CA Unpub Decisions

Calvin C., father of A.C., appeals from the dependency court’s Minute Order of May 3, 2017, terminating jurisdiction over A.C., declaring him a ward of the delinquency court and releasing him to the probation department. Calvin C. contends that it was error to declare A.C. a ward of the delinquency court without first obtaining the Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1 report which is mandated in the case of a dual status minor. We affirm the termination of dependency jurisdiction, but remand the matter to the dependency court to correct its Minute Order of May 3, 2017, to reflect the orders actually issued by the court on the record.

Matthew Allen Hernandez pled guilty to two counts of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and admitted to five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Hernandez to 16 months on one burglary and eight months on the other to run consecutively. The court struck two of the prior prison term enhancements and added a consecutive three years for the remaining three enhancements. The sentence was divided between three years in custody and two years mandatory supervision.

I.L., a minor, appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.
I.L. and another individual approached A.W. while he was walking alone. One of the two individuals pushed A.W., and the other one punched A.W. in the face. One of the individuals grabbed A.W.’s phone, and the two of them ran away. During an interview with an officer, A.W. identified I.L. as one of the

A Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise is a valid cost-shifting mechanism to settle an action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act; Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.), commonly known as California’s “lemon law.” (Department of Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 256, 260.) Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) offered to pay appellant Danielle Marissa O’Green $30,000.01 plus $7,500 in attorney’s fees and costs, or in the alternative, statutory damages plus attorney’s fees and costs to settle the case before trial. Appellant did not respond to the offer. After the jury returned a $28,100.07 verdict in favor of appellant, the trial court awarded Kia postoffer costs pursuant to section 998, subdivision (c)(1). O’Green appeals, contending that the section 998 offer was invalid and claims that the trial court erred in not awarding appellant postoffer attorney fees ($331,000+) and prejudgment interest. We affir

Katie Lynn Hawn was convicted by jury of battery with injury on a police officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)) and two counts of resisting an executive officer (§ 69). The trial court granted probation with 150 days county jail. She appeals, contending that the trial court committed instructional error. We affirm.

Ivan Gomez Sanchez was convicted following a jury trial of three counts of committing lewd conduct upon a 15-year-old girl. On appeal Sanchez contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the defense of reasonable mistake of fact. Sanchez also argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. We affirm the convictions but remand for resentencing in light of sentencing errors.

Christian Calderon and Daniel Ernesto Cordero appeal from the judgments entered on their convictions for first and second degree murder, respectively, and five firearm crimes, with firearm and gang enhancements, contending insufficient evidence supported the gang enhancements and Calderon’s conviction for first degree murder, and the trial court made instructional and sentencing errors. We conclude the trial court erred in imposing certain gang enhancements, but otherwise affirm. We remand the matter for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Edwin Alexander Perez appeals from a second degree murder conviction on the ground there is no substantial evidence demonstrating that he aided and abetted the murder. He also argues the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
We find substantial evidence supports the conviction and no instructional error. We affirm the conviction.

Defendant and appellant Edwin Alexander Perez appeals from a second degree murder conviction on the ground there is no substantial evidence demonstrating that he aided and abetted the murder. He also argues the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
We find substantial evidence supports the conviction and no instructional error. We affirm the conviction.

This appeal arises from a dispute between a law firm, Mullen & Henzell, L.L.P. (the Firm), and one of its former partners, Jeffrey C. Nelson. The litigation began when the Firm sued Nelson for breach of a promissory note. Nelson and his development company, Oak Creek Company (Oak Creek) (collectively “appellants”), cross-complained against the Firm, alleging, among other things, intentional interference with prospective business advantage (interference claim).
The Firm successfully demurred to the cross-complaint and first amended cross-complaint (FACC). The Firm did not move to strike the interference claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (California’s so-called anti-SLAPP statute) until the claim was repeated for the third time in the second amended cross-complaint (SACC).

In a negotiated plea, Kenneth Gene Townsend admitted assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)) upon his mother, and elder abuse with great bodily injury (§§ 368, subd. (b)(2)(B), 12022.7, subd. (c)). He received a stipulated sentence of 14 years in state prison.
Assigned counsel submitted a Wende brief, certifying an inability to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also submitted a declaration confirming Townsend was advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wished to call to the court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.) We find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

Vogue International, LLC and Todd Christopher International, Inc. (each doing business as Vogue International; collectively Vogue) were sued in a consumer class action for falsely advertising cosmetic products as “organic.” (Golloher v. Todd Christopher International, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Case No. 3:12-cv-06002-RS); hereafter Golloher Action.) Vogue sought defense coverage for the suit from its insurer, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford). Hartford denied a duty to defend or indemnify, and initiated this declaratory relief action in the Alameda County Superior Court. Vogue concurrently pursued a declaratory relief coverage action against Hartford in Florida, resulting in a judgment in favor of Hartford.

Alphonso McGill appeals his three-year sentence for bringing contraband into a jail. He argues the trial court erred in failing to order a probation report before sentencing and denying him an opportunity to present mitigating evidence, and denying his motion to reconsider or recall the sentence. We affirm.

These consolidated appeals raise two issues: (1) the denial of appellant Craig Kirkland’s petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, a provision of Proposition 47, to reduce his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) from a felony to a misdemeanor, and; (2) the court’s termination of his probation and imposition of a two-year state prison sentence. In our initial decision in this case, we concluded Proposition 47 does not apply to a conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851, and therefore, Kirkland was ineligible for resentencing. The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to us for reconsideration under People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). In light of Page, we conclude Kirkland has failed to establish his eligibility for resentencing.