CA Unpub Decisions

A jury determined that Robert Bailey meets the criteria for designation as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) The trial court ordered him committed to the Department of State Hospitals. Bailey contends the judgment should be reversed because: (1) the court admitted case-specific hearsay in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez); (2) the prosecution lacked authority to file the commitment petition; (3) counsel provided ineffective assistance when he did not object to irrelevant testimony; (4) counsel was ineffective when he did not object to a prosecution exhibit; (5) the tolling provision of Penal Code section 3000 violates equal protection guarantees; and (6) the tolling provision violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. We affirm.

Beginning in 2002, three attorneys in succession mishandled legal matters for Mordechai and Monica Kachlon, resulting in a substantial judgment against the Kachlons. The Kachlons filed this legal malpractice action against the attorneys in 2005. The first attorney obtained summary judgment on the ground that the action was time-barred as to him. (Kachlon v. Spielfogel, Jan. 6, 2016, B259872 [nonpub. opn.].) The second and third attorneys successfully moved to have the remainder of the dispute sent to arbitration and the civil action against them stayed. After the arbitrator ruled against them in 2015, the attorneys moved to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that it was not entered within five years of commencement of the action, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 580.310. The trial court denied the motion.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendants and appellants Edward Amilcar Chavac, Jose Efrain Ruiz, and Moreno Ruben Alvarado of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Gabriela D., and found true gang and firearm allegations. Appellants contend the trial court erred by admitting a photograph taken from a social media site; the Penal Code section 186.22 gang enhancements were not supported by substantial evidence; the prosecutor committed Griffin error during closing argument; and the trial court’s response to a jury question was erroneous. In supplemental briefing, appellants contend the matter must be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements pursuant to recently amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h), and the People aver that the court committed a minor sentencing error.

Appellant G.B. was declared a ward of the court and placed on juvenile probation after the juvenile court sustained allegations he possessed a concealable firearm in violation of Penal Code section 29610. Appellant appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, arguing the jurisdictional finding must be reversed because the eyewitness identification was unreliable, and four of the probation conditions imposed are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
We conclude a probation condition requiring that appellant “have peaceful contact only with all law enforcement” is unconstitutionally vague and strike that condition. We narrow the condition appellant stay away from any school campus unless enrolled consistent with state law that prohibits persons from visiting school grounds without notifying school authorities. We otherwise affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

18-year-old J.W. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders finding he committed petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484/488), and committing him to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF) for six months. He contends the court violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) by admitting his incriminating statements into evidence. We reject the contention and affirm the orders.

Andre Osipov sued his home loan servicer, Capital One, N.A. (Capital One), for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court granted Capital One’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Osipov challenges evidence submitted by Capital One in support of its motion and the trial court’s admission of that evidence. We affirm.

Andre Osipov sued his home loan servicer, Capital One, N.A. (Capital One), for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court granted Capital One’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Osipov challenges evidence submitted by Capital One in support of its motion and the trial court’s admission of that evidence. We affirm.

This appeal is from a judgment setting aside a fraudulent transfer of real property that defendant Demas Yan made to his relatives in order to avoid paying a money judgment owed to plaintiff Charles Li. Yan and the other defendants challenge the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in granting motions in limine that they claim had the effect of preventing the relatives to whom Yan transferred the property from presenting evidence of their equitable interest in the property. In addition, they claim the court erred in awarding attorney fees against all defendants on the ground the fees were incurred by Li to enforce his previous money judgment against Yan. They contend that defendants who were not parties to the earlier action between Li and Yan cannot be liable for attorney fees incurred in enforcing the judgment against Yan absent an express finding that they conspired with Yan to evade enforcing the judgment.

Defendant and cross-complainant R. Thomas Fair appeals from the trial court order denying his motion to stay judicial foreclosure by plaintiff law firm Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass and to compel Coblentz to arbitrate the matter. The trial court found Fair waived his right to arbitrate by entering into a settlement agreement with Coblentz and that Fair’s assent to the general releases and waiver of Civil Code section 1542 contained therein was “voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” Fair contends on appeal that arbitration provisions of his two engagement agreements with Coblentz required it to provide him written notice of his right to arbitrate. He contends he was fraudulently induced to sign the settlement agreement by the failure of Coblentz to provide separate written notice of his right to arbitrate when their fee dispute arose and by the law firm’s failure to make complete disclosures of facts concerning its potential malpractice.

Plaintiff Kimberly Cromwell defaulted on her home mortgage. In June 2008, Cromwell filed an action for declaratory relief, quiet title, and fraud against some of the parties involved in the foreclosure of her property. That case went to trial, the trial judge granted judgment in favor of defendants, and this Court affirmed.
In July 2014, four years and three days after her property was sold at a trustee’s sale, Cromwell filed this second action asserting multiple causes of action against many of the same parties. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrers to her first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. We affirm the judgment on two independent grounds: that Cromwell’s claims are barred in substantial part by res judicata, and in their entirety by the applicable statutes of limitations. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cromwell leave to amend.

In January 2011, defendant Eric James Pray pleaded guilty to felony receiving stolen property and felony possession of oxycodone. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. In July 2016, defendant filed a petition to have both convictions redesignated as misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47. The trial court granted defendant’s petition as to the oxycodone possession count but denied it as to the receiving stolen property count.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his petition for redesignation of his receiving stolen property conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by concluding that the value of the stolen property—a check written for $2,200—exceeded $950. Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing where he can present evidence that the stolen check’s value was less than $950. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the trial court’s order.

In 2017, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 was filed alleging that minor (J.R., born 2006) came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction because her caretaker, G.R. (hereafter Gregory), used a four-foot wooden paddle to hit her on her buttocks and thighs. Gregory, a family friend, is not minor’s biological father, but minor lived with Gregory for several years after her parents became homeless. After the dependency petition was filed and minor was removed from his care, Gregory filed a motion requesting to be designated minor’s third presumed parent under Family Code sections 7611, subdivision (d) and 7612, subdivision (c). Minor and both of her biological parents supported Gregory’s motion. Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court denied Gregory’s motion after finding he failed to hold minor out as his own child.

Petitioner Michael S. (father) is the father of Z.S., now three years old, who was declared a dependent of the Stanislaus County Juvenile Court and is the subject of these original proceedings. At the conclusion of a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered the termination of reunification services provided by real party in interest Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency). The court also set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider a permanent plan of adoption. Father filed a petition seeking an extraordinary writ to overturn the court’s order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) He contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that the agency provided reasonable reunification services. He also contends the court erred in suspending his visits. We deny the petition.

V.B. (mother) is the mother of three children – R.T., M.T., and R.B. (the children). H.B. (father) is the father of R.B. and joined mother’s appeal by letter brief. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption and terminated her parental rights. We affirm.