CA Unpub Decisions

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant Amateo Seno (defendant) with one count of committing domestic violence within seven years of a previous domestic violence conviction (Pen. Code, § 273.5(f)(1)) and one count of violating a protective order within one year of a conviction for violating a protective order that resulted in physical injury to the victim (§ 273.6(e)). Pursuant to a plea agreement with the People, defendant pled no contest to the domestic violence charge. The trial court dismissed the other charged count and sentenced defendant to five years’ probation. As one of the conditions of his probation, defendant was required to obey a protective order regarding the victim, Lisa R.

Jurors found defendants Allen Bowie and Dominique Chambers guilty of using a fortified house to suppress law enforcement entry in order to sell cocaine base. Jurors acquitted defendants of the sale of a controlled substance and found a gang enhancement not true. We conclude the judgments of conviction must be reversed because the jury instruction on the use of a fortified house misidentified two of the three elements of the offense. The partial acquittal demonstrated that jurors did not credit all of the prosecution’s evidence. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject Chambers’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Appellant Mytchell Mora appeals his conviction for two counts of stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a).) During trial, a hearing-impaired juror was impaneled, and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 224, made use of a special court reporter in order to understand the proceedings. Defendant contends that (1) the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury properly on the role of the special reporter in deliberations, (2) the parties failed to stipulate to the juror, and (3) the parties did not know the identity of the hearing-impaired juror, thus precluding defendant from making a peremptory challenge on that basis. We affirm.

Defendant City of Los Angeles (City) appeals from an order disqualifying the law firm of Gutierrez, Preciado & House (GPH) from representing it in this action. We conclude that the disqualification order was not an abuse of discretion, and thus we affirm.

Respondent Edward Olshansky obtained a three-year civil harassment restraining order against his neighbor, appellant Daniel Hustwit, after Hustwit came to Olshansky’s home late at night and delivered a profanity-laden ultimatum in which he repeatedly threatened to kill Olshansky’s dog. The exchange, witnessed by Olshansky’s wife, two minor daughters, and elderly parents-in-law, lasted approximately 10 minutes and was fully captured by Olshansky’s video doorbell. Hustwit’s underlying concern related to an incident that occurred earlier in the evening, during which Olshansky’s German shepherd allegedly bit Hustwit’s wife, Gihan Thomas, while she was walking their dog.

In the present petition for writ of mandate, appellant James Barrett alleges that several state agencies and administrators (collectively, respondents) unlawfully failed to collect state sales and use taxes owed by an Indian tribe and corporation. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer with leave to amend and, when Barrett failed to file an amended petition, dismissed the petition. Barrett appealed from the resulting judgment of dismissal.
We affirm. As we discuss, a writ of mandate may issue to compel performance of a ministerial duty, but may not command the exercise of discretionary powers in a particular manner. Because Barrett has not alleged either the failure to perform a ministerial duty or the unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of discretionary power, his petition failed to state a claim for relief in mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained respondents’ demurrer and entered judgment for respondents.

Defendants Jonathan Mitchell Carter and Joshua Earl Charles appeal the judgments following their convictions for carjacking and robbery with gun use enhancements. Carter challenges the admission of two items of evidence. We agree the trial court abused its discretion in admitting both pieces of evidence, but we find no prejudice warranting reversal. Charles challenges the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction, but his contention has been rejected in many cases and we see no reason to depart from them. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction. However, following the Supreme Court’s grant of review and transfer of this case back to us, we remand for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 620 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682).

Appellants 4sports & Entertainment AG (4sports) and Claude Lemieux appeal from an order denying their motion to disqualify counsel for respondents Ritch Winter and Wintersports Ltd. (Wintersports). Appellants contend respondents’ attorney, Martin Singer and his firm Lavely & Singer Professional Corporation (collectively, Singer), must be disqualified because Singer previously represented 4sports in a matter substantially related to the current litigation.

Plaintiffs appeal from an order denying their motion for an award of prejudgment attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court concluded the motion was untimely under rule 3.1702(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court because Plaintiffs filed the motion more than 180 days after the purported entry of judgment. Citing a series of interlocutory orders and a voluntary dismissal disposing of different causes of action, the court reasoned that entry of the final judgment occurred on the date the superior court clerk entered Plaintiffs’ dismissal of their last remaining claim. However, these discrete interlocutory orders were never reduced to a single judgment, and the record reveals significant confusion and uncertainty in the lower court about whether or when the final judgment was entered. Because the date of entry of judgment determines not just the deadline for filing an attorney fee motion, but also sets the jurisdictional deadline for filing a noti

On appeal, it is undisputed that defendant Gustavo Armando Luna, Jr. shot and killed a rival gang member, Christopher Hernandez. Hernandez’s family saw the shooting, which occurred just after Hernandez’s sister’s middle school graduation. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder.

On September 25, 2017, we affirmed the judgment entered after a jury had convicted appellant Thomas Nolan Yanaga of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) The jury found true an enhancement allegation that he had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) He was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 40 years to life: 15 years to life for second degree murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.

In 1993, defendant Gregory Chatten Stockman was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187 subd. (a), 664, 245, subd. (a)(1).) He was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to Napa State Hospital. (§ 1026.) In August 2016, defendant filed a petition seeking conditional release pursuant to section 1026.2. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s petition but denied a request to transfer his outpatient supervision from Sonoma County to San Francisco. Defendant appeals.

S.W. (minor) appeals from a dispositional order committing him to the county’s Youthful Offender Treatment Program (YOTP). He contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to YOTP absent substantial evidence that such a commitment would benefit him or that an alternative commitment to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (the ranch) was unavailable. He also contends the order should be modified to specify that the maximum term of confinement is five years, rather than five years four months. We find no abuse of discretion in minor’s commitment to YOTP, but agree that the maximum term of confinement should be modified.

Roy Rubin appeals from an order denying his request for child support from Elizabeth Kaske. The Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) concedes the family law court erred and that the case should be remanded for the court to “make appropriate factual findings and discretionary determinations in the first instance concerning whether child support is appropriate based on Rubin’s earning capacity, the nature of monies that Rubin receives from his father, and visitation expenses.” We agree and remand.