CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Lamont Kellum and Eric Stocker appeal from a
judgment entered after they were convicted by a jury of first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The jury found the firearm and gang enhancement allegations to be true. Appellants raise issues regarding insufficiency of the evidence, instructional error, and evidentiary error. We affirm.
Following our initial decision in this matter, appellants sought review in the Supreme Court.

Following a jury trial appellant Michael Capers was convicted of the first degree murder of Jamil Lyles (Count I), attempted murder of Brent Exley, Jerry Sims, Estvon Johnson, Deshawn Needham, and Darlene Allen (Counts II–V and VIII), and the second degree murder of Diamond Johnson (Count VII.) Appellant Daynell Bell was convicted of the first degree murders of Marvin Nichelson and Diamond Johnson (Counts VI and VII, respectively) and the attempted murder of Darlene Allen (Count VIII.)

Antonio Roman, Jose Rodriguez, and Ivan Lozano challenge their convictions and sentences on numerous grounds. We reverse their convictions on count 16, active participation in a criminal street gang. We remand for the trial court to resentence Roman and to ensure that he has an opportunity to present evidence for his eventual youth offender parole hearing. We conditionally reverse Rodriguez’s conviction and transfer the matter to the juvenile court with directions to conduct a transfer hearing. In the event the juvenile court transfers Rodriguez’s case to the criminal court, we instruct the trial court to provide Rodriguez with the opportunity to present evidence for his eventual youth offender parole hearing. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

The juvenile court found that 15-year-old B.T. committed attempted robbery and placed him on probation. (Pen Code, §§ 211, 664; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The minor appeals upon contentions that eyewitness identification was wrongly admitted, there is insufficient evidence he committed the crime, and the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

Rosemary Jensen and the County of Sonoma (County) have been engaged in protracted litigation regarding certain property owned by Jensen. An abatement hearing found Jensen’s property in violation of the Sonoma County Code, and the resulting abatement order was upheld by the Northern District of California, the Ninth Circuit, the Sonoma County Superior Court, and this court.
In the most recent iteration of the parties’ dispute, the County filed suit to enforce the abatement order and have Jensen’s property declared a public nuisance. Jensen now appeals from a judgment that, in part, finds her in violation of the abatement order, directs her to cease the present unlawful uses and abate the zoning violations, and requires her to pay civil penalties, costs, and attorney fees. She contends the County’s claim to enforce the abatement order was required to be filed as a compulsory cross-complaint in her prior actions and is barred by the statute of limitations.

Appellant Brian Lee Gulbranson contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it determined that he had not overcome his presumptive ineligibility for probation. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Kimberly Cromwell (Cromwell) defaulted on her home mortgage. In June 2008, Cromwell filed an action for declaratory relief, quiet title, and fraud against some of the parties involved in the foreclosure of her property. That case went to trial, the trial judge granted judgment in favor of defendants, and this Court affirmed. (Cromwell v. NDeX West, LLC (Oct. 18, 2012, A129374) [nonpub. opn.] (“Cromwell I”).)
In July 2014, four years and three days after her property was sold at a trustee’s sale, Cromwell filed this second action (“Cromwell II”) asserting multiple causes of action against many of the same parties. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrers to her first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. We affirm the judgment on two independent grounds: that Cromwell’s claims are barred in substantial part by res judicata, and in their entirety by the applicable statutes of limitations.

This case is before us for a second time, after the California Supreme Court transferred it back to this court with directions to reconsider in light of the recent opinion in People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page).
In December 2014, defendant Lauren Perez pleaded guilty to two felony offenses: unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count 2). Defendant admitted she had a prior conviction that qualified as a “strike” (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and admitted that she had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court subsequently dismissed the strike allegation, struck the prior prison term allegation, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on probation for three years.

David Matthew Kenny is serving a 25-years-to-life sentence for possessing stolen or extorted property. (Pen. Code, § 496.) He appeals the denial of a petition to recall the sentence and be resentenced under Proposition 47, which reduced the offense to a misdemeanor where the value of the property does not exceed $950. Kenny argues that the trial court committed prejudicial due process error by denying the petition without providing him notice or appointing counsel. He argues in the alternative that any affirmance by this court should be without prejudice to the refiling of a proper petition. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the order denying resentencing without prejudice to the trial court’s consideration of a new petition supplying evidence of his eligibility for relief.

Believing Charles McHugh and his attorney, Stephen Madoni, conspired to steal his client, Paul Leone, and to convince Leone not to pay outstanding legal bills, appellant and attorney Kerry Sorensen filed suit against the two for intentional interference with contractual relations. Charles and Madoni each filed a special motion to strike the cause of action against them pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court granted the motions.
Sorensen appeals. He claims the conduct of Charles and Madoni violates certain rules of professional conduct applicable to attorneys practicing law in this state. He also argues their conduct is subject to criminal punishment pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6128, subdivision (a), which makes it a misdemeanor for an attorney to, inter alia, engage in “deceit or collusion, or consent[] to any deceit or collusion, with [the] intent to deceive the court or any party.”

Appointed counsel for defendant Juan Manuel Hernandez asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. In response, he contends the charges against him were false, he is innocent, and he was pressured into accepting the plea offer. We affirm.

Defendant Trinidad Padilla Ruesga was charged with attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664 [count 1]) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) [count 2]). The information further alleged he intentionally and personally discharged a firearm in connection with count 1 (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and personally used a firearm in connection with count 2 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Defendant pled nolo contendere to count 2 and admitted he personally used a firearm. Following a trial, the jury found him guilty as charged on count 1 and found he intentionally and personally discharged a firearm. The trial court denied defendant’s new trial motion and sentenced him to seven years to life, plus 20 years for the firearm discharge enhancement, on count 1.
On appeal, defendant makes two contentions.

J.S. (mother) has four children. The two older children (who are both boys) have a different father than the two younger children (who are twin girls). E.E. (father) is the father of the two twin girls. E.B., who is married to R.B. (collectively the B.’s) is the paternal grandfather of the two older boys.
At the time of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (section 366.26) hearing below, the twin girls had been in a prospective adoptive placement for about a month and a half. Meanwhile, the B.’s had only just been approved as a prospective adoptive placement for the older boys. The juvenile court refused to place the twin girls with the B.’s. Moreover, it refused to continue the hearing so that the B.’s could be considered as a potential adoptive placement for the twin girls. Instead, it continued the hearing with respect to the older boys and terminated parental rights with respect to the twin girls.

Defendant and appellant, Anthony La Shaun Griffin, pled guilty to three counts of receiving stolen vehicles with a prior conviction for a vehicle-related theft (counts 1-3; Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 4; § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant additionally admitted suffering three prior prison terms. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to five years of imprisonment.
After defendant filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him.