CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Mario Teodoro Rios appeals a judgment following his jury conviction of insurance fraud (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (a)(4)), making a false report of a criminal offense (§ 148.5, subd. (a)), and attempting to induce false testimony (§§ 137, subd. (c), 664). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted him three years of formal probation, subject to various conditions.

A jury convicted Zihan Zhang of three counts of grand theft of labor or money (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), two counts of refusing to pay wages (Lab. Code, § 216, subd. (a)), and four counts of failing to provide itemized statements to her employees (§§ 226, subd. (a), 226.6). Zhang was prosecuted after several of her former employees filed wage claims with the California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), which is overseen by the Labor Commissioner. At trial, the People introduced in evidence the Labor Commissioner's awards (awards) to two victims as well as the expert testimony of two DLSE deputy labor commissioners, who opined that Zhang had violated numerous wage and labor laws against the victims.

An information charged defendant Clare Lyle Neighbour with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a) & 664, count 1); aggravated mayhem (§ 205, count 2); and attempted robbery (§§ 211 & 664, count 3). The information further alleged that in
count 1, the attempted murder was "willful, deliberate and premediated" (§ 189); that in counts 1 and 2, defendant "personally inflicted great bodily injury" on the victim
(§ 12022.7, subds. (a) & (b)); and that in counts 1, 2, and 3, defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
Before trial commenced, at the request of defense counsel the court conducted a multiday hearing to determine whether defendant was mentally competent to stand trial. As discussed in detail post, the court found defendant was competent and reinstated criminal proceedings against him. A jury subsequently found defendant guilty as charged and made true findings on the enhancements.

Defendant Teddino Johnson appeals from an order denying a motion to recall his so-called “three strikes” sentence of 25 years to life, brought pursuant to the provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act), codified at Penal Code section 1170.126. (See Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595.)
Defendant’s petition to recall his sentence and for resentencing was denied upon determination that he was not eligible for relief under the Act because he had sustained a prior conviction for forcible rape. (See §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I), 1170.126, subd. (e)(3).)
Counsel was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).)

The minor, Larry Z., admitted committing residential burglary. The juvenile court placed the minor on probation pursuant to a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790.) Thereafter, the court found the minor violated the terms and conditions of his DEJ probation, sustained the previously deferred residential burglary charge, and reinstated the minor on probation.
The minor now contends the juvenile court committed prejudicial error when it relied on unreliable hearsay evidence to find he violated DEJ probation. Finding the juvenile court erred in sustaining one of the alleged probation violations but not the other, we will modify the court’s order and affirm the order as modified.

A jury found defendant Keith Warren Sherman guilty of two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), with a special finding that he engaged in substantial sexual contact with the victim within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8), and one count of sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant’s sole contention is that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

T.O. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court orders (1) denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking custody of her daughter J.P. and (2) terminating her parental rights over J.P. Nicholas P. (Father), the father of J.P., joins in Mother’s argument challenging the parental rights termination order on the ground that the sibling exception to termination of parental rights applied. We consider, as to the former order, whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding Mother had not demonstrated changed circumstances nor that J.P.’s best interests would be served by offering Mother an opportunity to reunify with J.P. As to the latter order, we consider whether the juvenile court erred in declining to find applicable the sibling and parent-child exceptions to statutory provisions governing the termination of parental rights.

Port Medical Wellness, Inc. (Port Medical) sued the International Longshore & Warehouse Union—Pacific Maritime Association Welfare Plan (Plan), its Board of Trustees (Board), and its former claims administrator, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (Connecticut General), seeking payment for health care services provided to persons eligible for benefits under the Plan. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
State law causes of action seeking to recover unpaid benefits under a welfare benefit plan regulated under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.) are generally conflict preempted. We conclude that Port Medical’s claims for breach of implied-in-fact contract, intentional misrepresentation and quantum meruit—each of which seeks payment for services covered under the Plan—are conflict preempted under section 514 of ERISA. Port Medical’s two remaining claims—unfair competition

