CA Unpub Decisions

Krsta Bosko Savic died in 2005 at the age of 98. His son Zivomir filed a petition for probate of Krsta’s 1992 will, which left the entirety of Krsta’s estate to Zivomir. Krsta’s longtime neighbor and friend Janeen Whalen filed a competing petition for probate of a 2005 will, executed six weeks before Krsta’s death, which left $1 to Zivomir and the remainder of Krsta’s estate to Whalen.
In its statement of decision following a bench trial on the competing petitions, the trial court found the 2005 will was valid, but that Whalen had been Krsta’s “care custodian” (care custodian) within the meaning of Probate Code former section 21350, subdivision (a). Thus, Whalen was statutorily disqualified from inheriting under the will unless she presented clear and convincing evidence the donative transfer to her was free of undue influence. (Former §§ 21350, subd. (a)(6), 21351, subd. (d).)

Alex Lorre appeals from a judgment in favor of his former employer, Virgin America Inc. (Virgin), after the trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of Virgin on Lorre’s claims for disability discrimination, wrongful termination, retaliation, defamation, and breach of contract. Lorre was employed by Virgin since 2008 as an airplane maintenance technician at the Los Angeles International Airport. In 2014 Virgin terminated Lorre’s employment after Lorre offered to sell to his coworkers a headset a passenger left on an airplane. Lorre alleged that Virgin terminated his employment because of his physical disability and in retaliation for his request for medical leave, not for the stated reason that he had offered to sell the headset. Lorre also alleged that Virgin defamed him by falsely stating to his supervisors that he had committed a theft. Because Lorre failed to present evidence raising a triable issue of material fact as to each of the five causes of action, we affi

Joan Waldman and Shawn Clement married in 2000 and separated in 2011. After protracted litigation Waldman and Clement agreed in January 2016 to terms for the division of their community assets, which were then read into the record before the family court. When the parties later disagreed on the meaning of a principal term of the settlement—the allocation of copyrights to music composed by Clement during the marriage—the family court ruled in favor of Clement and entered judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (section 664.6), with the further provision that Waldman could appeal the disputed copyright issue to this court. Because the record and governing law support Waldman’s position, we reverse.

Pursuant to order by the California Supreme Court, we vacate our original opinion and issue this opinion instead. Our changes pertain only to appellant and codefendant Derrick Williams, a minor at the time of the crimes, following People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara).
This case involved a drive-by shooting on Christmas night by members of the 111 Neighborhood Crips gang, who drove into rival territory and ended up targeting two nongang members, killing a woman in front of her three-year-old daughter. At the time of the crimes, appellant Darnell Deshon Houston (Houston) (the shooter) was 33 years old, appellant and codefendant Lamar McKnight (McKnight) (the driver) was 23 years old, and Williams (in the backseat) was 15 years old.
Two juries were empanelled—one for Houston and McKnight (the Green Jury), and one for Williams (the Orange Jury).

This is the second appeal we have considered in this matter. In the first appeal, Fong v. Sheridan (Apr. 21, 2016, A144286) [nonpub. opn.] (Fong I), we reversed in part the trial court’s statement of decision regarding the damages award and prevailing party determination. We explained the statement of decision, by providing only a gross sum, failed to “meaningfully explain how that figure was determined” and constituted error. We vacated the damage award and instructed the trial court to “explain the factual basis for the damage award.”
Following the issuance of the remittitur in Fong I, the trial court entered a revised statement of decision. That statement set forth eight specific items of damages it was awarding “for discovery and remediation of the tanks,” as well as its calculation regarding recoverable rental costs. The court concluded all other damages “were not supported by the evidence.”

Plaintiff Julie Barrett appeals in propria persona from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant The Regents of the University of California (University) without leave to amend. Barrett, who was enrolled in a self-supporting graduate degree program at the University, alleges the University breached employment contracts purportedly requiring it to remit her full tuition costs as part of her compensation as a graduate student reader. Because Barrett cannot state a cause of action for breach of contract as a matter of law, we shall affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiff Robert Timothy Anton Voelker appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Central Marin Police Authority, City of Larkspur, Town of Corte Madera, Town of San Anselmo, Marin Community College District and several individual police officers on his complaint seeking damages for injuries sustained while attempting to evade arrest. He contends the court erred in concluding that the uncontroverted facts preclude recovery under his claims for violation of his civil rights or for negligence. We disagree and therefore shall affirm the judgment.

