CA Unpub Decisions

The court readjudged appellant T.S. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), after the court sustained allegations in a wardship petition charging him with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). Following several violations of probation, the court committed appellant to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ).
On appeal, appellant contends the court abused its discretion: (1) when it committed him to the DJJ; and (2) in calculating appellant’s maximum term of confinement (MTC). We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, (Ocwen) filed this interlocutory appeal from an order granting plaintiff and respondent William Larkin’s request for a preliminary injunction, barring Ocwen from foreclosing on Larkin’s property while Larkin’s lawsuit was pending. By the time Ocwen filed its opening brief in this appeal, the trial court had already dissolved the preliminary injunction because Larkin failed to post an undertaking as a condition of obtaining the injunction, and the trial court had denied Larkin’s request for attorney fees under Civil Code section 2924.12, subdivision (h), having concluded the injunction never took effect and Larkin was not a prevailing party. Ocwen nonetheless requested that this court decide the merits of the order granting the preliminary injunction because Larkin might challenge on appeal the order denying his request for attorney fees or seek prevailing party status at a later stage in the litigation.

A jury convicted Kenneth Lee Wagner of inflicting injury on a spouse or fellow parent (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377), and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). The trial court made a true finding that Wagner had five prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Wagner was sentenced to a term of 11 years in prison.
Wagner contends (1) substantial evidence does not support the domestic violence conviction because the injury he inflicted did not result in a traumatic condition; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike his prior strikes; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an aggravated upper term sentence for the domestic violence count. We conclude that Wagner's arguments lack merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

Yvette Cooper appeals an order denying her petition to reduce to a misdemeanor her felony conviction for three counts of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460.) She sought relief under section 1170.18, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which was enacted by California voters in November 2014 pursuant to Proposition 47. The trial court denied Cooper's petition on the basis her residential burglary conviction was ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 47.
Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We granted Cooper an opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, but she did not do so. After independently reviewing the entire record (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119), we find no arguable appellate issues and affirm.

Victor Hugo Saldana appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his conviction for transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); hereafter § 11379(a)) for other than personal use (Pen. Code, § 1210, subd. (a)). Saldana's conviction was the product of a guilty plea, and he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the conviction because he established by a preponderance of the evidence his trial counsel had not adequately advised him of the adverse immigration consequences of the plea.
We conclude Saldana has not established either that his counsel misadvised him or that any incorrect advice prejudiced him. We, therefore, affirm the order.

Jose Maldonado appeals the trial court's orders on his petition to reclassify all of his felony convictions as misdemeanors under Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Pen. Code, § 1170.18). He contends: (1) the court erroneously declined to reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor based on its improperly combining the value of stolen properties involved in counts 1 and 2; (2) a remand is required for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the value of the fraudulent instrument involved in counts 8 through 11; (3) the court erroneously declined to strike an on-bail enhancement under section 12201.1; (4) the court erroneously declined to strike a prior prison enhancement; and (5) the court miscalculated his custody credits under section 4019. We will remand the matter to the trial court with directions set forth below.

Jose Maldonado appeals the trial court's orders on his petition to reclassify all of his felony convictions as misdemeanors under Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, Pen. Code, § 1170.18). He contends: (1) the court erroneously declined to reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor based on its improperly combining the value of stolen properties involved in counts 1 and 2; (2) a remand is required for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the value of the fraudulent instrument involved in counts 8 through 11; (3) the court erroneously declined to strike an on-bail enhancement under section 12201.1; (4) the court erroneously declined to strike a prior prison enhancement; and (5) the court miscalculated his custody credits under section 4019. We will remand the matter to the trial court with directions set forth below.

A jury convicted Michael David Kane of first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211). As to the robbery, the jury also made a true finding that Kane personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife). (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court made a true finding that Kane had two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668), two prior serious felonies (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and two prior prison terms. (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668.) The trial court denied Kane's motion to strike his prior strikes, and it imposed an indeterminate sentence of 75 years to life, and a determinate term of 11 years.

Dr. Munish K. Batra appeals from a judgment in favor of Hoyt Hart on Batra's complaint for breach of three 2014 promissory notes and Hart's affirmative defense of setoff for usurious interest Hart paid on a 2010 promissory note. Batra contends we must reverse the judgment because the court failed to determine the amount due under the 2014 promissory notes and the determination was a necessary predicate to determining whether the interest Hart paid on the 2010 promissory note was usurious. Batra also contends we must reverse the judgment because the court's statement of decision was legally deficient in multiple respects.
We conclude the issue of Batra's damages for Hart's breach of the 2014 promissory notes was not before the court at trial because the parties stipulated the trial would proceed only as to equitable issues. We further conclude there were no deficiencies in the court's statement of decision requiring reversal of the judgment.

Douglas John Nail (Husband) appeals an order after judgment denying his request for an order seeking foreclosure on a residence to enforce the terms of a marital dissolution judgment whereby he was to receive an equalization payment of $100,000 plus interest. Eileen Cati Byrne (formerly Eileen Cati Nail) (Wife) opposed Husband's request and asserted the amount owed to Husband is offset by damages Husband caused to the residence during his occupancy, loss of a vacant property awarded to her by the marital settlement agreement based on Husband's failure to transfer ownership and failure to pay property taxes, and losses Wife incurred when her bank account was garnished to pay hospital bills owed by Husband. The court denied the request to enforce the judgment finding both Husband and Wife came to court with unclean hands because neither was innocent of wrongdoing, delay, or unfair conduct related to the marital dissolution.

Karin J. Konotchick Hanson and Aaron A. Hanson (Hansons) appeal from a judgment following the granting of a postdismissal motion by Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Nationstar) to enforce an amended settlement agreement (Amendment). The Hansons assert various procedural and substantive claims of error. For the first time in their reply brief, they also assert the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Amendment because (1) the parties did not enter into either the original settlement agreement (Agreement) or the Amendment while the litigation between them was still pending, and (2) the parties did not make a request while the litigation between them was still pending for the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce either the Agreement or the Amendment.

A jury found defendant Darryl Owen Freeman guilty of attempted oral copulation of a person under the age of 14 and 10 years younger than defendant (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288a, subd. (c)(1)) and committing a lewd act on a person under the age of 14 (id., § 288, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison, and defendant timely filed this appeal.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court allowed improper cross-examination of him by the prosecutor and should have granted his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC). We shall affirm.

This appeal arises against a backdrop of more than a decade of litigation between an elderly father and his son. In one chapter of this extended saga, the father, Luke Anthony Paul Lumina, secured a jury verdict against the son, Leonard J. Umina, and the son’s wife, Vicki A. Umina for unjust enrichment and was awarded money damages in the amount of $229,500.

In protracted litigation arising from a hotel redevelopment project by the City of Stockton and its former Redevelopment Agency (collectively, City), this appeal disposes of the sole remaining cause of action by the initial developer, plaintiff Civic Partners Stockton, LLC (Civic), against the successor developer that took over the project, Hotel Stockton Investors (H.S.I.), its general partner CFY Development, Inc. (CFY), and CFY’s owner, Cyrus Youssefi. We refer to Youssefi, CFY, and H.S.I. collectively as Youssefi.
We disposed of Civic’s other claims against Youssefi in Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005 (Youssefi I), leaving only a conversion claim alleging that Youssefi used Civic’s architectural plans in preparing a tax credit application for the project.