CA Unpub Decisions

Natalie Nicole Ragsdale appeals from the denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, which is part of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Enacted by voter initiative in November 2014, Proposition 47 reduced certain drug-related and property crimes from felonies to misdemeanors. Section 1170.18 provides a mechanism by which a person with a prior felony conviction for an offense now classified as a misdemeanor under statutes added or amended by Proposition 47 can petition to have their conviction designated as a misdemeanor and be resentenced accordingly. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f).)

Defendant and appellant Daniel Hasso appeals an order denying his special motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Hasso contends that the current action for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff and respondent Evelyn Shafer arises from his prior exercise of his right to petition, within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e), and is therefore a so-called SLAPP suit.
We will affirm the judgment.

Donna J. Kelly appeals from an order stepping down and then terminating her spousal support, entered on July 1, 2016. Her briefing includes much irrelevant discussion, including the assertion of issues arising from orders entered as far back as 2008. Family law judgments and orders are in general appealable as they are entered (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 116), but a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of the service of a notice of entry of each order or within 180 days of the date of entry of the order, if no notice of entry of the order was served. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104.) Once those time limits have expired, the order or judgment is final and is not subject to challenge on appeal. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King, at p. 109, citing Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 2 (now rule 8.104).) Accordingly, we will disregard all arguments pertaining to orders entered prior to July 1, 2016. We will also disregard the many irrelevan

Defendant and appellant James Lee Wilcoxson appeals his conviction for second degree murder. He asserts that the trial court erroneously allowed evidence of an unrelated crime as evidence of his intent in committing the charged offense and to negate his claim of self-defense. The People also appeal, asserting that it was error for the trial court to deem the murder to be second degree because the verdict form signed by the jury foreman did not specify that the crime was first degree murder. We reject both parties’ contentions.

Appointed counsel for defendant Richard Aaron Kennedy asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appointed counsel for minor R.S. asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to the minor, we will affirm the judgment.

The California Supreme Court transferred this case to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions, we conditionally reverse defendants’ convictions and sentences and remand the case to the juvenile court for a determination of defendants’ fitness for treatment within the juvenile justice system. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
Defendants Raymond Caudillo III and Eladio Tena, both age 17 at the time of the offenses and Norteño gang members, assaulted a mail carrier, breaking his cheekbone in three places. A jury found defendants guilty of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4), count 1), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d), count 2), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5). The jury also found true gang enhancements (§ 186.22,

This is defendant Margarito Gonzalez’s second appeal after a jury found him guilty of home invasion robbery, first degree residential robbery, first degree residential burglary, and four counts of assault. In his first appeal, we vacated the first degree residential robbery conviction, struck several enhancements, and remanded the matter for resentencing. In this appeal, Gonzalez’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm. However, we order the abstract of judgment corrected.

Father appeals the juvenile court’s disposition order removing his infant son from his custody. Father argues that the court should have ordered informal supervision and that there were less restrictive means available to safeguard the child short of removal. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering formal supervision because father did not request informal supervision and he continued to display poor parenting judgment. We dismiss the portion of the appeal about the removal order as moot.

Appellant Shvonte Abdual Bogard challenges a judgment of conviction entered following a guilty plea, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We reject his challenge and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Andre Purry appeals from the judgment of conviction following his conviction by jury of one count of making a criminal threat and one count of vandalism. He contends the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of a prior uncharged offense. Finding no error, we affirm.

Paul D. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order of dependency jurisdiction over E.D. (child), age two, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect), on the ground that the jurisdiction and disposition order as it related to him was not supported by substantial evidence. We hold that the juvenile court’s finding of dependency jurisdiction over the child based on father’s conduct was not supported by substantial evidence. However, because the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child based on mother’s conduct, we must also consider the court’s dispositional order as it relates to father. As a result, we hold further that the court’s dispositional order as to father was supported by substantial evidence.

Appellant Arbbie Hodge, a former inmate, brought suit against respondents California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) contending that during his years of incarceration serving an indeterminate sentence, respondents had misled him concerning the effect of earning good-time credits, that he suffered emotionally as a result, and that he was entitled to monetary compensation for the credits he had amassed that were never applied to reduce his sentence. The trial court found respondents immune from suit under Government Code section 844.6, which confers immunity on public entities for injuries to prisoners except in certain limited circumstances. On appeal, Hodge contends the court erred in concluding that the immunity conferred by section 844.6 supersedes any potential liability for violation of a mandatory duty under section 815.6, and in further finding that the prison regulation cited by Hodge imposes no mandatory duty suppo

Defendant and appellant Kil J. Kim (Kim) appeals a civil harassment restraining order after hearing that was obtained by plaintiff and respondent Sharlette Kang, who has not filed a respondent’s brief.
Kim’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for a continuance of the hearing on the request for a civil harassment restraining order. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
By way of background, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order on May 25, 2017. On June 16, 2017, when the matter was called for hearing on the petition, Kim’s counsel advised the court that Kim was not present due to her incarceration for allegedly violating the temporary restraining order, and counsel requested a continuance. The court granted the request and continued the matter to July 7, 2017.