CA Unpub Decisions

Noe Hernandez (appellant) was convicted and sentenced to 15 years to life as to one count of murder and three counts of attempted murder. Additionally, as to each count, he received a firearm enhancement of 25 years to life pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The 10-year and the 20-year enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) were stayed.
In this appeal, appellant seeks a new sentencing hearing in light of Senate Bill No. 620 (SB 620), a bill that amended section 1385, subdivision (h) and gave trial courts the discretion to strike firearm enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53. We conditionally reverse the firearm enhancements and remand the matter to the trial court to determine whether to strike any or all of the enhancements. If the trial court does not strike any of the enhancements, then the enhancements shall be reinstated as originally imposed or stayed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Tony B. committed a murder during the course of a residential robbery. Because he was over 14, and had committed a grave offense, he was charged directly in the criminal court pursuant to the filing discretion vested in the People at the time. Following the voters’ passage of amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 (Proposition 57), which removed the People’s filing discretion, Tony B.’s case was certified to the juvenile court for consideration of a motion to transfer the matter back to the criminal court under the section’s amended terms. (See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 (Lara).) After a protracted hearing, the juvenile court determined that Tony B. was not a proper subject for treatment in the juvenile court, and so returned the matter to criminal court.
Tony B. seeks review of that order by way of the instant petition for writ of mandate. This court initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court directed that we

Larry Joshua Lara appeals a judgment following his conviction after trial by jury for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310), a felony. The trial court found Lara had two prior strike convictions for robbery (§ 211, 667, subds. (d) & (e)), and had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5). The court sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of seven years.

The People appeal the trial court’s order dismissing the charges against Miguel Angel Chi for felony identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a). The court determined that Chi’s use of stolen credit cards to purchase store merchandise worth less than $950 could be charged only as misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5, subdivision (a). The People argue that section 459.5, which was enacted as part of Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18), does not apply to section 530.5 identity theft offenses, and that the cases relied upon by the trial court do not permit dismissal of a charged violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a). We recently rejected this argument in People v. Jimenez (May 8, 2018, B283858) _ Cal.App.5th _ [2018 Cal.App. LEXIS 410] (Jimenez). For the reasons set forth in that opinion, we conclude the court correctly dismissed the identity theft charges (counts 1-3) pursuant to Proposition 47. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendants Bhupendra Bhakta and Arvind Patel appeal a $40,837.57 judgment entered against them in favor of plaintiff Choice Hotels International, Inc. (Choice). This judgment originated from a Maryland state court and was filed in the Ventura County Superior Court under the Sister State Money Judgments Act (SSMJA). (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.10 et seq.) We conclude, among other things, that 1) Bhakta and Patel did not comply with or exhaust the statutory procedures for challenging a sister-state judgment that were available for them in the Ventura County Superior Court; and 2) they have not shown that the judgment the superior court entered was invalid, incorrect or that the SSMJA statutory procedure violated their constitutional rights. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Midtowne Spa, Inc. (Midtowne), a lawful commercial sex venue (CSV), was cited for violating CSV Regulations, Item 7 (Rule 7), which prohibits a CSV from “permit[ting] a person to enter, be or remain in any part of a CSV while in possession of, or consuming, using or clearly under the influence of, any alcoholic beverage or illegal drug.” Midtowne challenged the citation, and both the administrative law judge and trial court affirmed the citation. Midtowne now appeals the trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of administrative mandate. Because substantial evidence supports the citation, we affirm the judgment.

In this child custody move-away case, A.R. (mother) appeals a paternity judgment that denied her request to relocate the parties’ minor child from California to New Mexico, and granted primary physical custody to respondent A.W. (father), with visitation/parenting time to mother.
As discussed below, we perceive no prejudicial abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling, which denied the move-away request as not being in the minor’s best interests. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

Daniela Castillo (appellant) appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Price Pfister, Inc. (PPI), Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. (BDI), and Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. (Stanley) (collectively respondents) on her complaint for negligence and products liability. On appeal, she contends the trial court erred when it ruled her claims were time-barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4.
We find no error and affirm.

Ernest Sumen sued his former employer, Silver Star A.G., LTD., for wrongful termination, alleging Silver Star terminated his employment because he complained about unsafe working conditions. Silver Star moved for summary judgment or adjudication, asserting Sumen was discharged not because he complained about a safety concern but because his job performance was poor. The trial court found no triable issue existed as to whether Sumen either complained about a safety issue or was terminated because of a complaint, and granted Silver Star’s motion for summary judgment.
We conclude no triable issues exist as to whether Silver Star retaliated against Sumen for reporting safety concerns. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

After Lu Zhu and Jin Yan sued Yuan Yuan Geng in small claims court, Ms. Geng filed an unlimited jurisdiction civil case against them, and moved to have the small claims case transferred to the general jurisdiction court. After the small claims case was transferred, Ms. Geng voluntarily dismissed her general jurisdiction case against Zhu and Yan. After the dismissal was filed, Zhu and Yan filed a memorandum of costs, seeking $950 in filing and motion fees, $60 for service of process, and $15,606.25 in attorney fees, and also filed a separate motion explaining the basis for an attorney fee award. Ms. Geng filed a motion to tax costs, and opposed the motion for attorney fees, arguing that Zhu and Yan were not entitled to costs or fees under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 or 116.390, subdivision (e). The trial court entered judgment in favor of Zhu and Yan for costs of $1,010. Ms. Geng timely appealed the cost award.

These cross-appeals from the denial of both sides’ anti-SLAPP motions concern a long-running dispute between neighboring property owners. Plaintiff, cross-defendant and appellant Diana Gdowski owns a parcel of residential property located downslope from the property owned by defendants, cross-complainants and appellants Wayne K. Tsang and Bonni C. Ying. For several years, defendants have been substantially remodeling their home and the rear yard of their property. According to plaintiff, the project is being developed in violation of an agreement between the parties regarding a drainage plan to remediate runoff from defendants’ property onto plaintiff’s property. On the other hand, defendants contend their project complies with all permits and conditions, and plaintiff has engaged in a campaign of harassment to thwart completion of the project.

Mazen Adballah Aliahmad appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury of four counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) As to three counts, the jury found that appellant had substantial sexual conduct with the victim. (Id., § 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) Appellant was sentenced to prison for 12 years. He was ordered to pay the victim restitution of $100,000.

Andre Costa Soares appeals from the December 7, 2016 judgment revoking probation in two matters, case No. BA440274 and case No. BA440980. Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Pi-Aqua, Inc. (Pi-Aqua), a lawful commercial sex venue (CSV), was cited for violating CSV Regulations, Item 7 (Rule 7), which prohibits a CSV from “permit[ting] a person to enter, be or remain in any part of a CSV while in possession of, or consuming, using or clearly under the influence of, any alcoholic beverage or illegal drug.” Pi-Aqua challenged the citation, and both the administrative law judge and the trial court affirmed the citation. Pi-Aqua now appeals the trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of administrative mandate. Because substantial evidence supports the citation, we affirm the judgment.