CA Unpub Decisions

The County of Sonoma (County) issued a land use permit to real party in interest GTE Mobilenet of California LP (doing business as Verizon Wireless; hereafter Verizon) for an “Intermediate Freestanding Telecommunications Facility” in the form of a 65-foot faux pine tree and related ground-mounted equipment located at 421 Pepper Lane in Petaluma (the Project). Appellant Pepper Lane Neighbors for Environmental Protection (Pepper Lane) filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging, inter alia, violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.), local ordinances, and due process, as well as inconsistency with the “Petaluma Dairy Belt Area Plan.” The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the CEQA and Petaluma Dairy Belt Area Plan claims and, after hearing, denied the remaining claims. Pepper Lane appeals, focusing on the visual and aesthetic impacts of the Project. We affirm.

Kathleen Needham (Kathleen) appeals from two judgments enforcing a settlement agreement that resolved litigation arising out of the sale of her real property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6). We affirm. We also conclude respondents are entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court.

Appeal from a judgment enforcing a settlement.
Ignacio and Martin Becerra were employed by R. D. Hughes Drywall, owned and operated by Roger Hughes. Believing they had been improperly terminated, they sued Hughes on a variety of causes of action. In May 2016, each side being represented by counsel, the parties advised Judge Allan Hardcastle that they had reached a settlement. Counsel for the Becerras stated the terms:
“[Y]our Honor, . . . the total amount is $70,000. It’s going to be broken up in the following amounts. 28,000 will be paid within 60 days to the Li & Lozada Law Group [counsel for plaintiffs]. . . . [¶] 11,000 will be paid to Martin Becerra and 11,000 will be paid to Ignacio Becerra, with—inclusive of—I’m sorry, and it will be taxed accordingly as—as required by California State law and the federal government.

In this marital dissolution proceeding, Annemarie Schilders (Annemarie) asks us to reverse a family court order denying her request that Steven Stupp (Steven) pay $370,000 in attorney’s fees under Family Code section 2030. The order rested on the family court’s finding that the parties were essentially in the same financial position and that neither of them had the ability to pay attorney’s fees going forward. Because we conclude that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence, we shall reverse.

In this marital dissolution proceeding, Annemarie Schilders (Annemarie) asks us to reverse a family court order denying her request that Steven Stupp (Steven) pay $370,000 in attorney’s fees under Family Code section 2030. The order rested on the family court’s finding that the parties were essentially in the same financial position and that neither of them had the ability to pay attorney’s fees going forward. Because we conclude that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence, we shall reverse.

Keron Haynes appeals from a final judgment of recommitment for treatment under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act or the Act) (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.). He contends his recommitment was unauthorized after the underlying felony offense on which his original commitment was based was reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10; see Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
Because the trial court granted appellant’s motion to dismiss the district attorney’s subsequent petition for recommitment, and appellant has been released, we find that his claim is moot. We will therefore dismiss the appeal.

In appeal A146301, Annemarie challenges the September 2015 order granting Steven’s motion and awarding Steven discovery sanctions as well as sanctions under Family Code section 271. We shall affirm the order except that we shall reverse the award of sanctions under section 271. In appeal A148051, Annemarie challenges a February 2016 order correcting the obvious clerical error that occurred when the conflicting orders were filed in September 2015. We shall affirm the order.

Under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.), no punitive action may be taken against a public safety officer for any alleged act, omission, or other misconduct unless the investigation is completed within one year of “the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct,” subject to certain statutory exceptions. (§ 3304, subd. (d)(1).) One such exception provides that the one-year time period is tolled while the act, omission, or other alleged misconduct is also the “subject” of a pending criminal investigation or prosecution. (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).)

Defendant Cameron Allen Wiess appeals a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of second degree murder and attempted murder and rejected his claim that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. He contends that the trial court committed instructional error, that the sanity finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and that his sentences should run concurrently rather than consecutively. We shall affirm the judgment.

Codefendants Ezell Edwards and Anthony Hoskins appeal from a judgment entered after a jury trial convicting them of the second degree murder of Brondon McDaniel and other charges and enhancements, for which they were sentenced to terms of 43 years to life and 60 years to life respectively. They assert Batson-Wheeler error, arguing the district attorney improperly struck the only two African-American prospective jurors because of the district attorney’s racial bias. Hoskins, whom Edwards purports to join, also argues the trial court prejudicially erred by improperly admitting certain accomplice and informant testimony, uncharged offenses evidence and statements by Collier and Edwards against him; that he, Hoskins, received ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the court should not have ordered him to pay for a probation report.

We first encountered minor Alice Z. in 2014, when she was about five years old. Anaheim police officers had picked her up two years earlier after discovering her living with her parents, Michael and Tara Z., in almost unimaginable filth and squalor. Alice was returned to her parents with family maintenance services under the supervision of Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), services mainly focused on seeing that Alice’s home met minimum health and safety requirements and that she obtained necessary medical and dental care. The case was closed in 2015.

Alma G., the mother of minors Juan Pablo C. and Mariela Ruby C., has petitioned for reversal of an order of the juvenile court terminating her reunification services. Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) obtained custody of Juan and Ruby after Alma left their younger sister alone in the bathtub. The sister drowned.
The juvenile court terminated Alma’s services at a point just shy of the 24-month maximum allowed by the Welfare and Institutions Code for dependent children. Alma then petitioned this court to challenge the order, but the notice of intent to file a petition was filed late. Since Alma was unable to present facts amounting to an exceptional showing of good cause for this tardiness, we must dismiss the petition. But even if we had reviewed the petition on the merits, Alma would have come up short.

Ann Michelle Rosensitto appeals from an order setting aside a prior stipulation and order concerning her spousal support and child support, pursuant to Family Code sections 3690 and 3691. The trial court found the stipulation resulted from Ann’s fraudulent concealment of a new job and higher income during negotiations she and her ex-husband, Lewis, had regarding modified support amounts. Ann argues the set aside was error because Lewis’s request for it was untimely and there is inadequate evidence to support the trial court’s fraud determination. We conclude otherwise and affirm the order.

Based on his assault of his estranged wife in her home, a jury convicted Ernesto Luis Escamilla of residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code unless noted), domestic violence battery causing injury with a prior conviction for battery or assault (§ 273.5, subds. (a), (f)(1)), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)), and violation of a protective order with a prior conviction (§ 166, subd. (c)(4)). In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found enhancement allegations true concerning a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); 1192.7, subd. (c)(1), a prior serious and violent felony (§§ 667, subd. (d), (e)(1); § 1170.12, subd. (b), (c)(1)), and five prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Escamilla to an aggregate prison term of 21 years and 8 months. On appeal, he contends the court erre