CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Howard Edward Winston III pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine base for saleand admitted five prior drug convictions (§ 11370.2) in case No. 12F05147, and pleaded no contest to felon in possession of ammunition and misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior driving under the influence conviction in case No. 12F03368. The trial court imposed a stipulated state prison term of 18 years eight months.
On appeal, defendant contends there were insufficient reasons to impound his vehicle, the inventory search of his vehicle was not conducted pursuant to a standardized policy, and asks us to review the sealed affidavit to ascertain whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the search warrant. In supplemental briefs, he contends changes in the law reducing punishment for possession of cocaine base for sale and to section 11370.2 enhancements for prior drug convictions should apply retroactively to modify his sentence.

Defendant Dallas D. Rose appeals the revocation of his parole based on his failure to charge his GPS monitoring device and failure to report to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Adult Parole Operations (the Department). Defendant asserts that the Department failed to prove with admissible evidence that he had a conviction requiring ankle monitoring. Defendant argues that the Department used inadmissible hearsay to prove the underlying out-of-state rape conviction. We affirm because the Department had discretion to require electronic monitoring, regardless of whether defendant had been previously convicted of rape.

Marc Andre Edwards appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found gang and firearm enhancement allegations to be true. The trial court sentenced him to 48 years to life in prison.

This appeal arises from a slip and fall accident at a Vons grocery store. Rose and Raul Peralta (collectively, Peraltas) argue the trial court improperly entered summary judgment for The Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons), as there were triable issues of material fact that should have been decided by a jury. Vons argues there is no admissible evidence showing Vons breached its duty of care, or that any act or omission on their part caused Rose’s injuries. As we conclude appellant has failed to establish the existence of any issues of material fact, we affirm.

Jessica Hernandez (respondent), a former employee of AutoZone, filed this action against appellants alleging sexual harassment, battery, and negligence arising from her employment. Respondent agreed to arbitrate all disputes “arising out of or related to” her employment or termination of employment with AutoZone. Respondent specifically alleged that Vilchez carried out multiple incidents of harassment and battery “during business hours while (respondent) was on duty in [AutoZone’s] employment and . . . during the course and scope of [Vilchez’s] employment at [AutoZone].” Respondent also specifically alleged that, at all relevant times, Vilchez “was an agent and servant, acting within the course and scope of his employment with [AutoZone].”

Defendant and appellant Jason Zarr Haber appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of possessing methamphetamine for sale. He contends that a three-year sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to former section 11370.2 of the Health and Safety Code must be stricken, and the matter remanded for resentencing, in light of recent amendments to the law. The People concede the point, and we agree. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of conviction, but order the sentence vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the scope and amount of benefits due pursuant to a homeowner’s insurance policy. Roger and Mia Novack (the Novacks) appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, contending there remain triable issues of material fact that should be heard by a jury. We conclude Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (Pacific Specialty) has met its burden to demonstrate the Novacks failed to produce any evidence creating a triable issue of material fact, as there was a genuine dispute regarding the claims and Pacific Specialty conducted a thorough investigation of the Novacks’ claims. We therefore affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jordan Joseph (defendant) guilty of second degree murder for shooting Kody Cook (Cook) as Cook sat in his car. Defendant testified he shot Cook because Cook was reaching for a gun, but no weapon was recovered from Cook’s car. Defendant was 17 years old when he shot Cook, and at a fitness hearing held under then governing law prior to changes made by Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (the Act), the juvenile court determined defendant was not fit for juvenile court proceedings and permitted prosecutors to file charges in a court of criminal jurisdiction. We consider whether the changes worked by the Act require a new fitness hearing for defendant because his conviction is not yet final. We also consider whether the trial court should have given defendant’s proposed jury instruction on imperfect self-defense and whether reversal is warranted due to asserted prosecutorial misconduct.

Five weeks into a bench trial accusing him of fraud, defendant and appellant Frank Lane entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiffs and respondents Jeffrey Catanzarite Family Limited Partnership and others (collectively, Respondents) for a stipulated judgment in Respondents’ favor in the amount of $1.5 million. Approximately six months later, Lane filed a motion to vacate the settlement agreement contending he lacked the mental capacity to enter into it. The trial court denied the motion, and Lane now contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding his medical expert’s declaration and denying his motion to vacate. We disagree and affirm.

Defendants and appellants Tessie Cue (Cue) and Majestic Air (Majestic) (collectively, defendants) appeal from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and cross-appellant Ansett Aircraft Spares & Services, Inc. (Ansett), following a jury trial in this action for misappropriation of trade secrets, interference with prospective economic relationships, breach of contract, and unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the UCL claim).
Ansett also appeals from the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on punitive damages, by apportioning liability among defendants on the breach of contract claim, and by refusing to enter a judgment that held defendants jointly and severally liable for the damages awarded by the jury. Ansett further contends judgment should have been entered in its favor on its UCL claim and a permanent injunction issued against defendants.

This appeal and cross-appeal arise out of a car accident in which Rebecca Latham hit Samuel Gallagher as he was walking in a crosswalk. A jury found Latham negligent and awarded Gallagher future economic damages, including medical expenses, past noneconomic damages, but no future noneconomic damages. Gallagher filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the jury’s award was inadequate and inconsistent. The trial court failed to rule on the motion within the 60-day statutory deadline, but subsequently issued an order nunc pro tunc purporting to grant the motion for a new trial.
In her appeal, Latham argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial after the expiration of the 60-day period. In his cross-appeal, Gallagher argues that, if the nunc pro tunc order was not effective and his motion for a new trial was denied as a matter of law, the jury’s verdict was inadequate and inconsistent.

Zackariah Lehnen appeals from his judgment of conviction of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with findings that he committed multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and personally used a deadly weapon in his commission of the crimes (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) On appeal, Lehnen argues the trial court erred when it: admitted evidence of his jailhouse confession to a police informant; failed to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of murder; and calculated his presentence custody credits. We modify the judgment to correct the sentencing error, but otherwise affirm.

In 1995, Murray Goldstein, as trustee for his trust, entered into a limited partnership agreement with his daughter, Elise Goldstein, regarding the ownership and operation of certain real property. Under the agreement, Elise could not transfer her interest in the partnership without Murray’s prior written consent. In 2006, after Elise was diagnosed with a terminal illness, she transferred her partnership interest to her revocable living trust, and then amended her trust to provide that such interest should be distributed to her two siblings, Judy Egan and David Goldstein, upon her death. The day after Elise amended her trust, Murray provided his written consent to the transfer of Elise’s partnership interest to the trustee of her living trust, as amended, but did not sign a separate document consenting to the transfer of such interest from Elise’s trust to Judy and David.

In a dispute between a borrower and lender, the borrower’s assignee instituted arbitration proceedings against the lender pursuant to the terms of a June 2006 promissory note. The arbitrators awarded the assignee $672,122 on that and scores of similar notes, and the superior court confirmed the award. In a prior appeal we reversed, concluding the arbitrators exceeded their authority because the arbitration provision in the June 2006 note pertained only to that one note, and none of the other notes contained an arbitration provision. On remand the assignee sought from the trial court an order directing the arbitrators to enter an award in the assignee’s favor on the June 2006 note only. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over the dispute.
We affirm.