CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Oracle appeals from an order denying her special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Oracle contends the trial court erred in denying her motion on the ground that the first amended complaint for breach of contract (a residential lease agreement) filed by Lynch Partners, LLC (Lynch) did not arise out of protected activity. Oracle claims Lynch's action is based on a letter from her counsel demanding that Lynch return the security deposit she paid under the lease agreement, and sending a prelitigation demand letter threatening litigation is a protected exercise of the right of petition. We disagree that Lynch's breach of contract action is based on Oracle's demand for return of her security deposit and, accordingly, affirm.

Defendant Henry Miller pleaded guilty to one felony count and admitted the allegations that he had suffered four prior serious or violent felony convictions and had served two prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced Miller to a prison term of seven years—the upper term of three years (for the current felony conviction), doubled (for the serious or violent felony conviction priors), plus an additional year (for the first prison prior).
On appeal, Miller argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the upper term on the current felony conviction. We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

Marcelle Egley and Repossession Specialists, Inc. doing business as ABA Recovery Service (ABA) sued Ashley Sparks for slander per se, trade libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The superior court granted Sparks's motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. Egley appeals, contending the court erred in determining: (1) Sparks's statement was protected speech and (2) Egley did not carry her burden of showing a probability of success on the merits. We agree with Egley on her first point. On the record before us, we cannot say that Sparks showed that his statement giving rise to the underlying complaint was protected speech. As such, we reverse the order granting Sparks's anti-SLAPP motion.

Objector and appellant Jeanette Bazzell Turner appeals from a judgment after a trial in favor of petitioner and respondent Beverly Brito, as Administrator of the Estate of Ike Turner (the Administrator). In her opening brief, Turner contends the probate court erred in: (1) denying Turner's ex parte application to continue the trial; (2) overruling Turner's objection to the admission of a deposition transcript into evidence; and (3) denying Turner's motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial. In addition to disagreeing with Turner's substantive arguments, the Administrator contends that Turner did not timely file her notice of appeal from the judgment. We agree with the Administrator's jurisdictional argument and will dismiss the appeal.

Appellants Vincent Krolikowski and Connie Van Putten (collectively appellants) are former employees of the City of San Diego (the City) and members of the San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (SDCERS) who receive monthly pension payments from SDCERS, the administrator of the City's pension plan. Krolikowski and Van Putten separately filed lawsuits against SDCERS after SDCERS discovered an error in calculating their monthly pension benefits and took action to recoup the past overpayments. In their now-consolidated lawsuits, Krolikowski and Van Putten assert causes of action for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) and declaratory relief, all of which challenge SDCERS's ability to implement a recoupment procedure to collect the overpayments from Krolikowski and Van Putten. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of SDCERS.

On February 19, 2017, defendant Adam Anthony Kelley exchanged words with Michael F. at a gas station store in Olivehurst. They separately left the store, Michael leaving first. Michael waited outside and armed himself with a machete. Defendant left the store and, in the parking lot, Michael swung the machete at defendant but missed. Michael dropped the machete but picked it up as he ran away. Defendant went to his vehicle, retrieved a .22-caliber rifle, and fired several shots at Michael, striking him once in the back, entering his chest. The wound was potentially life threatening. Michael was hospitalized for several days.
On July 28, 2017, defendant was charged with attempted murder (count 1), assault with a firearm (count 2), and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (count 3). Firearm enhancements were alleged in connection with count 1 and a great bodily injury enhancement was alleged in connection with count 2.

An amended consolidated complaint that was deemed an information charged defendant Randnette Francine Billings with felony welfare fraud (count 1; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2)); perjury on an aid application (count 2; Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a)); offering a false document at trial (count 3; § 132); obtaining money exceeding $950 by fraudulent means (count 4; § 487, subd. (a)), and submitting fraudulent time sheets to In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) (count 5; § 72).
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted on all counts.
The trial evidence showed that defendant received a total of $56,813 in cash aid and food stamps (CalWORKs & CalFresh) during the years 2006 through 2010, based on her representation that she had no income, while in fact she earned income during that period by working for IHSS as an in-home caregiver.

A jury found defendant Victor Glenn Hedrick guilty of inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), and the trial court sentenced him to four years in prison. He timely appeals, contending the trial court erroneously admitted two prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code section 1109. As we will explain, we agree both prior acts were admitted in error, but find the error harmless and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Melvin George Humphrey guilty of manufacturing concentrated cannabis and possessing marijuana for sale. On appeal, defendant contends he was denied due process by the presentation of false evidence, which was stipulated to by his trial counsel. We will affirm.

Defendant Cody Allen Kirk appeals from the order denying his petition for relief from mandatory sex offender registration on equal protection grounds. He contends that state and federal equal protection principles require that the registration requirement be stricken. He alternatively requests that his appeal be dismissed without prejudice if we determine the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the petition. We affirm the trial court’s order.

Appellant Jennifer M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over her children Jamaya (born April 2013) and Howard (born April 2014). Mother’s sole basis for challenging the order is that the children are not adoptable. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability, and we therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Brenda S. (mother) appeals from the dependency court’s September 2017 order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Mother’s petition sought an order placing her three children, including her daughter A.S., with her at maternal great grandparents’ home. She contends on appeal the court abused its discretion when it denied the petition without a hearing. We affirm.

Appellant Shaka L. (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders, made at the six-month review hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e), continuing the placement of his twin daughters, Brooklyn and Londyn (born July 2016), outside of his custody and according him monitored visits. We affirm the orders.

Cesar G. (father) appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court, entered after his son Ryan G. (Ryan) was adjudicated a dependent of the court. Father challenges the findings underlying the dispositional orders as unsupported by substantial evidence. He also contends that the court was required to afford him unmonitored visitation absent a finding of detriment to the child. Finding no merit to father’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.