CA Unpub Decisions

Hosea Morgan (appellant) appeals from an order placing him on felony probation after a jury convicted him of five felony counts arising from a fraudulent workers’ compensation claim: insurance fraud in violation of Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1), insurance fraud in violation of Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1), grand theft of personal property in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a), presentation of a fraudulent claim in violation of Penal Code section 72, and perjury in violation of Penal Code section 118. He contends the judgment must be reversed because: (1) he was unfairly prejudiced by evidence that he suffered from erectile dysfunction because the jury had been shown a surveillance video in which he was physically affectionate with a woman who was not his wife; and (2) the court placed undue pressure on the jury to reach a verdict. We affirm.

On December 11, 2007, defendant pleaded no contest to receiving stolen property, including a laptop computer that had been stolen from the victim’s car (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and giving a false name to a peace officer (§ 148.9, a misdemeanor). In exchange for her plea, two other counts of the information (possession of controlled substance paraphernalia and possession of burglar tools) were dismissed. In January 2008 defendant was sentenced to 60 days in jail. After she violated probation in July 2008, the court imposed a seven-month jail term.

This is an action brought by a private citizen, appellant Matthew Sundt, to abate a public nuisance. Sundt is a bicyclist who rides along Blanco Road in Monterey County. Respondent Tanimura South LLC (“Tanimura”) owns property that abuts Blanco Road, and deposits soil onto the road in connection with agricultural operation on its property. Sundt alleges he is at risk for injury when riding on Blanco Road because the soil deposits affect his ability to ride his bicycle safely.

Following a jury trial, defendant James Lee Kline was found guilty of theft from an elder of an amount more than $950 in violation of Penal Code section 368, subdivision (d), (count 1) and grand theft of an amount more than $950 in violation of section 487, subdivision (a) (count 2). The crimes involved ATM withdrawals made with the debit card of L.R. (known as Peggy), who was an elderly woman for whom defendant occasionally did handyman work. The court suspended imposition of sentence, granted probation, and placed defendant on three years of formal probation under certain terms and conditions.

Defendant Craig Loken Wallis appeals after a jury convicted him of felony stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)) and four misdemeanors: two counts of cruelty to a child (§ 273a, subd. (b)) and one count each of false reporting of an emergency (§ 148.3, subd. (a)) and battery (§ 242). Defendant’s convictions related to three victims: Jane Doe, John Doe #1, and John Doe #2.
The trial court imposed a three-year upper-term prison sentence for the felony, with concurrent or stayed jail terms for the misdemeanors. The trial court issued a 10-year criminal protective order as to Jane Doe, John Doe #1, and John Doe #2.
On appeal, defendant contends his convictions of cruelty to a child (§ 273a, subd. (b); counts 4 & 7) were not supported by substantial evidence. He specifically contends that there was insufficient evidence of his criminal negligence and of the victims’ unjustifiable mental suffering. Defendant alternatively contends both of those convictions must be rev

Defendant Shane D. Miller appeals following his no contest plea to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)). He asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to a greater term than what he had agreed to as part of his plea bargain.
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the trial court to impose the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain, or to allow defendant to withdraw his no contest plea pursuant to section 1192.5.

Defendant Melissa Ashley Hansen pleaded no contest in connection with four separate proceedings to felony possession of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d); felony forgery of a driver’s license (§ 470a); two counts of felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); misdemeanor flight from a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle (id., § 2800.1, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor petty theft (§§ 484, 488). She also admitted two enhancements under section 12022.1. On March 15, 2016, the court imposed a sentence of one year in county jail. She was also placed on formal probation for three years.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent her in this court. Appointed counsel has filed an opening brief that states the case and facts but raises no issue. We notified defendant of her right to submit written argument on her own behalf within 30 days. The 30-day period has elapsed and we have received no response from defendant.

In case No. H042977, defendant Johnell Lee Carter appeals from a judgment of conviction in Santa Clara County Superior Court case No. C1478588 (C1478588). In case No. H043545, defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction in Santa Clara County Superior Court case No. C1505628 (C1505628). On its own motion, this court ordered the two appeals to be considered together for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and disposition.
In case No. H042977, defendant was convicted by jury of five counts of oral copulation in violation of Penal Code section 288.7, subdivision (b), as charged. The victim of those offenses was defendant’s stepdaughter. In a bifurcated trial, the court found an allegation of a prior violent or serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and an allegation of a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) to be true. On October 30, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to five consecuti

A jury convicted Felipe Rabadan Reyna of nine sexual offenses. On appeal, Reyna claims the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s hearsay statements under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1230) by finding the victim was an unavailable witness. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Alejandro Perez Medina appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 years old, oral copulation with a child under 14 years old, a lewd act on a 15-year-old child who was at least 10 years younger than defendant, and oral copulation with a child under 16 years of age by a person over 21 years of age. Defendant contends that with regard to his conviction for committing a lewd act on a 15-year-old child, the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1112 because it contained language he contends incorrectly “absolved the jurors from finding that [he] had the statutorily required lewd intent” when he touched his victim in the commission of that offense.

Romo Productions, Inc. (Romo) is a manufacturer of apparel, including military apparel. Paradise Sewing, Inc. (Paradise) was a sewing subcontractor for Romo. This case grew out of a dispute in which Romo accused Paradise of breaching their contract and stealing Romo’s clients and property. The trial court granted a nonsuit on most of Romo’s causes of action and denied a motion to reopen. We affirm the judgment.
Romo failed to prove necessary elements of its causes of action for breach of contract and trade libel, and its offer of proof did not show Romo could have done so if the trial court had granted the motion to reopen. The contract on which Romo sued was an unenforceable noncompetition, nonsolicitation, and nondisclosure agreement. Only if Romo could prove misappropriation of trade secrets by Paradise (a theory that was never pled) could it enforce any portion of the contract. Assuming for purposes of this appeal that Romo could have established the existence of a trad

Jose V. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a combined hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 388 and 366.36 conducted on October 24, 2017. At that hearing, the court denied father’s section 388 petition, in which he requested that his son, then three-year-old Evan, be returned to his custody under family maintenance services. The court also entered findings and orders pursuant to section 366.26, terminating father’s parental rights and freeing Evan for adoption.
After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)

John W. is the father of Adam and Levi, now six and five years old, respectively. In September 2016, the juvenile court established a permanent plan of legal guardianship for the children after John failed to reunify with them. On October 3, 2017, at a postpermanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3), the court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over the children but retained its jurisdiction over them as wards of the legal guardianship.
John appealed from the juvenile court’s October 3, 2017, ruling. After reviewing the juvenile court record, John’s court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on John’s behalf. This court granted John leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
John submitted a letter requesting reinstatement of reunification services so he can learn more about his son

Matthew C., age 17 at the time of the offenses, was adjudged a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after he was found to have committed the crimes of home invasion robbery in concert, during the commission of which a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A), 12022, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 & 4), criminal threats, during the commission of which a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 422, 12022, subd. (a)(1); counts 5, 7, & 13), and first degree burglary (§ 459; counts 14 & 15). His maximum period of confinement was determined to be 18 years, and he was committed to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities.
On appeal, we hold the juvenile court was not required to stay the disposition on count 5 pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, we affirm.