CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Donte Barnes (Donte) appeals from a protective child-custody order granted in favor of respondent Lisa Barnes (Lisa). Although Lisa and the minor children had only been in California a short time, the trial court granted sole physical custody of the children to Lisa and issued a restraining order against Donte pursuant to the court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under Family Code section 3424. Section 3424, subdivision (a), provides that “[a] court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if … necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse.” In his appeal, Donte claims the trial court erred in exercising emergency jurisdiction because, allegedly, there was insufficient evidence to show that Lisa or the children were ever abused, threatened or mistreated by him.

Appellant/defendant Michael Salinas pleaded guilty to one count of felony vandalism. The court imposed a jail term, followed by mandatory supervised release subject to certain conditions. He did not object to any of the conditions.
On appeal, defendant argues some conditions of his mandatory supervised release are unreasonable and constitutionally invalid, and his attorney’s failure to object at the sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance. We affirm.

Appellant Jesse Montijo was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)) and an enhancement for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53) was found true. Appellant was sentenced to the mid-term sentence of three years for robbery, and 10 years for the gun enhancement, for an aggregate determinate term of 13 years in state prison.

Charles Scott Evans was convicted, after jury trial, of three felony counts of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying at trial and three misdemeanor counts of violating a protective order. He challenges his convictions for attempting to dissuade a witness on multiple grounds; he also challenges his sentences for these convictions. Similarly, Evans challenges his misdemeanor convictions for violating a protective order as well as the sentences for these convictions. Finally, Evans raises a claim of cumulative error. We will reverse one of Evans’s convictions for attempting to dissuade a witness, for insufficiency of the underlying evidence. We reject his other contentions. We will remand the matter for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Mother gave birth to J.B. while her four eldest children were in the custody of the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS). J.B. was also removed from mother’s care when the juvenile court found true allegations that mother failed to provide the child with needed medical care. Mother did well enough in her reunification plan that the juvenile court returned all five children to her care under family maintenance. However, the children were removed from mother once again after the juvenile court found true additional allegations that mother failed to protect the children when the mother’s live-in boyfriend (and possibly mother) left bruises on the children from corporal punishment. The court subsequently terminated mother’s reunification services and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for selection of a permanent plan for J.B.

Defendant and appellant Christopher Lee Dearman has a 28-year criminal history that includes a burglary conviction from 1990, several property crime convictions from 1991, 1994, and 2005, two child molestation convictions from 1997, and a drug conviction from 2013. On July 3, 2014, in case No. E058218, we affirmed defendant’s 2013 drug conviction and seven-year prison term. (People v. Dearman (July 3, 2014, E058218).) On July 20, 2017, defendant was paroled from his prison term. The next day, on August 21, 2017, defendant signed a notification regarding his parole terms. However, over the following three days, defendant’s parole agent believed that defendant had violated the terms of his parole by entering a residence that had not been approved and by failing to maintain the charge on his GPS monitoring device. On August 24, 2017, defendant was arrested.

The trial court denied the Proposition 64 petition of defendant and appellant, Charles Augustus Moore. Defendant contends the trial court erred. The People concedes the trial court erred. We reverse the order with directions.

This is defendant and appellant Ronald Ralph Demedio’s second appeal. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1); receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 2); and grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2); count 3). Defendant subsequently admitted that he had suffered five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)), and three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)). As a result, in 2015, defendant was sentenced to a total indeterminate term of 25 years to life and a total determinate term of 13 years in state prison.

Defendant and appellant, Francisco Sanchez, appeals from the judgment entered after defendant pled no contest to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and admitted two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). After accepting defendant’s no contest plea and admissions, the trial court dismissed defendant’s remaining charges. The court sentenced defendant to four years in state prison and awarded him 269 days of custody credit, which included 35 days of presentence conduct credits awarded under section 2933.1.

A jury found Desiree Montoya guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2). With respect to count 1, the jury also found true an allegation that Montoya committed the attempted murder willfully, and with deliberation and premeditation. In addition, with respect to count 1, the jury found several firearm allegations to be true, including that Montoya personally used and discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). With respect to both counts, the jury found true an allegation that Montoya inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Montoya to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in prison.

This appeal arises from a dispute between a commercial property owner (and its principals) (collectively plaintiffs) and a business park association (and related parties) concerning the association's removal of a fence near plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs sued the association and its former board president, claiming the fence removal was wrongful and caused plaintiffs to suffer economic and emotional distress damages. After years of hard-fought litigation, the court sustained a demurrer on certain causes of action and later granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. Plaintiffs appeal from the summary judgment. We affirm.

A jury convicted Ronald Steven Bishop of 12 counts of committing a lewd act with a child 14 or 15 years of age, eight counts of sodomy of a person under 16 years of age, eight counts of oral copulation of a person under 16 years of age, five counts of sexual penetration of a person under 16 years of age, three counts of sodomy of an unconscious person, three counts of sexual penetration of an unconscious person, one count of sexual penetration of an intoxicated person, one count of possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 5), one count of contacting a minor with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act with a child 14 or 15 years of age (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 1), and a misdemeanor count of annoying or molesting a minor (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The court sentenced Bishop to a total of 43 years in state prison for the felony counts (counts 1, 5–45) plus 364 days for the misdemeanor (count 2) to be served at any penal institution.

A jury convicted Adam M. Araujo of assault with intent to commit a specified sex crime during the commission of a first degree burglary, first degree burglary, indecent exposure - unlawful entry, lewd conduct, prowling and peeking.
The court sentenced Araujo to life with the possibility of parole for count 1, the remaining felony counts were stayed under section 654 and the sentence for the misdemeanor counts was time served.
Araujo appeals challenging the conviction for count 2, contending count 2 is a lesser included offense (LIO) of count 1, and he also argues if we reverse count 2 we should remand the case to allow the court to reconsider its imposition of a $10,000 restitution fine. The People correctly concede count 2 must be reversed. They contend there is no reason to remand for reconsideration of the restitution fine. We agree with the People on both issues. Accordingly, we will reverse the conviction for count 2 and affirm the balance of the judgment.

B.R. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order issued against him pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et. seq.) after the trial court found that he engaged in conduct directed at his wife, M.R., that was "certainly harassment." On appeal, B.R. argues that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the order because "only one incident occurred and one incident alone cannot demonstrate 'harassing' conduct." (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) We conclude that there is substantial evidence that B.R. engaged in a course of conduct directed toward M.R. that was harassing and affirm the order.