CA Unpub Decisions

J.P. appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court found true the allegations of a delinquency petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, charging him with one misdemeanor count of engaging in lewd conduct. (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (a).) He contends incriminating statements he made to a police officer should have been suppressed because his implied waiver of his rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)), was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. We need not decide if the statements should have been suppressed because any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. We affirm the judgment.

The Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant Matthew Kane Hall’s Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss two counts of a 17-count grand jury indictment as well as the enhancements and prior conviction allegations attached to those counts. (All statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The District Attorney contends sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury to support indicting Hall for conspiring to commit extortion. We agree and reverse the trial court’s dismissal orders.

K.N. appeals from an order denying without prejudice her request for a restraining order against Martin Stowell. She contends the trial court was biased and the judge abused his discretion in denying her request. We conclude the court did not properly exercise its discretion in denying K.N.’s request for a restraining order. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in light of this opinion.

A jury convicted Christopher Maurice Manning of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code) and found a nonaccomplice was present in the residence. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) Manning contends the trial court erred and violated his constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of disorderly conduct or prowling (§ 647, subd. (h)). Finding no basis to reverse the judgment, we affirm.

Kristina C. (mother), mother of six-year-old Michael G., appeals the juvenile court order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition without a hearing. The petition asked the juvenile court to change the visitation order to either lift the visitation restrictions or, in the alternative, liberalize visitation to allow for community visits, unsupervised evening and weekend visits, and unlimited third party supervised visits. We affirm.

Kristina C., mother of six-year-old Michael G., appeals the juvenile court’s findings and orders made at the six-month review hearing, where the juvenile court found that mother had been provided reasonable reunification services, adopted an updated case plan, and ordered continuation of mother’s services. On appeal, mother challenges the reasonable services finding and the updated case plan. She also challenges the juvenile court’s summary denial of her section 388 petition, by which she sought, inter alia, to terminate jurisdiction.
The crux of mother’s contentions, both below and on appeal, is that there is insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional finding that she sought unnecessary and risky medical interventions for Michael, and it was unreasonable to require her to admit this in order to reunify with him.

Evidence showed that, when R.M. (minor) was eleven years old, he made a seven-year-old male relative orally copulate him. As a result, the trial court found true an allegation of unlawful oral copulation by force or fear (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(B)) and placed the minor on probation in the custody of his mother.

A jury convicted Durjan Germaine Gray of the second-degree murder of a peace officer, gross vehicular manslaughter, and flight from a peace officer causing death. The jury also convicted Gray of driving under the influence with injury and found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a person, not an accomplice, in the commission of that offense. The trial court sentenced Gray to a total term of 32 years to life imprisonment.
Gray appeals. He contends (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Gray's two prior convictions for reckless driving while evading a peace officer (§ 2800.2); (2) the court erred by not providing an accomplice instruction to the jury in connection with the great bodily injury sentencing enhancement; (3) the court erred by not providing additional instructions to the jury on causation issues; and (4) the prosecutor erred by misstating the law during closing argument. We conclude Gray has not shown reversible error. We therefore af

A.R. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court's March 19, 2018 jurisdiction and disposition findings and orders placing minors N.R. and L.W. in foster care. She contends there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence to justify the out-of-home placement. We disagree and affirm.

T.F. appeals the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders removing her minor son, C.R., from her care. Both T.F. and C.R. suffer from osteogenesis imperfecta, a genetic bone disorder commonly known as brittle bone disease. T.F. asserts that the juvenile court's judgment must be reversed because insufficient evidence supported the court's findings that she failed to provide adequate medical care to C.R. and that, as a result, C.R. was at risk of suffering physical harm in her care. T.F. also asserts insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that C.R. was at risk of physical harm if returned to her care. We reject these challenges and affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from a probation revocation proceeding in which the court revoked probation for David Antonio Monzon on the grounds he had failed to report to his probation officer and that he attempted to commit a car burglary. In this appeal, Monzon challenges only the evidence of the alleged attempted burglary. He contends the evidence is insufficient to prove, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that he attempted to enter a car to commit theft. We will find the evidence sufficient and affirm the trial court's decision.

Saleem Ishaque (Husband) and Mary Sesti (Wife) entered into a premarital agreement (Agreement) approximately one month before they married. The Agreement contains a provision in which each spouse waived any right to reimbursement for separate property he or she contributed into a "designated" "Household Account." The family court found that the parties designated a Household Account through their conduct; specifically, by adding Wife as an owner of the sole account from which the couple paid all their living expenses. Husband challenges this construction on appeal, maintaining the parties could only designate a Household Account by specifically naming or labeling an account "Household Account." We find no error in the family court's construction.

Greg Dagher asserted various claims against Ford Motor Company (Ford) arising from alleged defects in his Ford truck's diesel engine. Ford filed a motion for summary judgment, primarily arguing that Dagher's claims were barred by an earlier federal class action settlement under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. The trial court agreed, granted Ford's motion, and entered judgment accordingly.
Dagher appeals. He contends the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply because (1) he was not a member of the earlier federal class action; (2) even if he were a member, he effectively opted out of the settlement; and (3) even if he did not opt out, it would be manifestly unjust and violate his due process rights to bind him to the settlement. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Luis Alford pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) The court sentenced Alford to eight years in custody, plus three years four months on mandatory supervision. The court also imposed various fines and assessments. Alford's appellate challenge concerns the court's imposition of monetary penalties (Pen. Code, § 1464; Gov. Code, § 76000, together "penalty statutes") based on two statutory assessments: (1) a criminal laboratory analysis fee (laboratory fee) (§ 11372.5); and (2) a drug program fee (§ 11372.7).