Manoj Parashar appeals from an order granting a protective order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (DVPA)), as to his wife M.P. and their child. On appeal, Parashar contends the order is not supported by substantial evidence and the trial court should have ordered a continuance of the hearing. We affirm.

An information charged Bryan Martin Huntington, Frank Gallegos Reyes, and Rebecca Patricia Gallegos with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 1; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code), and assault with a deadly weapon not a firearm, i.e., pieces of a wood two-by-four (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2).
Reyes was separately charged with attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664, subd. (a); count 3), and assault with a second deadly weapon, i.e., a piece of metal pipe (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4).
Huntington and Reyes were alleged to have inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and used a deadly weapon to commit robbery, and that Reyes used a deadly weapon to commit attempted robbery (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
A jury convicted Huntington of second degree robbery, and found true the deadly weapon enhancement. The jury also found Huntington had not inflicted great bodily injury.

Jennifer F. (mother) filed a Family Code section 7822 petition seeking to have her children, Alexandra and Roman A., declared abandoned by their father, Gabriel A. (father), so his parental rights could be terminated and the children adopted by their stepfather, Shaun F. (stepfather). The family court granted the petition. Father appeals, contending substantial evidence does not support the family court’s finding that he left the children with mother or that he intended to abandon them. We affirm.

Appellant, Kerry Scott Ussery, a retired Modesto police officer, challenges the judgment entered in favor of respondent, County of Stanislaus (County), following a court trial on appellant’s personal injury action. Appellant’s complaint alleges the County is liable for injuries he sustained during a pursuit intervention technique (PIT) training session that is required for Modesto police officers. According to appellant, although the vehicles used for the PIT training belonged to the Modesto Police Department (MPD), the County is liable for their dangerous condition because the County had the right to control the PIT vehicles.
The trial court found that the evidence “unwaiveringly [sic]” pointed to the County’s lack of control of the property alleged to be dangerous, i.e., one or more PIT vehicles. Accordingly, the trial court ruled in the County’s favor on the ground that appellant did not meet his burden of proving the County owned or controlled the property at iss

Appellants, Enrique Reyes and Guadalupe Reyes, rented a portion of a parcel of land from Kutnerian Enterprises and Migran Kutnerian, upon which appellants parked their travel trailer. Respondents, David Bernel and Joann Bernel, other tenants on Kutnerian’s property, supplied appellants with electricity from their meter and water from their well. After the Bernels ceased providing electricity to appellants, they filed the underlying complaint. In a related action, Kutnerian sued appellants to evict them from the land.
The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on all causes of action alleged against the Bernels. The court relied on the preclusive effect of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer action filed by Kutnerian against appellants and appellants’ failure to state a cause of action. Thereafter, the court dismissed the complaint as to the Bernels and entered judgment in their favor.

Ryan Koelewyn, a self-represented litigant, appeals from an order denying his requests to (1) modify child custody and visitation, (2) dissolve a restraining order, and (3) vacate the court’s award of attorney fees to Jennifer Koelewyn. Ryan argues the family court failed to properly exercise its discretion when it denied his requests because it (1) erroneously treated his request to modify attorney fees as a motion for reconsideration, (2) was required to dissolve the restraining order because he showed a change of circumstances, and (3) incorrectly applied the changed circumstances standard to his request to modify visitation. He asks us to reverse the order denying his requests and remand the matter to the family court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on them. Because Ryan has not shown prejudicial error with respect to the appealed from order, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a personal injury action filed by plaintiffs and respondents Rodolfo Funez and Arlene Garcia against defendants and appellants Jorge Luis Salazar, Sr. (Jorge Sr.), and Leslie Salazar. In the course of the litigation, default has been entered against defendants three times. Twice, the trial court set aside the default at the request of defendants. The trial court denied defendants’ request to set aside the default a third time and entered a default judgment in favor of Funez (but not Garcia) in the amount of $91,186.02, reinstating a judgment entered, but later vacated, after the first entry of default.
On appeal, defendants raise several claims of error, but we need address only one. Plaintiffs failed to serve a statement of damages in accordance with the procedures required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11. The resulting judgment is therefore void.