CA Unpub Decisions

Fred Eddie Gamboa was convicted after a jury trial of evading a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) with special findings by the court in a bifurcated proceeding that he had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served three prior prison terms for felonies (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). On appeal Gamboa contends the court erred in denying his midtrial request to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta). We affirm.

S.L., a minor, appeals from an order declaring that he remain a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after the juvenile court found true the allegation that he committed a second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The court terminated a previous order of home on probation and ordered S.L. to be suitably placed in an open facility.
S.L. contends there was insufficient evidence to prove he aided and abetted a robbery. The Attorney General argues no error, but contends remand is necessary to allow the juvenile court to calculate predisposition custody credits. We remand the case for the limited purpose of calculating S.L.’s predisposition custody credits, but otherwise affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Anita Washington (plaintiff), acting pro. per., sued the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) and HACLA employees Margarita Rodriguez and Giovana Adams (collectively the HACLA defendants), as well as Abecassis Management, Inc. and Aaron Abecaccis (collectively the Abecaccis defendants), in connection with plaintiff’s eviction from her apartment pursuant to a prior unlawful detainer (U.D.) action. Plaintiff now appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgments in favor of the HACLA defendants and Abecaccis defendants after sustaining their respective demurrers. We affirm.

Appellant Rodney Fernandez challenges the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126 (Proposition 36). He contends that Proposition 36 created a due process liberty interest in resentencing, as well as a rebuttable presumption in favor of resentencing. He also contends that the standard guiding the trial court’s discretion—whether the petitioner poses an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”—is void for vagueness, and that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that he posed such a risk. We affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that alleged minor William M. (minor) possessed for sale a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11375, subdivision (b)(1). The court declared minor a ward of the court, ordered him placed in the camp community placement program for seven to nine months, and set the maximum period of confinement at four years and two months. Minor appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to sustain the petition. Minor also contends the trial court erred in admitting case-specific hearsay with respect to the forensic analyst’s identification of the controlled substance. Finally, minor requests that we independently review the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing on his Pitchess motion to ensure that all discoverable materials were produced. Because insufficient evidence supports the petition, we reverse.

Domingo Anthon Cervantes appeals a judgment the trial court imposed after it revoked his postrelease community supervision (PRCS). (Pen. Code, §§ 3451, 3455.) The court imposed a 180-day period of confinement for Cervantes’s PRCS violation to run “consecutive to any other sentence.” (Italics added.) We conclude, among other things, that the court lacks authority to run a period of confinement for a PRCS violation consecutively to a sentence in another criminal case. The portion of the judgment imposing a consecutive sentence is stricken; as so modified, we affirm.

George Gomez and American Development Construction, Inc. (ADC) (plaintiffs) brought an action against Juan Contreras Vivanco, Vanessa Vivanco Penado, and California Realty & Investment Group, Inc. (CRIG) (defendants) for work performed on a construction project. In a court trial, plaintiffs prevailed on their causes of action against Vivanco for breach of oral partnership agreement and breach of fiduciary duty, and defendants prevailed on plaintiffs’ cause of action for unjust enrichment. Vivanco appeals, and we affirm.

Samuel Lagunas was convicted after a jury trial of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder with special findings by the jury that he had personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to the victim and by the court in a bifurcated proceeding that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and the three strikes law. He was sentenced as a second strike offender to an aggregate state prison term of 39 years to life.
On appeal Lagunas contends his juvenile adjudication for robbery should not have been used as a prior strike conviction because the People failed to prove he was at least 16 years old at the time he committed the offense, as required by sections 667, subdivision (d)(3)(A), and 1170.12, subdivision (b)(3)(A).

A jury convicted appellant Artin Simonian of burglary and felony vandalism, based on his forced entry into a residence by breaking two glass doors. Appellant claims the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find that he entered the residence with the intent to commit theft, and therefore that his conviction for burglary must be reversed. He also contends the trial court erred by applying an incorrect standard when it denied his motion for a new trial. Finally, he requests correction of several errors in the abstract of judgment.
We hold that sufficient evidence of intent supports the jury’s verdict. However, we conclude that the trial court employed the incorrect standard when ruling on appellant’s new trial motion. We therefore reverse the court’s order denying that motion and remand to allow the trial court to properly consider it. Additionally, we direct the trial court to correct the errors in the abstract of judgment, to the extent they are relevant following remand.

In 2003, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Battise Collins (defendant) of three counts of inflicting corporal injury to a spouse, and one count of false imprisonment (§ 236). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate life term under the three strikes law. After voter approval of Proposition 36 in 2012, defendant petitioned to have his sentence recalled pursuant to section 1170.126. The trial court denied the petition following a hearing, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s conduct demonstrated an intent to cause great bodily injury.
Defendant appealed, contending the trial court improperly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to find him ineligible for resentencing. When we decided defendant’s appeal, the Courts of Appeal were in conflict as to the appropriate burden of proof.

A jury found defendants and appellants Kelvin Velado and Edward Amilcar Chavac guilty of first degree murder, and found true allegations of firearm use and that the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. The court sentenced both defendants to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on the substantive offense, and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1).
Defendant Chavac asserts various errors related to the admission of the recorded jailhouse statement of codefendant Velado as a declaration against penal interest pursuant to Evidence Code section 1230, and also joins in the arguments of Velado. Defendant Velado asserts numerous claims of instructional error.

Defendant Jonathan Bernard Hurth appeals from an order denying his petition for a recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, commonly known as “Proposition 36.” Defendant challenges the trial court’s determination that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to the public and was therefore not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

In this marital dissolution action, Xia Xu E. appeals a judgment on reserved issues, arguing the trial court misjudged the evidence and prohibited her from presenting more evidence. We disagree with each contention, and therefore affirm.

The California Attorney General filed a civil action against then-attorney and defendant Mitchell Stein (defendant), as well as others, for engaging in unfair business and advertising practices and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against defendant. After settling with and obtaining final judgments against all of the other defendants, the Attorney General moved for summary adjudication of a declaratory relief claim seeking a declaration that the Attorney General was the prevailing party in the action against defendant. The trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment against defendant declaring the Attorney General the prevailing party and dismissing without prejudice all remaining claims against defendant.
On appeal, defendant challenges the summary adjudication order as legally erroneous, as well as the orders granting the TRO and preliminary injunction.