CA Unpub Decisions

Barbara and John Wittman asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium against respondent Coty, Inc. (Coty), alleging that Barbara’s exposure to asbestos in Coty’s talcum powder resulted in her mesothelioma. The trial court granted summary judgment in Coty’s favor on appellants’ claims, concluding that the Wittmans lacked evidence that Barbara was exposed to asbestos fibers through her use of Coty’s product. Appellant John Wittman challenges the grant of summary judgment. We affirm.

Chequita C., the mother of now 11-year-old R.R. and six-year-old Blake C., appeals the juvenile court’s June 21, 2017 jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring R.R. and Blake dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). Chequita contends the court’s jurisdiction findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Defendant and appellant Lamar Ahmad Tatum (defendant) contends that the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of an African-American prospective juror was racially motivated, and that the trial court improperly overruled his Wheeler/Batson objection made on that ground. Finding no merit to defendant’s contention, we affirm the judgment.

Rebecca M. Buckley (Buckley) sued her former employer, El Dorado Enterprises, Inc. (El Dorado) for employment discrimination. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the trial court ordered the case to binding arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award purportedly disposing of all issues submitted for arbitration. Although the arbitrator found that Buckley prevailed on two of her six claims, he did not award her any monetary damages, because she “suffered no actual out of pocket loss.” In issuing his award, the arbitrator observed that Buckley had not sought to recover her attorney fees. Three months later, following a postaward motion by Buckley, the arbitrator issued a second award, granting Buckley, as the “prevailing party,” her attorney fees and costs.
Buckley subsequently petitioned the trial court to confirm the two awards, while El Dorado moved to vacate the second award. The trial court confirmed the initial award but vacated the second award on the ground t

After a jury awarded the plaintiff $1,002 in damages in a dispute over a residential co-op board’s election, a court awarded the plaintiff’s attorneys more than 130 times that amount in attorney’s fees. After the co-op paid $124,701.22 and later sent a check for an additional $45,291.23, plaintiff’s attorneys rejected the check because it was $887.10 short in postjudgment interest and because they wanted to apply for another $4,480 in attorney’s fees. The attorneys then sought discovery and, when it went unanswered, moved to compel a response. The co-op responded that the motion to compel was moot because the plaintiff’s daughter (who was substituted in for the plaintiff after he died) had accepted the $45,291.23 check and signed an acknowledgment of the satisfaction of the judgment. The trial court ruled that the satisfaction of judgment was invalid, and granted the motion to compel. The co-op appeals. We have jurisdiction to reach the merits by treating this appeal

Ronald Sanders appeals from a three-year, eight-month sentence following his convictions for identity theft and grand theft of personal property. Appellant represented himself at trial, and his claims on appeal arise from the hearing on his self-representation motion pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). Appellant contends his Faretta waiver was invalid, because he was misadvised by the court that his maximum sentence would be three years in prison, rather than three years and eight months. He further contends that the trial court should have inquired further into any alleged conflict of interest between appellant and his appointed counsel before accepting appellant’s Faretta waiver. Finally, he argues, in the alternative, that the doctrine of estoppel mandates that his sentence be reduced to no more than three years in prison. As explained below, we find no reversible error. Additionally, at the request of respondent, we will amend the abstract of ju

A jury convicted defendant Custodio Espinosa of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), a felony, and carrying a switchblade knife on his person (§ 21510, subd. (b)), a misdemeanor. The jury further found true an allegation defendant personally used a handgun during the robbery. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court found true a prior serious felony conviction allegation and two prior separate prison term allegations. (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).)

A jury convicted appellant Roger Ruiz of one count of assault with a firearm and found true the accompanying firearm and gang enhancements. Appellant was sentenced to 24 years in state prison for the crime. Later, he pled no contest to one count of assault with a firearm on a peace officer with a personal firearm use enhancement, for a stipulated term of 18 years in state prison. The parties also agreed that appellant’s prior 24-year prison sentence would be reduced to 18 years and stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Appellant, who was 16 years old at the time he committed the crimes, then filed a motion to remand his case to juvenile court pursuant to Proposition 57 (effective November 9, 2016), which requires the district attorney to make a transfer motion in juvenile court before prosecuting a juvenile offender in criminal court. The trial court denied the motion, and sentenced appellant to 18 years in state prison.

Kenneth Wayne Johnson appeals an order denying his petition for resentencing after the trial court reduced his 1995 felony conviction for possession of cocaine to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. Johnson argues, and the Attorney General acknowledges, the court erroneously denied the petition in the mistaken belief the sentence in the drug case had run concurrently with, rather than consecutively to, Johnson’s 1996 three strikes sentence for a robbery/burglary. However, the Attorney General asserts Johnson forfeited the issue by failing to object in the trial court and, in any event, the claim is moot. Neither contention has merit. We reverse the order and remand the matter for a new resentencing hearing.

Plaintiffs Cynthia Mason-Ealy and Roshanna Franklin appeal from judgment following an order dismissing their lawsuit against defendant Pomona Unified School District (the District) in this action for employment discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). In contravention of the trial court’s order, Franklin attempted but never filed a fourth amended complaint. Mason-Ealy filed an untimely fourth amended complaint after receiving notice of the District’s ex parte application to dismiss the lawsuit. Plaintiffs contend the trial court lacked authority to dismiss their lawsuit under Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, because Mason-Ealy filed an untimely fourth amended lawsuit on the eve of the ex parte hearing. Given the clear difference in procedural posture in Gitmed, we conclude it does not apply. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to dismiss the case. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant B/E Aerospace, Inc. (B/E Aerospace) appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Blanca Torres (Torres) in her action for employment discrimination. Torres’s operative first amended complaint went to trial on her claims against B/E Aerospace for discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940, et seq.) based on age and gender, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The evidence at trial showed that B/E Aerospace terminated Torres in what it claimed was a reduction in force (elimination of her position), but the jury accepted Torres’s contention that B/E Aerospace’s reasons were a pretext for improper discriminatory motives. The jury awarded Torres a total of $1.516 million in compensatory damages and $7 million in punitive damages. The trial court granted B/E Aerospace’s motion for a new trial conditioned on the reduction of punitive damages to $1 million. Torres consented to the re

A jury convicted Brian Kirk Long of one count of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder and five counts of assault with a firearm and found true specially alleged firearm and criminal street gang enhancements. On appeal Long contends the trial court erred by giving irrelevant and misleading jury instructions, permitting the prosecution to amend the information after the close of evidence to charge five counts of aggravated assault as lesser related offenses of attempted murder and preventing defense counsel from asking a proper hypothetical question during cross-examination of the prosecution’s gang expert. He also contends his aggravated assault convictions were not supported by substantial evidence and his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. We modify the judgment to correct an unauthorized sentence and affirm the judgment as modified.

Appellant, James O’Brien challenges the family court’s denial of his motion under Family Code section 2122 to set aside portions of a judgment disposing of community property assets. He argues respondent committed fraud and nondisclosure of certain encumbrances on community property, rendering the distribution judgment unjust. Because his motion to partially set aside judgment was untimely, we affirm the family court’s order denying it.

Ji Hyun Kim appeals from a civil harassment restraining order protecting respondent Jennifer Shevock from Kim. Kim argues there was no substantial evidence to support the order. We disagree and affirm.