CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Larry Wimberly sued the County of Sacramento, its child welfare agencies, and six of its employees for defamation. Defendants are the County of Sacramento (County), the former Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (now Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services) (DHHS), the former department’s Child Protective Services Division (CPS), Sheila Kearney, Yong Ueda, Lisa Boulger, Sheryl Matranga, Michelle Callejas, and Ann Edwards (collectively defendants).
Wimberly alleged the employees committed libel, slander, and other torts against him when, in dependency proceedings involving his children, they reported that the children and their caretaker said he raped his daughter and struck the children’s mother while she was pregnant. Plaintiff alleged the defamation also occurred when one of the employees questioned him about the allegations in the presence of another person.

In this action arising from cleaning and storage of personal property after a residential fire, defendants and cross-complainants Ken and Judi McKnight appeal from a judgment insofar as it denies relief on their cross-complaint for conversion against plaintiff and cross-defendant Ray Ranciato dba American Fire Recovery (AFR). The McKnights contend the trial court erred in concluding that Civil Code section 3051 gave Ranciato the right, through a possessory lien, to hold all of appellants’ property until services were paid in full. (Further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.) Appellants contend the statute does not apply in this case but, even if it does, Ranciato had an obligation to return a portion of the property when the McKnights paid a portion of the bill. We agree with the trial court.

Minor Anthony C. appeals the jurisdictional and dispositional orders entered after the juvenile court sustained a delinquency petition for robbery and delaying a police officer. Our independent review of the record has revealed no arguable appellate issues, and we affirm.

Jeremy Murphy appeals a judgment following conviction of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, elder abuse with infliction of injury, misdemeanor resisting and obstructing a police officer, and misdemeanor willful disobedience of a protective order. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 368, subd. (b)(1), 148, subd. (a)(1), 166, subd. (a)(4).) We affirm.

Plaintiffs Lawrence S. Cutler and Cindy E. Cutler (plaintiffs) lost their home to foreclosure in mid-2016. Several months later, they filed the instant lawsuit, alleging wrongful foreclosure and violations of California’s Homeowner Bill of Rights, Civil Code sections 2923.55 and 2924.17, and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. Their first amended complaint named as defendants Bank of America, National Association (Bank of America); Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. (MERS); the Bank of New York Mellon as Trustee for the Certificateholders Alternative Loan Trust 2007-11T1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-11T1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-11T1 (BONY); and New Penn Financial LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) (collectively, defendants).

The jury found defendant and appellant Justin Dijon Brown guilty of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) in count 2, and found that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). The trial court declared a mistrial as to count 1 (§ 211 [robbery]), in which it was also alleged that Brown personally used a firearm (§12022.53, subd. (b)), and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that Brown had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), had been convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and had been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170, subds. (a)–(d)).

Days before trial, defendant and appellant Mari Sor Diaz–Huerta moved for a continuance and sought to substitute in newly retained counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant contends that the court’s denial of her substitution request deprived her of the right to be represented by her counsel of choice. Defendant also contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel by virtue of her court–appointed counsel’s failure to conduct a proper examination of the coroner. We affirm.

In 2000, defendant and appellant Michael Miller was sentenced to an indeterminate life term under the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) after a jury convicted him of inflicting corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245), and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236). After the voters approved Proposition 36 in 2012, Miller petitioned to have his sentence recalled under section 1170.126. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that Miller’s conduct demonstrated an intent to cause great bodily injury.

Jennita Foster and her limited liability company, GHM007, LLC (GHM), previously appealed from a judgment entered in favor of Old Republic Default Management Services (Old Republic). We affirmed the judgment and awarded costs on appeal to Old Republic. Pursuant to a contractual attorney fees provision, the trial court awarded attorney fees of $41,658.75 to Old Republic after the matter was remitted. Foster appeals a second time, contending Old Republic was not the prevailing party and that attorney fees should not have been included in the costs calculation or otherwise awarded. We affirm.

Joe Ribakoff, a frequent attendee at meetings of the Long Beach Transit Company Board of Directors, filled out a public speaker’s card and spoke on agenda item 10 at the board’s August 24, 2015 meeting for the three minutes allowed each public speaker on an agenda item. When he rose to speak a second time on the same agenda item, it was during the board’s deliberation and voting period. He was not permitted to speak, and, after a short exchange with the chair of the board, left the speaker’s podium with the verbal assistance of a Long Beach Police Officer who routinely provided security for meetings. Later, Ribakoff filed this action, asking that we reverse the trial court and determine that the board’s three-minute limit on public speakers is contrary to state statutes and federal and state free speech principles. We find neither statutory nor constitutional violations, and affirm.

Plaintiffs Hsien Li Peng, Shou-En Wang, Chang Wu, Ssu Han Liu, Shwu Shing Wu, Chun-Fang Wu, and Chun-Yi Chen sued (1) Fredrick William Voigtmann (F.W. Voigtmann) and Law Office of Fred Voigtmann, P.C. (collectively, the California defendants), and (2) Fredrick N. Voigtmann (F.N. Voigtmann) and Concordia Consulting Ltd. (collectively, the foreign defendants). The plaintiffs alleged a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against all defendants and a second cause of action for fraud against the foreign defendants only.
The California defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) against all plaintiffs other than Chen, which the court granted. The six plaintiffs affected by the order appealed, commencing case No. B278988.

This is the sixth appeal brought and maintained by plaintiff Chetan Thakar (who has represented himself throughout this litigation) against numerous defendants in New Jersey and California based upon an alleged conspiracy to deprive Thakar of employment and legal representation. All but one of the appeals were unsuccessful. In the other, we reversed the trial court’s order dismissing on demurrer all of the claims against defendant Robert Conti (respondent in this appeal), finding that some of the claims, while factually improbable, were legally adequate. Conti was the attorney for Smitray, Inc., S.D.P. Investments, Inc. (the Smitray corporate defendants), Dinu Dahyabhai Patel, and Nick Dahya (all of whom are collectively referred to as the Smitray defendants) in various actions Thakar filed against them, including the present action. In this appeal, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Conti. We also affirm.

Plaintiff David Watts appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on his claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against his insurance company, defendant Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (Safeco). Watts sued after Safeco denied coverage under his homeowner’s policy for a full time rental home in Palm Springs during the time his vacation home was uninhabitable and undergoing repairs due to water damage. Instead, Safeco paid for all of his hotel stays and meals whenever he went to the area. The trial court held his claims were barred by the policy’s one-year limitation period to bring any action after a loss. We agree and affirm.

Allen Gelbard and Lisa Du Boise appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgments in favor of Rosslyn Hummer and Eric C. Peterson, the lawyers for the landlord in an unlawful detainer action against Gelbard and Du Boise. We affirm.