CA Unpub Decisions

On or about March 23, 1993, Dayton obtained a loan in the amount of $101,199 from Countrywide Funding Corporation, secured by a deed of trust on real property on Crowley Lane in Fairfield.
On February 2, 2012, Dayton submitted a loan modification application to BANA. And in September 2012, Dayton submitted a second loan modification application. BANA denied the second application on December 19, 2012.
On November 4, 2013, Dayton called the loan servicing department at BANA and spoke with Almita Sasso. Dayton asked Sasso for the monthly payment amount and principal balance on his loan so that he could provide that information to Keep Your Home California in order to apply for mortgage assistance. Sasso told Dayton that his monthly payment was $806.49, and the principal balance was $73,103.29. She also informed him that there were 69 payments past due and the amount in arrears at that time was $91,943.
Toward the end of the call, the following exchange took place:

Defendant owns and operates a business called California Carolina Dogs from her residential property in Vallejo. Caru is a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals (SPCA) registered as a nonprofit public benefit corporation with a principal office in Sonoma County.
On October 5, 2017, Caru filed a complaint against defendant asserting one cause of action under Corporations Code section 10404. This law authorizes an SPCA such as Caru to bring a complaint against a person for violating “any law relating to or affecting animals . . . .” (Corp. Code, § 10404.) Caru sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
According to Caru’s complaint, defendant violated various state and local laws governing the health and safety of dogs between September 2015 and May 31, 2017.

On February 10, 2015, San Pablo Police Officer Matthew Brown responded to the scene of a reported burglary, where Lee’s wife told him she had returned home to find all the Lees’ property missing. Lee subsequently filed a theft claim under his renter’s insurance policy with Homesite Insurance (Homesite), telling the insurer that the allegedly stolen property exceeded $50,000 in value and that Lee had hired an attorney to assist him with the claim.
On March 12, 2015, Officer Brown called California Department of Insurance Detective Clint Herndon and told him the burglary reported by Lee’s wife on February 10 involved “suspicious circumstances that he thought might involve an insurance claim.” Herndon then met with Brown and Suzie Short, an investigator working for Homesite. After Brown and Short showed Herndon evidence they had gathered on their own, Herndon decided to open his own fraud investigation into Lee’s theft claim.

In the early morning of Sunday, October 4, 2009, three men, Kedric Green, Michael Bailey and Kevin Harrell, all in their 20’s, agreed to drive two women home from a San Francisco nightclub upon learning that one of them, Ariael Kittles, had lost her car keys. The driver, Green, was visiting the Bay Area from Baton Rouge, Louisiana with his friend, Bailey, and they were staying with Bailey’s cousin, Harrell. At the end of the drive, the three would be assaulted and robbed by a group of strangers, and Bailey would be fatally shot.
Four defendants—appellants William Jones and Lance Molina (defendants), and two other defendants who are not parties to this appeal, Maurice Lige and Kittles—were arrested and charged in December 2009 with crimes related to this incident. After a 2014 trial, Jones and Molina were convicted of all the counts against them that were presented to the jury and some, but not all, of the accompanying enhancement allegations were found to be true.

According to the Department’s trial court filings, the maternal grandparents confirmed on July 27, 2020, that they had no Native American ancestry, stating they were from Mexico. E.L. also denied Indian ancestry for herself and stated she did not know about the children’s father’s ancestry during the course of the proceedings. However, at a hearing on October 5, 2021, E.L. stated she believed she had Indian ancestry but had not studied her family’s history and did not know if they had ancestry in a tribe in California. She also stated that she and the children had never lived on a reservation, did not have tribal identification cards, and that the children had never been wards of a tribal court. Neither the court nor the Department investigated Indian ancestry further prior to the selection hearing.

reviewing, in general, what happens once a school bond is approved by the voters. Unfortunately, nobody has yet written a catchy song – perhaps “I’m Just a Bond” – explaining this process, which is set forth the Education Code and implementing regulations. Despite the lack of rhyming lyrics and an entertaining tune, we shall do our best to summarize this rather complex and obscure process as concisely as possible.
We begin with the Legislature’s adoption of the Leroy F. Green School Facilities Act of 1998 (Sen. Bill No. 50 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 1998, ch. 407, § 4) (the Act). The Act’s purpose was to provide adequate education facilities to, among other things, accommodate the increasing number of students and decrease class sizes. (§ 17070.10 et seq.) The Act, therefore, “governs the allocation of state funds for school facilities construction.” (California Charter Schools Assn. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1221, 1230.)

In October 2002, a jury found defendant guilty of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594) and found he had suffered two prior “strike” convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In April 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus two consecutive one-year prior prison term enhancements. Remittitur issued on January 28, 2005.
Almost 16 years later, in January 2021, defendant filed a motion requesting modification of his sentence—specifically, the striking of the two prior prison term enhancements—under Senate Bill No. 136. Because defendant’s judgment had been final for many years, the trial court denied the motion.
On November 17, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion.

