CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Carlos Ochoa was on felony probation in Kern County Superior Court case No. BF162002A (case 2002) for a Vehicle Code 10851 conviction when he again was found in possession of a stolen vehicle. In Kern County Superior Court case No. BF164452A (case 4452), he was convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a). Based upon the conviction in case 4452, he was found to be in violation of his probation in case 2002.
On October 12, 2016, Ochoa was before the trial court for a concurrent sentencing hearing on the probation violation in case 2002 and the conviction in case 4452. The trial court reinstated formal probation in case 2002, and imposed a term of mandatory supervision pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B) in case 4452. Ochoa maintains the trial court erred in reinstating probation in case 2002, instead of imposing a sentence pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h).
We affirm.

Appellant Epifanio Soto stands convicted of two counts of assault with a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(2); one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1); and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest, in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). In addition, section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancements were found true as to both assault counts. Soto was sentenced to a total of nine years in prison for these offenses and enhancements in case No. SF018215A.
In a separate proceeding in case No. SF015819B, Soto was found to be in violation of his probation based upon commission of the offenses in case number SF018215A. As a result, probation was revoked and Soto was sentenced to a concurrent four-year term for these offenses.

Defendant and appellant M.B. appeals from a juvenile court’s disposition order, under which it detained him in juvenile hall under a terminal disposition, to be released on January 18, 2018, which was one day prior to his 18th birthday. He complains that the court abused its discretion in committing him to juvenile hall simply because finding an appropriate placement was difficult. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in not instructing the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of grand theft. We affirm.

On April 6, 2017, an information charged defendant and appellant Dennis Wayne Buckley with attempted murder under Penal Code sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a) (count 1); and assault with a deadly weapon, a knife under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). The information also alleged that in the commission of counts 1 and 2, defendant inflicted great bodily injury under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The information further alleged that defendant had served two prior prison terms under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On April 14, 2017, a jury found defendant not guilty of count 1, and guilty of count 2. In addition, the jury found true the great bodily injury allegation. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations; the trial court found the two prior convictions true.

The juvenile court adjudged defendant and appellant, S.O., a ward of the court for unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 29610. S.O. filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the search and seizure of his person. The court denied the motion to suppress, and S.O. admitted the charge against him. On appeal, S.O. argues law enforcement conducted an unlawful traffic stop of the car in which he was a passenger. The deputy in question stopped the car for failure to signal a right turn, which violated the Vehicle Code only if the turn may have affected other cars. (Veh. Code, § 22107.) We agree with S.O. that the evidence does not provide a lawful justification for the traffic stop. We therefore reverse with directions to grant the motion to suppress.

The People appeal from a judgment of dismissal of a criminal action against defendant and respondent, Deandre Shamare Brown, charging him with possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 1) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 2). The People contend the trial court abused its discretion in denying the People’s request for a continuance of trial, and granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the case. The People argue they demonstrated good cause for a continuance. In addition, they argue they were entitled to a trial continuance under the 10-day grace period applicable under Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B), even without a showing of good cause.
We agree the trial court violated Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B) by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss during the 10-day grace period, but we conclude the error was harmless because the People were not ready for trial.

A jury found defendant and appellant Sergio Morales Solano guilty of (1) second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)—Count 1) ; (2) driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury to another person (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)—Count 2); (3) driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08-percent or more and causing bodily injury to another person (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)—Count 3); and (4) failing to stay at the scene of a car accident that resulted in a death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)—Count 4).

Defendant and respondent, Nicolas Simental, sexually abused plaintiff and appellant, Rooke Baron, numerous times for about a year and a half, beginning when she was 15 years old. Simental was 11 years older than Rooke. Rooke filed the instant civil action against Simental, and defendants and respondents, Stephen Born and Southern California Aquatics Federation Water Polo, Inc. (SCAF), for damages, alleging childhood sexual abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Simental, and negligence against Born and SCAF. Because Simental and Born were SCAF officials or agents, Rooke also sued SCAF for vicarious liability based on Simental’s acts of sexually abusing Rooke, and based on Born’s negligence in not protecting her. The jury found Simental liable for sexually abusing Rooke but found SCAF and Born not directly or vicariously liable.
Rooke appeals from a judgment against Simental, awarding Rooke $2,064,675 in damages solely against Simental.

In 2014, defendant and appellant Dwayne Kevin Mills pled guilty to the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1). Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
In a previous nonpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition providing evidence of his eligibility.

On November 4, 2014, the voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47); it went into effect the following day. Proposition 47 reduced certain nonserious, nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors. It added and amended sections of the Penal Code. Penal Code section 1170.18 was added and provides that a person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who would have been guilty only of a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time the plea was entered, or at the time of trial, may petition for a recall of the sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing.

In two separate cases, defendant and appellant Jonathan Lauer pled guilty to one count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly.
In a previous nonpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petitions for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Ca1.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petitions without prejudice to consideration of subsequent petitions providing evidence of his eligibility.

Defendant and appellant Ryan James Hawkins pleaded no contest to, among other things, a felony count of attempted unlawful driving of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 and Penal Code section 664. Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which among other things established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
In a previous nonpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of Hawkins’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Hawkins’s petition without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition providing evidence of eligibility.

Paul R. Johnson was charged in this case with one count of felony reckless evasion of a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). It was also alleged that Johnson had suffered a serious/violent felony prior conviction (strike) (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and three prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Prior to the preliminary hearing, Johnson was found not competent to stand trial (§ 1368) and he was committed to a state hospital. About three months later he was found competent and criminal proceedings were reinstated.
The case was scheduled for jury trial, however, after the voir dire process had been completed, Johnson failed to appear and a mistrial was declared.
Ultimately Johnson returned to court and entered into a plea agreement. Under that agreement, Johnson pleaded guilty to the evasion count and admitted the strike prior. The parties stipulated to a four-year term.