CA Unpub Decisions

Raheen Mario Chiles appeals from a judgment of conviction for residential burglary and possession of burglary tools, contending the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion and in admitting evidence of prior uncharged misconduct. We affirm.

The procedural history of this case spans nearly 18 years and is recounted in detail below. In sum, although Karla M. and Augustine B. Gasca officially divorced in 2004, they have battled over custody of their children ever since. In addition to spanning the children’s entire childhood, this custody dispute has led to the intervention of several therapists as well as multiple evidentiary hearings regarding the efficacy of the current therapeutic model. On appeal, Augustine contends that the trial court erred in failing to change the current therapeutic model even though the court had reliable evidence that the therapy was not achieving the goal of reunification. Augustine also contends that the court violated his right to a fair hearing by failing to follow statutory guidelines and rules of court when interviewing the children during an evidentiary hearing, and by lifting, in only a limited fashion, the safe harbor rule regarding the family’s therapy sessions.

In 2006, Tia Smith executed a promissory note to obtain a loan for $556,000, secured by a deed of trust on real property she owned in Los Angeles. The beneficiary of the trust deed was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). By 2007, Smith’s trust deed had been acquired by the RALI 2007-QO1 trust, a mortgage pooling security, and her note by Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas (Deutsche Bank), which was also the trustee for certificate holders of the RALI 2007-QO1 trust. Deutsche Bank retained Aurora Loan Services LLC to service the loan.

Anthony Hughes appeals from his conviction for second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189). A 2011 “cold hit” indicated a DNA profile obtained from forensic evidence found at the 1998 murder scene matched Hughes’s profile. Hughes argues the 13 year delay in charging him violated his state and federal constitutional rights. Hughes also contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding third party culpability evidence and by declining to strike prejudicial DNA evidence. We affirm.

Appellant James Samuel Tjogas, Jr., appeals an order denying his motion to modify the terms of his probation. Desiring to make contact with his 15-year-old daughter, Tjogas petitioned for modification of a no contact restriction barring him from seeing his wife and children under the terms of a protective order that was put in place as a condition of his probation under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (k). He has now filed repeated, unsuccessful petitions for modification of this protective order. The present appeal arises out of the third such petition, the first two having been denied without prejudice to refiling.

Martin Balmaceda appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after he pled guilty to offenses requiring registration as a sex offender. Balmaceda contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to advise him, before accepting his plea, of the lifetime nature of the registration requirement.
We affirm.

Defendant Mark Alan Mairose was convicted of misdemeanor possession of an ingestion device (Health & Saf. Code § 11364, subd. (a)) and two counts of felony failure to appear while on bail (Pen. Code § 1320.5).
On appeal, Mairose’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that raises no issue. We notified Mairose of his right to submit written argument on this own behalf within 30 days. The 30-day period has elapsed and we have not received written argument from Mairose.
Pursuant to Wende, we have reviewed the entire record and find that there is no arguable issue on appeal. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and we appointed counsel to represent him. In conducting his analysis of potential appellate issues, appointed counsel informed us in his declaration that he consulted with a staff attorney at Appellate Defenders, Inc. Counsel then filed a brief pursuant to the procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. Counsel did not argue against defendant, but advised the court he was unable to find any issue to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument on his own behalf, but he has not done so.
We have examined the entire record and, like counsel, have not found an arguable issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the postjudgment order.

Defendant Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S., Inc. (Disney), would not allow plaintiff Carole Waddell and her dog Bagel to enter Disneyland because Disney employees concluded Bagel was not a service dog. Plaintiff claims Bagel was a service dog and that Disneyland’s refusal to let her into Disneyland with Bagel constituted disability discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.) and the Disabled Persons Act (§ 54 et seq.). The sole issue here is whether plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under these statutes. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Disney. We affirm the judgment. It was undisputed that the dog was not trained as a service dog. Under sections 51 and 54.1, the lack of special training disqualified Bagel as a service dog, and Disney’s refusal to allow Bagel to enter the park did not violate either the Unruh Act or the Disabled Persons Act.

Plaintiff Peter Albrecht claims that while employed by the University of California Irvine Medical Center (UCI) he was harassed and, ultimately terminated, due to his age and disability. The defendant employer, Regents of the University of California, claims he was fired due to excessive unexcused absences. The court summarily adjudicated various retaliation and discrimination claims, but allowed Albrecht’s harassment claims to go to trial. The jury returned a defense verdict, and Albrecht appealed from the ensuing judgment.

Anna V. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights of minor A.B., with adoption selected as the permanent plan. She contends the order should be reversed and remanded due to the failure of the juvenile court to further inquire into E.B.’s (father) claim of Indian ancestry. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.) She also contends that if further inquiry leads to evidence supporting the claim, the juvenile court should comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et. seq.). The Fresno County Department of Social Services (the department) concedes and we accept the concession.

Appellant/defendant Markus Mayers, an inmate at a correctional facility, entered into a negotiated disposition and pleaded no contest to assaulting another inmate. He was sentenced to the stipulated second strike term of seven years.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief that summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We affirm.

Appellant/defendant David Bui was convicted of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), after assaulting his girlfriend in his bedroom. He was sentenced to the second strike term of eight years. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motions to question the victim and impeach her credibility with evidence that she had prior convictions for driving under the influence and was on probation at the time of the charged offense; she had previously been charged in a domestic violence incident in which defendant was alleged to be the victim; and the charges against her in that prior domestic violence incident were dismissed. We affirm.

County’s approval of a well construction permit (Permit No. 2014-539; “the well permit”). The well permit was issued to real party in interest RB Ranch Development, LLC (“RB Ranch”), which subsequently constructed the well on property on Orange Blossom road in Oakdale.
Appellants are seven individuals who also own property on Orange Blossom Road in Oakdale. Five of the appellants alleged in the petition that since RB Ranch constructed its well, the “depth to water” at their well has increased.