CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Brandon Scott Fisher contends on appeal that the trial court exceeded its authority when it imposed alcohol prohibitions on appellant as a condition of his probation. The People concede and we agree. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions to strike probation condition Nos. 22, 24, 25 and 26.

After his motion to suppress was denied, appellant Jesus Alejandro Lopez pled no contest to one felony count of violating Vehicle Code section 10851. He challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

In case No. 16CEJ600074-2R, the court sustained allegations in a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), charging appellant Jeremiah K. with attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 459 & 460, subd. (a)). In case No. 16CEJ600074-2A, the court sustained allegations charging appellant with indecent exposure (§ 314, subd. 1)).
On November 2,2016, the court readjudged appellant a ward of the court. It also revoked and reinstated probation in an unrelated case, set appellant’s maximum term of confinement at three years six months, and committed appellant to juvenile hall for 60 days, followed by release on the Juvenile GPS Monitoring Program for 60 days.
On appeal, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his adjudication for attempted first degree burglary. We affirm.

Mohammed Goraya appeals from the trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award in his favor. On November 17, 2016, after soliciting a letter brief from Goraya regarding the timeliness of the appeal, this court issued an order deeming the appeal timely. After reviewing the record on appeal, however, it is apparent that the contentions in Goraya’s letter brief were inaccurate and mistaken. Having again reviewed the question, which the parties analyzed in their appellate briefs, we are compelled to conclude that the appeal was, in fact, filed late. We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits and must dismiss the appeal.

Gabriel Rosiles stands convicted of the murder of his girlfriend and infliction of corporal injury on her. He argues his conviction must be reversed for a number of reasons. He first contends the trial court committed multiple prejudicial evidentiary errors by: (1) excluding relevant third party culpability evidence; (2) admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence without proper foundation; (3) admitting improper expert testimony on domestic violence; and (4) admitting the improper opinion testimony of an investigating detective. Rosiles next argues the trial court gave a prejudicially erroneous jury instruction regarding consciousness of guilt arising from a third party’s false testimony. Finally, Rosiles argues that trial counsel was ineffective in numerous respects. We will affirm.

Defendant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Financial) appeals the trial court’s December 9, 2016 entry of summary judgment of a bail bond forfeiture and subsequent February 24, 2017 denial of Financial’s motion to set aside summary judgment. We reverse because the court lost jurisdiction over the bond on November 19, 2014, when it failed to forfeit the bond as required under Penal Code section 1305 .

A jury found defendant and appellant Roy Ezell guilty of first degree burglary while another person, other than an accomplice, was present, and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had suffered one prior strike conviction, one prior serious felony conviction, and two prior prison terms. As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 17 years in state prison, consisting of 12 years on the burglary count, plus a consecutive five years for the prior serious felony conviction. The sentence on count 2 was imposed but stayed pursuant to section 654. The trial court also imposed a concurrent one-year sentence on one of defendant’s prior prison term enhancements.
On appeal, defendant contends We reject defendant’s first claim of error because the record reveals defendant abandoned his request to represent himself.

Theresa Hawkins, administrator of the Estate of Edgar J. Hayes, Jr. (Edgar's estate), appeals from an order approving final settlement of the Estate of Almuth Aline Solomon-Hayes (Almuth's estate). Hawkins contends the proceeds from the settlement belong to Edgar's estate, rather than to Edgar's adult children, and the settlement should be cancelled, or, alternatively, reformed to effect transfer of the settlement proceeds to Edgar's estate for administration. We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it approved the settlement, ending years of litigation between the two estates and their heirs. We affirm the order.

Appointed counsel for defendant Thomas Richard Carr filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the entire record, we have found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. We therefore affirm.

Roger Towers appeals from a restraining order issued against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8, which allows an employer to obtain such an order where an employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence. San Joaquin County Counsel’s Office (County Counsel) sought the order after Towers appeared angry and agitated at meetings of the San Joaquin County Planning Commission and San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors, and personally blamed San Joaquin County Community Development Department employee K.S. and a consultant, A.S., for zoning restrictions preventing him from developing his land. The order prevented Towers from harassing, threatening, stalking, or contacting, K.S. and A.S. It further prevented Towers from entering the employees’ workplace, or attending planning commission or board of supervisors’ meetings without first contacting the sheriff’s department to arrange for a deputy to be present.

A petition filed August 31, 2015, alleged that then 15-year-old Elijah S. (the minor) came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he possessed a short-barreled shotgun (Pen. Code, § 33210) and committed the offense in support of a criminal street gang . The minor admitted violating section 33210, the juvenile court found the offense was a felony, and the gang allegation was dismissed. The court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and placed the minor on probation subject to certain terms and conditions including that he “[n]ot own or have any dangerous weapons in his possession” and “[o]bey all laws.”
The minor violated probation by failing to obey the probation department’s directive to report to a meeting with a youth team. The court reinstated the minor on probation.

A juvenile court may commit a minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) only if it finds he or she has committed a “DJF-eligible offense”, and only if it was “the most recent offense alleged in any [section 602] petition and admitted or found to be true by the court.” ; In re D.B However, the court “may dismiss [a section 602] petition, or may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal.” (§ 782.) Under certain conditions--if the “structured institutional environment and special programs available only at the DJF” would best serve a minor’s needs, and if “the severity of a minor’s offenses, and the minor’s own special needs, call for a disposition that includes DJF”--the “ ‘interests of justice and the welfare of the minor’ ” may both point toward a DJF

A jury found defendant Pavel Postelnyak guilty of first degree murder with a firearm for shooting and killing his coworker. He was sentenced to serve 50 years to life in state prison.
Defendant contends on appeal that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because (1) counsel failed to object to alleged character evidence that he had a temper and became more aggressive shortly before the killing, and (2) counsel prematurely withdrew a request to instruct the jury on motive. He also contends insufficient evidence supports his murder conviction.
We conclude defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective as he had strategic reasons for not objecting to the temper evidence and for withdrawing a request to instruct the jury on motive. Even assuming counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable standard, we conclude there is no prejudice. We also conclude sufficient evidence supports defendant’s murder conviction. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Gordon Allen Wilson molested K.L., who was about eight years old, on many occasions when she was visiting his home. Convicted of 13 counts of committing a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 27 years in state prison, defendant appeals. He contends (1) the trial court negated the intent element of section 288(a) by instructing the jury that motive is not an element of the crime; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive terms. We conclude (1) intent and motive are not synonymous, so the jury instructions did not negate the intent element of section 288(a); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying probation; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive terms.
We will affirm the judgment.