CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Glen Austin Wagner appeals the judgment following his convictions for first-degree murder and mayhem. The jury also found true sentence enhancement allegations for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm and proximately causing great bodily injury, and for committing the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Appellant contends (1) he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, who failed to discover that his prior felony burglary conviction used to impeach his testimony had been reduced to a misdemeanor, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted a witness’s involuntary statements to police, and counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make a timely motion to suppress, and (3) remand is required so that the trial court may exercise its newly enacted discretion to strike the firearm enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2), and to correct a miscalculation of his pre-sentence credits.

Plaintiffs and appellants Debra S. Johnson-Champ and Michael W. Champ (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from orders vacating a default and default judgment entered against defendant Thomas Helo (Helo) and recalling and quashing the writ of execution, following the trial court’s grant of a motion by real party in interest and respondent George Schwary (respondent) requesting such relief. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

Defendant and appellant Stephen Galindo (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance for sale. He contends that the judgment was unsupported by substantial evidence. We find no merit to defendant’s contention, and affirm the judgment.

In this employment case, plaintiff Ron Udell was hired as president of defendant Kenko International to make the company profitable. He failed to do so for five years straight and could not convince the board of directors he could turn the company around in the future, so the board of directors terminated him. Udell sued, claiming his termination was actually due to his race, his age, and several medical conditions and disabilities. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding he could not raise a triable issue of fact that his termination was based on anything other than his failure to make Kenko International profitable. We agree and affirm.

In this employment case, plaintiff Ron Udell was hired as president of defendant Kenko International to make the company profitable. He failed to do so for five years straight and could not convince the board of directors he could turn the company around in the future, so the board of directors terminated him. Udell sued, claiming his termination was actually due to his race, his age, and several medical conditions and disabilities. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding he could not raise a triable issue of fact that his termination was based on anything other than his failure to make Kenko International profitable. We agree and affirm.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 1902, AFL/CIO (AFSCME), real party in interest and appellant, appeals from a trial court decision granting a writ of administrative mandamus filed by respondent Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (the District). The District filed the petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to challenge the decision of a hearing officer on an AFSCME grievance. The trial court set aside the hearing officer’s decision on the grounds that the hearing officer’s decision (1) granted relief on an issue that was not ripe; and (2) exceeded the scope of the issue before him.
We agree that the matter did not present a ripe controversy. We further agree that the hearing officer exceeded the scope of the issue before him. Finally, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the hearing officer exceeded his authority pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties (MOU). Therefore, we af

This appeal concerns the interplay between “prevailing party” findings under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) (section 1032(a)(4)) and Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717). In this case, the judgment declared defendant Liberal Arts 677 Benevolent Foundation the prevailing party in the lawsuit under section 1032(a)(4). Postjudgment, defendant sought attorney fees under section 1717 as the prevailing party on the contract. The trial court denied the section 1717 motion without finding that defendant was not the prevailing party on the contract. The record fails to demonstrate as a matter of law that defendant either was or was not the prevailing party on the contract. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether defendant prevailed on the contract under section 1717.

Plaintiff Moysey Chernyavsky filed a malicious prosecution action against Michael Dekhtyar. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of Chernyavsky, and entered a judgment awarding him $25,500 in damages. Dekhtyar appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he lacked probable cause to pursue his claims, and that he acted with malice. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Richard Jurado (defendant) appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 47. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition on the ground that defendant’s conviction for taking or driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 was not a theft offense eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. Defendant sought review in the California Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court for reconsideration in light of its decision People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). We issued a notice to the parties inviting them to submit letter briefs addressing the effect, if any, the Supreme Court’s decision Page should have on this case. Upon consideration of the parties’ letter briefs and the Page decision, we again affirm the order denying defendant’s petition, but do so without prejudice to consideration of a new petition providing evidence of defendant

Jesse Washington (appellant) appeals from an order dismissing his case. Appellant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the trial court erred. Specifically, appellant has failed to provide citations to applicable law and the record on the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the matter for failure to prosecute. Therefore, we affirm the order.

This action is one of the coordinated “Transient Occupancy Tax Cases,” in which certain cities have sought to impose liability on online travel companies for transient occupancy tax.
In 2008, the City of San Francisco (the city) assessed transient occupancy taxes against the OTCs. The OTCs paid the tax assessments under protest and sued the city, challenging the assessments and seeking refunds. The trial court granted the OTCs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the OTCs are not “operators” under the city’s ordinance and that any consideration above the amount received by the hotel itself is not rent, but consideration for services other than use or possession of a room. Judgment was entered, specifying the amount of refunds owed to the individual OTCs, along with pre- and post-judgment interest. The city appeals.
We find that the OTCs are not liable for TOT under the language of the city’s TOT ordinance, therefore we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant Gary Fanger, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from orders entered following an evidentiary hearing on visitation, child custody, and child support matters relating to two of his children. He raises various arguments, many of which concern the trial court’s decision to allow the children the right to abstain from participating in their parents’ religious activities. Because the older child will have turned 18 years of age by the time this case is remanded to the trial court, this order, as a practical matter, is moot as to her. As to the younger child, we reverse in part, and direct the lower court to strike the provision that prohibits the parties from forcing the child “to participate in any activities, including religious activities.” As to appellant’s remaining attacks on the lower court’s rulings, he has failed to provide us with an adequate record to conduct a meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we must affirm the balance of the order.

Saint Francis Memorial Hospital (Saint Francis) petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate after being fined by the California Department of Public Health (Department). The trial court sustained the Department’s demurrer based on the statute of limitations, and judgment was entered in the Department’s favor. On appeal, Saint Francis argues that the court erred by sustaining the demurrer because the petition was timely under the applicable statutes, the limitations period was equitably tolled, and the Department is equitably estopped from claiming the petition was filed late. We affirm.

Saint Francis Memorial Hospital (Saint Francis) petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate after being fined by the California Department of Public Health (Department). The trial court sustained the Department’s demurrer based on the statute of limitations, and judgment was entered in the Department’s favor. On appeal, Saint Francis argues that the court erred by sustaining the demurrer because the petition was timely under the applicable statutes, the limitations period was equitably tolled, and the Department is equitably estopped from claiming the petition was filed late. We affirm.