CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Cesar Gordon took Joseph Franco’s bike from a Costa Mesa Taco Bell. But Franco saw what was going on and chased Gordon down, grabbed his backpack, and threw him off the bicycle. Gordon attempted to retain the bike, and a scuffle ensued, during which Gordon landed at least one punch. Franco would later testify Gordon hit him twice in the face, and there is no issue concerning whether Gordon used force in his effort to keep Franco’s bike. Gordon was convicted of attempted robbery and petty theft and sentenced to nine years in prison.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Lisa Bertolino, Tulare County Public Defender, Thomas McQuire, Assistant Public Defender, and Amber Miramontes, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Max Feinstat, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.

On June 1, 2017, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of John R. (father) and O.R. (mother) to their children Jordan R. (three years old) and Johnny R. (20 months old) at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, father contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his petition pursuant to section 388 to reinstitute reunification services. Father further contends the trial court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception in determining whether to terminate his parental rights. We find no error and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Joseph A. Kalashian, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Tulare Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Janet E. Neeley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellant and defendant A.H. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after admitting the allegations that she unlawfully possessed a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610) and unlawfully possessed live ammunition (§ 29650). The court placed her in the custody and control of the probation department, committed her to the Riverside County Youth Treatment and Education Center and, among other conditions, ordered her to submit to warrantless searches of all electronic devices. Appellant now argues that this condition is overbroad because it permits review of her personal information, without regard to its relevancy to any suspected criminal activity or noncompliance with probation conditions. We agree that, as written, the condition is overbroad and must be modified. In all other respects, we affirm.

Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but inviting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Hagihassan has not responded to our invitation to file a supplemental brief. After having considered the briefing and having independently reviewed the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

A jury convicted David Ashton of second degree murder following his fatal assault of his girlfriend, Regina Moore. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Ashton argues his conviction must be reduced to involuntary manslaughter because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of implied malice. He also seeks a new trial for the exclusion of evidence relevant to whether he acted with implied malice.
Following the framework set forth in People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500 (Cravens), we conclude there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ashton acted with implied malice. Although the trial court erred in excluding evidence relevant to his defense, the error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.

Jacqueline A. Quilalang brought this action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) and U.S. Bank, National Association as trustee for Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns Asset-Backed Securities I LLC, Asset Backed Certificates Series 2006-AC1 (U.S. Bank; collectively defendants). In the operative second amended complaint, Quilalang brought a total of 11 causes of action against defendants, including causes of action styled as invalidity of contracts, cancellation of instruments, quiet title, declaratory relief/injunctive relief, violation of Civil Code section 2924.17, breach of contract, and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Quilalang requested that the trial court cancel a deed of trust and various notices and documents pursuant to which U.S. Bank had sought to foreclose on real property owned by Quilalang, among other forms of relief. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend as to all of her causes of actions on var

In February 2015, defendant Timothy Varmall admitted to stabbing an acquaintance, Smurti Patel, to death. Defendant met Patel, who had a substance abuse problem and was often homeless, at a Sacramento homeless shelter. Although they did not have a romantic relationship, defendant began to develop feelings for Patel. When defendant told Patel how he felt, she said she was getting back together with a former boyfriend. Defendant was enraged.
Defendant began plotting to kill Patel for rejecting him. In September 2014, he purchased a knife for the purpose of killing her. He carried the knife with him at all times in case an opportunity arose to kill her. On several occasions, defendant saw Patel and pretended to be nice to her so he could gather information on where she was living and the routes she took home.

Petitioner Phillip Spector (husband) filed for dissolution of his marriage to respondent Rachelle Spector (wife). The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s inherent authority to reconsider its own orders as explained in Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094 permitted the court to sua sponte modify the terms of the temporary spousal support order retroactively under the circumstances presented. Wife argues the trial court was precluded from doing so pursuant to Family Code sections 3603, 3651, subdivision (c), and 3653, subdivision (a), and the various cases interpreting those statutes. We conclude the court had inherent authority to reconsider its prior order and to apply its modified decision retroactively. Finding no merit in wife’s argument that the court violated her due process rights when it exercised this authority, we affirm.

A jury found defendant Duarte Manuel Gonsalves guilty of murdering Paul Bryant with a shotgun and of being a felon in possession of a firearm; defendant inflicted the mortal wound by shooting Bryant at close range in the neck and face. The jury also found several attached firearm enhancements true, and in a subsequent proceeding, the court found that defendant had a prior strike, a prior serious felony, and had served two prior prison terms. The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 55 years to life for the murder and firearm enhancement consecutive to an aggregate determinate term of 13 years for the felon in possession conviction, the serious felony enhancement, and the prison priors.

Father M.H. appeals from the juvenile court’s exit order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) He argues the juvenile court in San Joaquin County (juvenile court) erred by sending the dependency file to the family law court in Butte County (family court) absent proper reason to do so. We agree. We reverse that portion of the exit order sending the file to Butte County and direct the juvenile court to recover the dependency file from the family court in Butte County.

Julie Skeie (Wife, to follow the style of the briefing) initiated this dissolution action on January 16, 2015, after moving to California from Tennessee with her two youngest minor children after separating from Peter Skeie (Husband) in November 2013; her oldest son (born June 1997) joined her in June 2014, while a younger son (born Jan. 1999) remained with Husband in Tennessee. She effected personal service of the summons on Husband, who was present in California, shortly after filing the petition. Husband did not timely file a responsive pleading. Wife requested entry of default on June 3, 2015; the court entered a default judgment shortly afterward—on June 18, 2015. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 580.) On July 24, 2015, Husband moved to set aside the default judgment, neglecting to make a request to set aside the underlying default as well.

A jury found defendant Charles Daniel Hubbard guilty of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and found defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the carjacking (former § 12022.53, subd. (b)) and the assault (former § 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d)). Sentenced to 15 years 8 months in state prison, defendant appeals, contending that the jury’s true finding on the firearm-use enhancements and his conviction for assault with a firearm are not supported by substantial evidence. He also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an instruction on being armed with a firearm as a “lesser included enhancement” of personal use, the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury, and section 29800 violates the Second Amendment.