In July 2000, Collins, having twice sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer and informant, was given the option of getting eight to 10 years in prison or turning in his friend. He chose to turn in his friend and, to that end, signed a contract with the Modesto Police Department that was approved by the district attorney’s office. Pursuant to the agreement, Collins was required to buy drugs from Ruiz, Ruiz’s brother Javier Ruiz, and another individual in controlled settings, and to testify as needed, in return for which he would plead guilty to one count of selling drugs, and be sentenced to local time and three years’ probation. He was required to obey all laws and make all court appearances, and to keep Modesto Police Sergeant Helton advised of his residence and whereabouts. Helton would contact Collins when a purchase was to be made, then tell him from whom to make the buy.

On October 5, 2016, defendant entered a store and moved toward one of the cash registers. Based on defendant’s gait and odd “mumbling,” it appeared to the cashier that he was drunk. Defendant reached over the counter and began pressing buttons on the cash register. After failing to open the till, defendant pulled out a knife and began “swinging it slowly.” Next, he picked up some merchandise and exited the store. A supervisory employee followed him outside and called 911 to report the incident.
Sheriff’s deputies confronted defendant outside of the store. Defendant extended his arm and pointed the blade of his knife at them. He ignored repeated commands to drop the knife, resulting in a standoff lasting several minutes. Defendant paced back and forth, occasionally pausing to drink from a “liquor bottle,” and taunted the deputies with profane language and gestures.
Defendant alternated between pointing his knife at the deputies and running its blade across his wrists and

Defendant and appellant, D.S. (Mother), is the parent of M.S., a dependent child of the juvenile court who will turn 18 years of age in June 2022. Mother appeals from the August 5, 2021 orders terminating her parental rights to M.S. and selecting adoption as M.S.’s permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother claims (1) insufficient evidence supports the court’s August 5 finding that M.S. was adoptable; and (2) postjudgment evidence that, in September 2021, M.S. had left her prospective adoptive parents’ home and no longer wished to be adopted by them is both admissible in this appeal and undermines the adoptability finding. Thus, Mother claims the section 366.26 orders must be reversed.
Petitioner and respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), counters that (1) substantial evidence supports the August 5, 2021 adoptability finding, and (2) this appellate court

On July 12, 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 3). As to count 1, the jury found true that defendant had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). As to counts 1 and 2, the jury found true that defendant committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In addition, defendant admitted that he had suffered one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)(1)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).

Haghighi owns a two-story, four-unit apartment building in Barstow, California. According to Haghighi, someone vandalized the property on August 3, 2016. At the time, only one of the units was rented out, and that tenant had been out of town on that date. Haghighi had managed the property himself beginning in January 2016, and he testified that from that time he stayed in a second unit two or three days a week, when he came to the property from his home in Los Angeles. According to Haghighi, the damage from the August 3, 2016 vandalism was profound. In addition to substantial breakage and theft, the vandals caused flooding, including by stealing dishwashers and copper pipes for the water heater, leaving water “spewing all over the place.” The flooding caused, among other things, the ceiling of one of the lower units to collapse.
Haghighi reported the damage and filed a claim with Mercury on September 29, 2016.

Jane Doe, born in 1997, is Garcia’s stepdaughter. Garcia married Doe’s mother when Doe was about two years old. Doe grew up considering Garcia to be her father; she was not told until she was 11 years old that he was not her biological father. She described their early relationship as only sometimes typical and normal, as she described Garcia as “a very strict person.” Doe’s family lived in small apartments and moved a lot. At times, Garcia, Doe’s mother and Doe’s siblings slept in the same room; the children sometimes took turns sleeping in the same bed as their parents.
When Doe was seven, Garcia began touching her inappropriately. The first incident (count 1) occurred while Doe slept with her parents in their bed, and Garcia touched her vagina both over and under her bed clothes while he was having intercourse with Doe’s mother. Doe did not say anything because she was confused about what was going on.

As alleged in the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC), WFG is “a multi-level marketing company selling investment, insurance, and various other financial products through a network of distributors.” It operates “nation-wide” with “approximately 3,500 offices in the United States, including many in California.”
Sellers worked for WFG as an “ ‘associate’ ” from April 2018 through early 2019. To work for WFG, Sellers was required to sign a “non-negotiable” contract called an “Associate Membership Agreement” (AMA), which “set forth uniform [company] rules and policies.” Upon signing the AMA, Sellers became a “member of WFG’s independent sales force,” “authorized to engage in the business of selling products” offered by WFG. WFG classified Sellers, and other associates like her, as independent contractors.