CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Hung Si Vuong of first degree residential burglary and found true an allegation that another person was present in the residence at the time. The jury also found true Vuong’s prior strike conviction for first degree residential burglary. Vuong’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his last minute oral motion to continue the trial so he could fire his lawyer and retain new counsel. We find no error and therefore affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant LaShanda Jones appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendant and respondent Masongrove Homeowners Association. The judgment of dismissal was entered after the court sustained without leave to amend defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s third amended complaint.

Third Wave Technology Services, Inc. (Third Wave) filed two appeals. In one appeal, it challenges an order disqualifying its counsel, Haney & Young. In the other appeal, Third Wave challenges an order denying Haney & Young’s motion to be reinstated as counsel.
We find no error and affirm.

Charles C. Davis appeals an order denying a petition to recall and resentence his felony conviction for the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, with a prior similar conviction, to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (Pen. Code, §§ 666.5, 1170.18, subd. (a).) We reverse and remand so that Davis may file his Proposition 47 petition to prove, if he can, the elements required for relief.

The juvenile court bypassed reunification services for Courtney K. (mother) and presumed father Robert V. (father, collectively parents) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 and set a permanency planning hearing (.26 hearing). Parents petition for writ relief. They contend the court erred by denying reunification services. We deny the petitions.

Jordan Louis Golston (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 ), and the trial court sentenced him to six years in prison. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and shall affirm the judgment.

Lyman Sims appeals from a superior court decision denying his petition to reclassify two robbery convictions as misdemeanors under provisions of Proposition 47. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. We conclude there are no issues requiring further review and affirm.

In this dependency appeal, Tonya C. (mother) seeks relief from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights with respect to her son Damien M. (born October 2006) at a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Appellant contends that termination of her parental rights was improper under the “beneficial relationship” exception to adoption. In addition, she argues that her due process rights were violated when she failed to receive visitation with the minor for six months prior to the permanency planning hearing and that the juvenile court failed to properly consider Damien’s wishes before terminating her parental rights. Seeing no error requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s termination order, we affirm.

Appellant A.P. (Mother) is the 20-year-old mother of two daughters, R.M. (age two) and H.S. (age four). This appeal concerns only H.S., who was detained by child welfare authorities after her half-sister R.M. was brought to the hospital with 11 broken bones in different stages of healing. Ultimately, the juvenile court sustained R.M.’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (e) (severe physical abuse) and H.S.’s petition under section 300, subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling). At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court placed H.S. with her noncustodial father, K.S., and denied Mother reunification services under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2) and (b)(3). It also reduced Mother’s supervised visits from once a week for one hour to four times a month for one hour each.

Defendant Douglas Wilson appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment of conviction against him after jury trial, ordering him to be placed on three years felony probation, and to serve six months in county jail, regarding criminal misconduct that occurred on April 9, 2016. Defendant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief that does not raise any legal issues. Counsel requests that this court independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and has not done so. Upon our independent review of the record pursuant to Wende, we conclude there are no arguable appellate issues requiring further briefing and affirm the judgment.

Attorney Eugene Schneider appeals the denial of a motion seeking approximately $42,000 in contractual attorney fees in a dispute with his former client, respondent Eric Deam. We affirm the order denying his request for attorney fees.

In this consolidated appeal, defendant Waymond Earl Starritt appeals a judgment entered on a single sentence following his convictions in two separate jury trials. In the first case, he was found guilty by a jury of possession for sale of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) (count one) and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310) (count two); as to count one, the trial court found true allegations that he had three prior convictions within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). In the second case, Starritt was found guilty by a jury of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69) (count one) and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (id., § 21310) (count two); as to both counts, the trial court found true the allegation that Starritt had committed the offenses while on bail in the first case (id., § 12022.1). The trial court imposed sentence in both matters, sentencing Starritt to a total unstayed term of 15 years

Defendant Paul Scott’s appeal raises several fact-specific questions. Was there substantial evidence at trial that Scott was defending himself, such that it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury on self-defense? Was there substantial evidence that he and the victim, Jane Doe, cohabitated in an intimate relationship, as required under the theory of Penal Code section 273.5 that was charged in the information? And was there substantial evidence that Scott inflicted great bodily injury on Doe, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e)? Our review of the record in response to these questions, and our determination of a legal issue affecting sentencing, lead us to affirm.

On April 2, 2018, appellant filed separate notices of appeal purporting to appeal from orders entered on August 18, 2017 and September 15, 2017. According to the notices of appeal, the September 2017 order “modified” the August 2017 order, and both orders were in turn “modified” by a January 31, 2018 order. Appellant asserts all three orders are appealable as postjudgment orders (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2)) and as orders granting (or refusing to dissolve) an injunction (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6).)
The gap between the entry of the August and September 2017 orders and the filing of the notices of appeal was significant — 227 and 199 days, respectively. Assuming for the sake of argument that these were appealable orders, the notices of appeal were untimely. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104, 8.108; see Anderson v. Chikovani (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1401