CA Unpub Decisions

J.Y. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order denying her visitation with her minor son, Gavin G. (Gavin). Mother contends there was no evidence or findings that her visits were detrimental to Gavin supporting such an order. We conclude the court’s denial of visitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. When the court made the order, reunification efforts had been terminated after approximately 18 months of services. Mother had made no progress towards addressing her addiction, and a Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing had been set. These factors, among others, indicate there was no likelihood that Mother’s loss of visitation affected the subsequent termination of her parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant David K. Flagg purports to appeal from the order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant. That order is not directly appealable, but as an interlocutory order may be reviewed if a timely appeal is taken from a subsequent order or judgment of dismissal. (Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 616, 635.) “No judgment or order of dismissal was entered in the instant case. However, in the interest of justice and to prevent unnecessary delay, a reviewing court may deem the order appealed from as incorporating a judgment of dismissal and treat the notice as applying to that dismissal.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 988, fn. 2.) Given that both parties treat the appeal as properly before us, we will modify the order to make it an appealable order of dismissal.

In a prior appeal arising from this matter, we affirmed the presumed parent status of Joel D. (Joel) and Donald Q. (Donald), but vacated the juvenile court’s order granting Michael P. (Michael) presumed parent status. (In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475 (Alexander P.).) Michael now appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying his subsequent motion for presumed father status. Michael argues the juvenile court erred by subjecting his presumption of parentage to Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c)’s detriment analysis. Michael further asserts the court was required to identify him as a presumed parent due to his execution of a voluntary declaration of paternity. The court’s failure to do so, he contends, resulted in depriving him of his parental rights without a finding of unfitness. We disagree and affirm the order.

In case No. A151881, K.E. (Mother), mother of five-year-old J.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders removing J.M. from her care and placing him in foster care. She contends the court: (1) failed to follow proper procedures relating to relative placement in declining to place J.M. with his maternal grandparents; (2) erred in placing J.M. in an out-of-county foster home; and (3) failed to specify the frequency and duration of her visits with J.M.

Defendant Anna Zbitnoff appeals following the trial court’s order granting plaintiff Wilmington Trust’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on its complaint for quiet title and other claims. We affirm.

William Chamberlin appeals following jury verdicts convicting him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (id., § 246), and finding him legally sane at the time of the crimes. His sole challenge on appeal asserts instructional error in the sanity phase. We affirm.

T.H. is the mother of K.S., the child at issue in this juvenile dependency matter. G.C. is the child’s father. The child was born while the mother and the father were in jail on charges of murdering and torturing other children. After sustaining a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, the juvenile court denied reunification services to both parents and placed the child in a concurrent foster home.

After a jury found appellant B.W. to be gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.), the trial court reappointed respondent Public Guardian for Santa Clara County as conservator of appellant. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing him to be called as witness by the public guardian in violation of his rights to equal protection, (2) failing to instruct the jury on how to properly evaluate expert testimony, and (3) permitting the jury to consider case-specific hearsay testimony from an expert witness.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Sean Michael Murphy pleaded no contest to stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)), misdemeanor making criminal threats (§ 422), and misdemeanor battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (a)). The trial court placed defendant on probation.
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that states the case and facts, but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed and we have received no response from defendant.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 (Kelly), we have reviewed the entire record. Following the California Supreme Court’s direction in Kelly, supra, at page 110, we provide a brief description of the facts and the procedural history of the case.

On May 29, 2018, respondent court suspended criminal proceedings prior to the preliminary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Petitioner, Gerardo Benitez, contends the felony complaint should have been dismissed because he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing within 10 court days from the date he was arraigned in custody on the felony complaint. Petitioner also contends respondent court abused its discretion when it suspended criminal proceedings, and also erred when it refused to conduct a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 1368.1. Although petitioner was not entitled to have his preliminary hearing within 10 court days from the date he was arraigned in custody, he is entitled to relief on the basis that the court abused its discretion and suspended the proceedings pursuant to section 1368. The petition is granted.

The two minors, R.B. #1 and R.B. #2, twins, were born in 2016 with positive meconium screens for opiates. The mother, A.B., tested positive for morphine and admitted she used heroin on and off during the pregnancy, and that she had smoked heroin two to three days prior to giving birth to the minors. She also admitted to a history of using both heroin and methamphetamines. Four months prior to the birth of the minors, the mother also tested positive for morphine. The mother did not finish high school and was not employed.

A.M. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying an evidentiary hearing on her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking return of her two-year-old son Michael Y. Mother also appeals from the court’s decision to terminate her parental rights at the permanency hearing held under section 366.26 because the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with the notice and inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Michael’s father (Father) is not a party to this appeal. We conclude the contentions lack merit, and we affirm the juvenile court’s order and judgment.

Appellant Michael Farag was convicted by jury of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and possessing methamphetamine. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by 1) denying his request for a mistrial after the jury may have been exposed to prejudicial information about him; 2) questioning the jurors about this issue in his absence; and 3) failing to give full and complete instructions on the weapons charge. Finding these contentions unmeritorious, we affirm the judgment.

Russell Jason Davis (petitioner) seeks permission to file a belated notice of appeal by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to challenge his sentence following a December 1, 2017, conviction and sentencing for vehicle theft with a prior felony grand theft involving a vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 666.5, and escape from prison without use of force in violation of section 4532, subdivision (b)(2).