CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Elliott Chance was convicted of two counts of forcible resistance to an executive officer (Pen. Code § 69) and two counts of resisting arrest (Pen. Code § 148) . He makes three arguments on appeal, the first two asserting failure to instruct on lesser included offenses, and the third insufficient evidence to support the jury finding that the officers were lawfully engaged in the performance of their duties. We conclude that the insufficient evidence argument fails. But we also conclude that the court should have instructed on lesser included offenses, and thus reverse the convictions on counts one and two.

On July 21, 1995, defendant Frank Ramirez was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, §. 12021, subd. (a)(1)). On April 17, 2016, defendant was sentenced to 29 years to life under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In the years since his conviction, defendant has filed multiple petitions for writ of habeas corpus and for resentencing, all of which have been denied.
On September 11, 2017, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (a). The district attorney opposed the petition, arguing that it should be denied because the crimes do not qualify for resentencing. On October 20, 2017, the trial court denied the petition. The trial court found that defendant’s petition sought relief that had previously been denied, and that he was not eligible for the requested relief because his convictions were not subject to the resentencing pro

The juvenile court found it had dependency jurisdiction over now one- and one-half-year-old S.L. (child) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) and ordered the child removed from parental custody.
J.L. (father) concedes there was sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction based on his substance abuse but argues there was insufficient evidence to base jurisdiction on his mental health issues or domestic violence claims.
Because these insufficient evidence claims are not justiciable we cannot grant father any effective relief. Therefore we dismiss the appeal.

A jury convicted David Claudi Abbott, Jr., of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 2), and possession of counterfeit money with intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 476; count 3). The court found true sentence enhancement allegations (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) that Abbott had prior felony convictions for possession for sale and transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11378, 11379, subd. (a)).
The court sentenced Abbott to an aggregate term of five years, consisting of the two-year midterm on count 2, a consecutive three-year term for the former Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c) sentence enhancements, and concurrent two-year terms on each of counts 1 and 3.

A jury convicted defendant, Joshua Paul Fuhrmann, of forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 1), false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 3), and misdemeanor domestic violence battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 4). The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 2), and the charge was later dismissed on the People’s motion. After denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the court sentenced defendant to the midterm of six years on count 1. It imposed the midterm of two years on count 3, but stayed the sentence under section 654, and suspended the sentence for count 4.
Defendant contends the court wrongly denied his new trial motion based on juror misconduct. He also argues his sentence violates federal and state constitutional prohibitions on cruel and/or unusual punishment and the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the midterm on count 1. We reject his contentions and a

While speeding down a busy street one morning, appellant ran a red light and hit a woman and her two children as they were crossing the street. The collision killed one of the children, seriously injured the other two victims and severely damaged appellant’s car. Despite this, appellant did not pull over until another motorist chased her down and blocked her car. Appellant told the police she had not been drinking that day, but her blood alcohol content (BAC) was three times the legal limit. She was ultimately convicted of multiple crimes, including implied malice murder and hit and run. On appeal, she challenges her convictions for those offenses on the grounds there is insufficient evidence she acted with conscious disregard for human life or that she realized she had struck the victims. She also contends her statements to the police should have been suppressed as being involuntary, and the exclusion of certain statistical evidence rendered her trial unfair. We reject appell

Ronny Gerardo Midence-Allen appeals from the judgment following his conviction on one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale. (Health & Saf. Code § 11378.)
He contends we must reverse the judgment because the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when she argued to the jury she had satisfied her burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by providing only “reasonable” evidence of his guilt. Further, Midence-Allen claims his own trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the improper argument and request a curative instruction.

Gigi E. Ruegsegger appeals from an order dismissing her action against MTGLQ Investors (MTGLQ) on the operative fourth amended complaint. Ruegsegger argues the trial court erred by failing to enter judgment on MTGLQ’s default on the first amended complaint. We disagree and affirm the order.

Shayan Safai appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying her expert witness fees after finding her pretrial Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer did not shift those costs to Malcolm Johnson, who failed to prevail in his personal injury action against Safai following an accident on the 405 freeway. (All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless noted.) Safai contends the court erred in concluding her offer of compromise was invalid under the then-recent decision in Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121 (Sanford). Under Sanford and the de novo standard that governs our review where there are no disputed facts, as here, we explain that Safai’s offer was valid. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand for the court to determine the expert witness fees to which Safai is entitled under section 998’s cost-shifting provisions.

This is a complex accounting case involving claims for unpaid commissions which the trial judge said was “one of the most difficult cases in [her] time on the civil panel.” We will do our best to sort it out.
The losing party, Sawyer & Company (Sawyer Inc.) presents four arguments on appeal. It first claims that a spreadsheet (set forth in both exhibits 122 and 125) offered by defendant Elements Food Group (Elements), should not have been admitted into evidence because it wasn’t prepared until after the trial had begun. Sawyer Inc. thinks Elements should have been held to an earlier-prepared exhibit, exhibit 3. We reject this claim because the spreadsheet recalculated commissions in Sawyer Inc.’s favor, correcting a mistake exhibit 3 had made in applying a lower commission rate than allowable even under Elements’ own theory of the case. The trial judge was within her reasonable discretion to allow the recalculation into evidence.

Long-Dei Liu, M.D., appeals from a wrongful death jury verdict in favor of Yuanda Hong and his two minor sons. Hong’s wife, Ling-Nie, died at Garden Grove Hospital shortly after the birth of their second child. Liu was her obstetrician. After a 20-day trial, the jury apportioned 25 percent of the liability for Ling-Nie’s death to Liu and 75 percent to the hospital.
On appeal, Liu argues that the evidence does not support the jury’s verdict against him with respect to liability or damages. He also contends the judgments eventually entered against him were improperly entered.
We affirm the judgment. The jury’s verdict rests on substantial evidence, which, as a reviewing court, we have no power to override. The amended judgments from which he appeals were properly entered.

Lisa J. Reed (Lisa) and James Armstead Reed (James) were married in 1988 and separated in 2004. A judgment addressing custody, visitation, and other issues was entered in December 2010, and a judgment on reserved issues, including property division, was entered in July 2014.
Lisa filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on reserved issues entered in July 2014. She is challenging: (1) an order, incorporated into the December 2010 judgment, terminating her right to receive spousal support; (2) an order barring her from presenting evidence on issues that could have been covered in her final declaration of disclosure required by Family Code section 2105; (3) attorney fee sanctions of $20,000 imposed against her under section 271 in the July 2014 judgment; and (4) monetary sanctions of $5,000 imposed against her in the judgment entered in July 2014 based on breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, Lisa contends both judgments must be reversed because the trial court was biased agai

Defendant Erick Wayne Scott contends on appeal that the trial court failed to specify the duration of a protective order that prohibits him from committing violent acts or threats against a particular child. The People concede and we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the protective order and remand to the trial court.

Appellant Darrell Carter, Jr., pled no contest to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)). After several violations of probation, the court sentenced Carter to a three-year prison term.
On February 21, 2017, appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, asking this court to independently review the record. An ensuing review of the record disclosed that the trial court may have erred in its award of presentence custody credit. On October 23, 2017, this court issued a letter to the parties allowing them to file a letter brief addressing this issue. Having considered the parties’ briefs, we conclude the court erred in its award of presentence custody credit, modify the judgment accordingly, and affirm as modified.