CA Unpub Decisions

A.D., hereafter mother, appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her children, I.R. and L.D. The only issue she raises is the denial of her request to modify the order setting the permanency planning hearing and for six months of reunification services. She contends that because she made the necessary prima facie showing, she was entitled to have an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that she did not make a prima facie showing as to either prong of Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, and we will therefore affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant Jose Francisco Cervantes beat his girlfriend during an argument. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant within seven years of a prior domestic violence conviction. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a) & (f)(1).) In return, defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years with various terms and conditions of probation. On appeal, defendant challenges four of his probation conditions, claiming they are unconstitutionally overbroad and/or vague, and should be stricken or modified. Specifically, he argues (1) the electronics-search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad because it impermissibly restricts his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) the residential search condition, the weapons condition, and the change of residence condition are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We agree modification is required as to some of the challenged probation conditions, but r

Defendant and appellant Hispano Services, Inc., a corporation (Hispano Services) appeals from the lower court’s order granting plaintiff and respondent Cristina Hernandez’s motion to strike Hispano Services’ special motion to strike (Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16 [the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) statute]) plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons discussed herein, we order the appeal dismissed.

Plaintiff and appellant Keane Williams appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate an arbitration award. In his motion, he contended that the arbitrator erroneously held that his claim was time-barred and ignored an applicable tolling statute—Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.12—that rendered the action timely.
Plaintiff acknowledges that an order denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award is not appealable. However, he asks us to treat his appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate. For the reasons we discuss below, we decline to exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a mandate proceeding. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns an award of defense costs to a public entity pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. The motion for such costs was not filed until after entry of judgment and was therefore not timely. However, because plaintiffs have failed to show how they were prejudiced by the late filing, we will affirm the judgment.

At trial, it was undisputed defendant Juan Mejia fatally shot Ivan Carrillo. The jury's primary task was to decide whether the crime was first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. The jury returned a first degree murder verdict, and found true the special circumstance allegation that Mejia intentionally killed Carrillo while lying in wait. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The jury also found Mejia personally and intentionally used a firearm in committing the murder. (Id., §§ 12022.53, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The court found Mejia had one serious felony prior and four strike priors. (Id., §§ 667, subds. (a), (e)(2)(A), 1170.2, subd. (c)(2).)
The court sentenced Mejia to life without the possibility of parole for the murder with special circumstances, plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement and serious felony prior.

Larry Lee Wynn contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike a prior strike conviction in sentencing him. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Santiago Cardenas pled guilty to one count of felony assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and one count of attempted unlawful taking of a vehicle. The trial court placed Cardenas on formal probation for a period of three years. On appeal, Cardenas challenges nine of the probation conditions that the court imposed (conditions 6e, 6k, 6n, 6r, 9a, 10g, 11a, and 11b), on a variety of grounds. Cardenas objected to only two of these nine conditions in the trial court, and, as to those two, raised no constitutional objection. Instead, he contended only that imposition of those conditions was unreasonable, given the circumstances of his crime and his criminal history. We conclude that Cardenas has forfeited a number of his challenges to the probation conditions. We further conclude that his nonforfeited contentions are without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted defendant Jonnyrae Mountain Witt of second degree murder and intentional infliction of traumatic injury upon a cohabitant. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement. The trial court imposed but stayed sentence on the other conviction and other firearm enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting numerous prior uncharged acts pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1109. Moreover, in supplemental briefing, the parties have addressed whether the recent enactment of Senate Bill No. 620 (Senate Bill 620) requires us to remand this matter to allow the trial court to consider exercising its discretion to dismiss the firearm enhancements.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. However, we will remand the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to c

We are combining for decision two appeals pending before this court. In Friends of the Santa Clara River v. County of Los Angeles, case number B282421 (Friends), plaintiffs and appellants Friends of the Santa Clara River and Santa Clarita Organization for Planning and the Environment appeal a judgment and writ of mandate decertifying portions of a final environmental impact report (EIR) prepared and certified by defendants and respondents County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (collectively, the County), and directing the County to bring those portions into compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) In California Native Plant Society v. County of Los Angeles, case No. B282427 (Native Plant), the same plaintiffs and appellants appeal a nearly identical judgment and writ of mandate in a separate but related case after the same judge conducted a joint hearing for the two cases.

Allegheny Casualty Company (Allegheny) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to set aside summary judgment on a bail bond it posted for Eduard Isabekian. It contends the trial court twice lost jurisdiction over the bond and therefore, had no authority to order entry of summary judgment. We affirm the judgment.

In this dispute between a law firm and its former client, the trial court imposed terminating sanctions against defendant Sue Tsang due to her recalcitrance during discovery. It then entered judgment awarding a portion of certain settlement funds to plaintiff Franceschi Law Corporation (the law firm) and the balance to Tsang. Tsang appealed the judgment. Acting without an attorney, Tsang did not provide a complete clerk’s transcript and her briefs do not adequately address the salient issues or include sufficient citations to the record. Because she failed to carry her burden to demonstrate reversible error, we affirm.

J.S. (mother) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order setting a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her daughter, 10-year-old A.G. Mother claims that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that there was a substantial risk of detriment to A.G. if returned to her care and that she received reasonable reunification services. We acknowledge that mother loves A.G. and made some progress during the reunification period, but we conclude that substantial evidence supports both challenged findings and therefore deny the petition.

M.H. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order after a contested jurisdiction hearing finding there was substantial danger to the physical health and well-being of her daughter, 12-year-old H.H., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The court removed H.H. from Mother’s care, ordered reunification services for Mother, and therapeutic visits with Mother if H.H. desired them.