CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Horacio Tridado Medina contends on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering him to register as a sex offender and pay an associated fine. The People concede and we agree. We reverse the registration order, strike the fine, and remand to the trial court.

On May 17, 2016, defendant pled no contest to pandering by procuring (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(1)) and misdemeanor spousal abuse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), in exchange for a stipulated four-year prison term. The court referred the matter to the probation office for report and recommendation. The court set the date for sentencing and ordered defendant to be present.
The probation report, prepared on June 8, 2016, noted that defendant was a construction laborer. He had been in that occupation for three years and currently made a net income of $2,100 per month. The report recommended that defendant be ordered to pay $1,800 in restitution (§§ 1202.4, 1202.45), $80 pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), $60 pursuant to Government Code section 70373, and $296 pursuant to section 1203.1b for a probation report within 30 days or, if in custody, within 30 days following release, or as ordered by the court.

Defendant and appellant, E.L. (father), appeals from the order terminating his parental rights to his children, A.L. and B.L. Father contends plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), and the juvenile court did not comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law. We conclude the court erred, but father has failed to demonstrate prejudice. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Richard Dean Pangus, of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and violating a protective order (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a)). The protective order at issue protected J.P., defendant’s former girlfriend and the victim in the assault count. The jury found defendant not guilty of willfully inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), and the court declared a mistrial on the lesser included offense of battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)) when the jury deadlocked on it. The court sentenced defendant to a total of three years in state prison.

Defendant and appellant, Manuel Taylor, pled guilty to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, a 1996 Honda Civic (count 5; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); receiving stolen property, the 1996 Honda Civic (count 6; Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools (count 7; Pen. Code, § 466). A jury thereafter convicted defendant of operating a chop shop (count 1; Veh. Code, § 10801); unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, a 1993 Honda Civic (count 2; Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); breaking or removing vehicle parts (count 3; Veh. Code, § 10852); and receiving stolen property (count 4; Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted he had suffered a prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of eight years eight months.

On May 1, 2006, plaintiff and appellant Regena M. Patterson refinanced her home in Ontario through Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu). The property was sold at a trustee’s sale on October 21, 2014. Plaintiff alleged that the foreclosure was wrongful because there is no valid assignment of the trust deed or promissory note to U.S. Bank, which was the foreclosing beneficiary at the trustee’s sale. She now appeals a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer to her second amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. Although the complaint alleged 10 causes of action and the demurrer was sustained as to all of them, she addresses only the validity of the demurrer as to her claim for wrongful foreclosure. Her sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because she had standing to challenge the foreclosure as based on void assignments of the trust deed.
We will affirm the judgment.

In 2005, defendant and appellant, Robert Wayne Puls, pled guilty in case No. FVI021475 to one felony count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) In a previous opinion in this appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s Proposition 47 petition to reclassify his 2005 Vehicle Code conviction as a misdemeanor. (People v. Puls (June 7, 2016, E064118) [nonpub. opn.].) We held that such convictions are ineligible to be reclassified as misdemeanors under Proposition 47, regardless of whether such convictions were theft-based and involved vehicles worth $950 or less. (Id. [at pp. 6-10].)

W.R. (Father) and C.B. (Mother) appeal from an order terminating parental rights over their biological child, D.B. They contend the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) and the juvenile court had reason to believe D.B. might be an Indian child, but failed to follow the procedures required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. §1901 et seq.). They therefore ask this court to remand the case to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of complying with the requirements of ICWA.

Fred Poutoa pled guilty to failing to appear while on bail. (Pen. Code, § 1320.5.) Thereafter a jury convicted him of the remaining counts, possession by a felon of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). Poutoa admitted he had served one prior prison term (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668) and had two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, 668). The court sentenced Poutoa to a total term of seven years and four months.
Following Poutoa's appeal, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We granted Poutoa an opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, but he did not do so. After independently reviewing the entire record (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119), we find no arguable appellate issues and affirm.

A jury convicted Martell Brown of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422; count 1) and felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1); count 2). The jury found true the allegations that Brown used a dangerous and deadly weapon in making the criminal threats in count 1 (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 12022, subd. (b)(1)). At the conclusion of the jury trial, the court found true certain probation denial priors (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)) and a prison prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). Brown's appointed appellate counsel on appeal filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

By a felony complaint deemed an information, defendant and several codefendants were charged with violating Health and Safety Code former section 11359 and section 11366.5, subdivision (a) (count 1, possessing marijuana for purposes of sale; count 2, making a space available for unlawfully manufacturing, storing, and distributing a controlled substance).

Defendant Michael James Phillips contends the trial court erred when it sentenced him to a prison term that was longer than originally agreed by the parties and the court in a plea agreement. He asks us to remand and order the trial court to sentence him according to the terms of the agreement. The Attorney General agrees the trial court violated the agreement, but, recognizing the plea form’s calculation of the maximum sentence was incorrect and the trial court wanted to sentence defendant to the maximum prison term, he argues we should remand to allow the court to sentence defendant to the time stated in the agreement, or, if the court is unwilling to sentence defendant to the agreed term, allow defendant to withdraw his plea.

Defendant Cody Allen Bowles stole T.G.’s truck and later ran over T.G.’s stepson, severely injuring him. Charged with carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon, and hit-and-run driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury, defendant filed a Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss the carjacking charge, claiming the magistrate did not have probable cause to hold him over for that alleged offense. However, before the trial court ruled on the section 995 motion, defendant pleaded no contest to all the charges and enhancement allegations with the understanding that the trial court would issue a certificate of probable cause allowing him to appeal the section 995 issue. The trial court granted defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause and sentenced him to 13 years in state prison.

Defendant Chris Andrew Jackson pleaded no contest to animal cruelty and threatening a victim or witness because of assistance in prosecution, and was placed on formal probation for five years. (Pen. Code, §§ 597, subd. (a), 140.) After violating probation multiple times, the court finally revoked probation and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of three years eight months in prison.
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After examining the record, we conclude the trial court erred in orally pronouncing restitution fines pursuant to sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, but that the abstract of judgment already reflects the proper statutory restitution fine amounts. We shall therefore modify the judgment to include the proper restitution fines, and affirm the judgment as modified.