother) appeals from the dispositional orders of the juvenile court denying mother reunification services for her dependent daughter, S.S., pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), and finding that S.S.’s biological father, Z.S., was S.S.’s presumed father rather than Michael C., who was the father of two of S.S.’s half-siblings. Mother also asserts the juvenile court erred in terminating dependency jurisdiction over S.S. We find no error and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Appellant John Robert Arrowood appeals from his conviction for felony domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), felony making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), and a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

Via a petition for writ of mandate, Charles John Briggs, Jr., Margaret Briggs Arroyo, and Teresa Briggs Schwerdt (petitioners) challenge the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint of real parties in interest Everett Earle Pearce, Jr. and Flora Geraldene Crawford (real parties) for failure to bring the action to trial before the statutory deadline set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. Petitioners have not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The petition is denied.

While an inmate at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, appellant David Phillip Rodriguez was involved in a melee with some correctional officers. A jury subsequently found him guilty of battery by an inmate on a non-inmate, attempted battery by an inmate on a non-inmate, attempted interference with an officer’s performance of duty, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate.

A jury convicted appellant Nicholas Castrejon of 18 counts stemming from a four-day crime spree: an attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 6); eight counts of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211; counts 1, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 16 & 17); three counts of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); counts 2, 7 & 14); five counts of robbery (§ 211; counts 3, 8, 9, 10 & 15); and an attempted carjacking. Both firearm and gang participation enhancements were found true in each of these 18 convictions. The jury also convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon, and found true a gang enhancement, from an incident that occurred while appellant was in jail pending this trial. Finally, he was convicted of participating in a criminal street gang during both the crime spree and the jail assault (§ 186.22, subd. (a); counts 19 & 22). Appellant received an aggregate determinate prison term of 81 years two months, and an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 45 years.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Ulices Villavazo, of four counts of committing lewd acts on a child under 14 years old. The jury also found true the allegation that the offenses were committed against multiple victims. (§ 667.61, subds. (c), (e)(4).) The trial court imposed a sentence totaling 60 years to life, which consisted of four consecutive terms of 15 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends his convictions should be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct or error, because the prosecutor made statements during the People’s closing and rebuttal arguments that improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense and misstated the reasonable doubt standard of proof. Defendant also contends that his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statements constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).
We reject defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury found Victor Lopez Sanchez guilty of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2); assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3); attempted voluntary manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of attempted murder (§§ 192, subd. (a), 664; count 4); assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 5); discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 6); using force or threat of force to dissuade a witness from reporting a suspected crime to law enforcement (§ 136.1, subds. (b) & (c); counts 7 & 9); making criminal threats (§ 422; counts 8 & 10); discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 11); intentionally and knowingly violating a court-issued domestic violence protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 12); possessing a controlled substance; count 13); and possessing controlled substance paraphernalia.

Roberto Chaidez appeals from an order filed August 10, 2017, denying a request for a parole consideration hearing under Proposition 57. We dismiss the appeal.In 2006, a jury found Chaidez guilty of two counts of residential burglary of inhabited dwelling homes (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460), each with a Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) allegation, rendering it a "violent felony" for enhancement purposes; one count of possession of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)); and one count of taking and driving a vehicle without the driver's permission (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) with a Penal Code section 666.5, subdivision (a) allegation (repeat offender). The jury found true Chaidez had two strike priors, two serious felony priors, and three prison priors. The court sentenced Chaidez under the "Three Strikes" law to an indeterminate term of 60 years to life in prison.

Defendant Thomas Moore appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petitions for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126. Appointed counsel for defendant filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

H.M., the mother of the minors D.W., Q.W., S.C.W., and L.L., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 395; undesignated statutory references are to this code.) She contends the court’s order removing the minors from her custody is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the orders.

Defendant Teran Curtis Washington pleaded no contest to burglary and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant also admitted to personally using a firearm in the commission of the burglary. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years eight months in state prison, including a consecutive upper term of 10 years for the firearm enhancement.
On appeal, defendant contends that, under a recent amendment to section 12022.53, this matter must be remanded to the trial court so it may consider whether to strike the firearm enhancement imposed in this case. The People agree that defendant is entitled to the benefit of the recent change to the law because the amendment provides discretion to impose a lesser sentence, and because there is nothing in the amendment to suggest the Legislature intended it to apply prospectively only.

It was always Mildred Gorman’s intent to split the assets in her trust equally between her two children, with her son William Jory (defendant and appellant with his wife Jodene Jory, collectively the Jorys) receiving her house and her daughter Linda Carthen (plaintiff and respondent) receiving an equal value from the trust. Gorman did not know how to accomplish this goal and told her attorney the children “would have to figure it out after she was gone what to do about the house.” To that end, after Gorman’s death, her children signed two “SHARE & SHARE ALIKE STATEMENT[S]” agreeing Jory would receive the house and an investment account, while Carthen would receive Gorman’s personal property, the trust account, an oil investment, and a “Promissory Note.” One statement included values of the assets to be disbursed and the total each child would receive, while the other did not.