In an opinion filed September 11, 2014, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction, following a no contest plea, of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)) and infliction of corporeal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). (People v. Kirk (Sept. 11, 2014, A138871) [nonpub. opn.].) We observed in our opinion that in his opening brief, defendant asserted he was entitled to additional custody credits. In his reply brief, however, he advised that he obtained relief through a section 1237.1 motion in the trial court and therefore “ ‘[withdrew]’ ” the issue even though he “ ‘[was] not and has never been in agreement with the credits.’ ” (People v. Kirk, supra, A138871.)
The instant appeal is from an order denying a subsequent 1237.1 motion to correct the abstract of judgment that defendant filed in propria persona, seeking an additional 247 of actual custody credits.

We consider whether the trial court properly granted a motion to disqualify an attorney and her law firm from representing Cream’s Dismantling, Inc. (the Company), Joseph Cream, Jr. (Joey), and Amanda Cream (Amanda) (collectively, Defendants). Jan Rosen (Rosen) is Joey’s sister and Amanda’s aunt. In 2011, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed criminal charges against the Company, Joey, Rosen, and their father, alleging violation of environmental laws in relation to the Company’s operations. During the criminal proceeding, there was a joint defense agreement between the attorney for Rosen and the attorney for the Company and Joey.
In 2016, Rosen sued Defendants alleging contamination of real property, and interference with her attempts to sell the property. Attorney Cannata’s law firm filed an answer to Rosen’s complaint on behalf of Defendants. Rosen moved to disqualify Attorney Cannata and her law firm. The trial court granted the motion. We affirm.

In 2010, on the heels of the great recession, the State faced an enormous budget gap. To close that gap, in November 2010, the Department of General Services (DGS) entered into an agreement to sell eleven state-owned buildings, referred to as the Golden State Portfolio, to California First, L.P. (California First). The transaction was set to close in mid-December. The next day, Jerry B. Epstein and A. Redmond Doms sued Governor Schwarzenegger, DGS, and Ron Diedrich, the Acting Director of DGS (together, the State) to stop the sale of the Golden State Portfolio to California First or anyone else. Two months of intense litigation ensued, including a request for preliminary injunction and proceedings before the Sixth District Court of Appeal and our Supreme Court.
In the interim, Governor Jerry Brown assumed office. On February 9, 2011, he announced that the State would not sell the Golden State Portfolio and would close the budget shortfall through other means.

This case tells a cautionary tale about the risks laypersons face when they undertake to represent themselves, the often contentious nature of litigation between ex-spouses, and the practical challenges to and limits on the trial courts’ ability to assist litigants (particularly those unrepresented by counsel) to resolve their disputes when they are unable or unwilling to do so on their own. Fortunately, although it is a long and unhappy story, it is one that we are now finally able to bring to a close with a comparatively happy (if greatly delayed) ending.
Appellant Diana Dunkelis appeals from an order denying her motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Subsequent developments that both parties agree are properly before us have substantially narrowed the parties’ dispute and simplified the relief to be granted on remand. We reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand with directions to order the parties to comply with their limited remaining obligations under the settleme

Appellant Martina M. Ibarra (Ibarra) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found in favor of respondents Duane and Leslie Papierniak (together, the Papierniaks) and STC Construction and Engineering, Inc., (STC) in her action against respondents for damage to her condominium. She contends: (1) the trial court erred in ruling she had no standing to proceed on her claim for damage to the common area of the condominium building; (2) the court erred in declining to give three proposed special jury instructions; (3) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; (4) the court erred in denying her motion for a new trial; (5) the court erred in ruling that the Papierniaks’s offer of settlement under Code of Civil Procedure, section 998 (998 offer) was valid, or alternatively, in finding that the expert fees the Papierniaks incurred—and which the court ordered Ibarra to pay pursuant to the 998 offer—were reasonable.

The court readjudged appellant T.S. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), after the court sustained allegations in a wardship petition charging him with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). Following several violations of probation, the court committed appellant to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ).
On appeal, appellant contends the court abused its discretion: (1) when it committed him to the DJJ; and (2) in calculating appellant’s maximum term of confinement (MTC). We affirm.