CA Unpub Decisions

Lisa S. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders exerting dependency jurisdiction over her daughter Paige S. (Paige) and removing Paige from her custody, and argues that neither order is supported by substantial evidence. We conclude to the contrary, and affirm.

Appellant Guillermina S. (Mother), mother of three boys, Anthony S., J.S. and I.M., appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order asserting jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d), based on the unhygienic condition of the family home and Mother’s failure to protect the children from her husband, Louis S., who used drugs and had a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a minor. In her opening brief, Mother contends there was no substantial evidence to support the findings that the children were at risk as a result of the condition of the family home or Louis’s conviction for sexual abuse, but does not address the finding that Louis’s long-time drug abuse posed a risk to her sons.

A jury convicted Kenneth Watkins (defendant) of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that he used a deadly and dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 16 years to life, comprised of 15 years to life for the murder and one year for the weapon enhancement.
Defendant filed a timely appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On February 13, 2018, we gave notice to defendant that his counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. The period elapsed, and we received no response from defendant.

This juvenile dependency case involves three children: Maxwell M. (who was 21 months old at the time the petition was filed), Logan F. (who was almost four years old), and Paris F. (who was 10 years old). C.S. (mother) is the mother of all three children; Anthony M. (father) is Maxwell’s father and the step father of Logan and Paris. In this appeal, mother and father challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders. We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s findings and affirm both orders.

S.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of her request for a continuance for a contested disposition hearing; and the juvenile court’s order removing her children A.D., age five, and A.P., age two, from her custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361, subdivision (c), on the ground that the order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for a continuance, and that there was substantial evidence to support the court’s order removing the children from her custody. We therefore affirm.

Dejuan Lamont Robertson (defendant) removed items from a storage shed less than ten feet away from the back door of an apartment located above a mortuary. A jury convicted him of first degree burglary and, because the apartment was occupied at the time, specially found that a person was “present in the residence during [the burglary’s] commission.” On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not declaring a doubt about his competence to stand trial and that the jury’s verdict and special finding are not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.

A jury convicted Robert Andrew Rodriguez (Rodriguez) of first degree burglary of a residence. On appeal, Rodriguez contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, specifically, the jury’s determination that he entered the residence with the intent to commit rape or theft. However, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we find there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the intent element beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm the conviction.

A jury convicted Robert Andrew Rodriguez (Rodriguez) of first degree burglary of a residence. On appeal, Rodriguez contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, specifically, the jury’s determination that he entered the residence with the intent to commit rape or theft. However, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we find there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the intent element beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm the conviction.

Kevin Crey and Toni Crey (the Creys) appeal from a summary judgment motion granted in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (Wells Fargo). However, the Creys have failed to provide Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment or the parties’ declarations in support of, and in opposition to, the motion or their statements of undisputed fact or their evidentiary objections. Where, as here, the Creys fail to provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or order is correct and, on that basis, affirm.

“[A] default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) Defendants argue here that the process server fabricated the service of summons and, as a result, did not serve it in the prescribed manner. The trial court rejected the fabrication argument, found service valid, and denied defendants’ motion to set aside a default judgment as void. On appeal, we decline defendants’ invitation to reweigh the trial court’s credibility determinations. We affirm the order denying defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment.
The appeal from that order was consolidated with an appeal from the judgment. We dismiss the appeal from the judgment because defendants have abandoned it.

A jury convicted Marvin Collins (defendant) of injuring a spouse, cohabitant, or girlfriend through the personal infliction of great bodily injury after he beat his on-again, off-again girlfriend in his duplex apartment. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court committed numerous instructional and evidentiary errors and also committed reversible error in imposing a six-year prison sentence rather than placing him on probation. We conclude there was no reversible error, and affirm.

A jury convicted Juan Bernard Dominguez (Dominguez) and Richard Ernesto Mendoza (Mendoza) of two counts of attempted murder as well as shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The jury also found that Dominguez personally discharged a firearm and that the crimes were committed to benefit a criminal street gang. On appeal, Dominguez contends that imposition of the gang enhancement was improper because the prosecution failed to establish the requisite connection between the overarching gang and its subsets and failed to present sufficient evidence that the crimes were committed at the direction of, in association with, or to benefit the gang. We disagree. Mendoza claims that several portions of the gang expert’s testimony constituted testimonial hearsay and should have been excluded under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). We disagree. Mendoza also claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on premeditated murder based on aiding and abetting liability.

Plaintiff Aharon Simkin appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the probate court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to his petition alleging wrongful conduct by his brother, defendant Michael Simkin, regarding their deceased father’s assets and living trust. Aharon alleged that Michael unduly influenced their elderly and infirm father, who depended on Michael as a caretaker and attorney, to make various transfers and trust amendments to Michael’s benefit. The probate court found the causes of action lacking largely on the basis that Aharon had failed to plead undue influence adequately. We disagree with the probate court’s conclusion, and accordingly reverse the order sustaining the demurrer to seven of Aharon’s 10 causes of action. Aharon has also shown a reasonable possibility that the defects in two of the remaining causes of action may be cured by amendment.

Around 10:30 a.m. on March 6, 2014, Douglas Wooley walked across 97th Street on the west side of Main Street in Los Angeles. As he crossed, a gold Mercury Grand Marquis crossed Main on 97th and stopped where Wooley had crossed. Two men emerged from the passenger’s side of the Grand Marquis and each fired several shots at Wooley, killing him. Desmond McMiller, Patrick Pearson, and Deshonda Young were arrested and charged with Wooley’s murder and various other crimes—11 counts in all—associated with the murder and the ensuing investigation.
After a joint trial, the jury found the three defendants guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Young to 65 years to life, Pearson to 72 years to life, and McMiller to 161 years and four months to life in prison. Each defendant appeals, and each defendant joins in arguments made by each of the other defendants. Finding no error.