CA Unpub Decisions

Wiggins was arraigned by video on a felony complaint charging him with residential burglary. He was ordered to appear at two upcoming hearings—a February 14 readiness hearing and a February 20 preliminary examination. The court remanded him to the sheriff’s custody and set bail at $50,000. A week later, Surety posted a $50,000 bail bond to secure his release in exchange for guaranteeing his personal appearance at the readiness hearing.
Wiggins did not appear at the February 14 hearing. Defense counsel told the court that he had “maintained continual contact with [his client] throughout the case,” had “spoken with him multiple times,” and suspected he may have confused the two hearing dates. The court agreed to trail the matter from the morning to its afternoon calendar to give counsel an opportunity to call his client. The court called the matter again in the afternoon session, where it continued the readiness hearing to the next court day, February 18.

Plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants Alex Roudi and Interwest Capital Corporation (Interwest) appeal from an order vacating an arbitration award in their favor and striking their petition to confirm that award. The arbitration award stemmed from two matters commenced by defendant, cross-complainant and respondent Reza Paydar: a document inspection and accounting dispute against Interwest and a shareholder derivative matter against both Roudi and Interwest. In granting Paydar’s motion to vacate the award, the superior court ruled that plaintiffs’ counsel, Cooley LLP (Cooley), violated California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.7(d)(3), prohibiting lawyers from simultaneously representing two clients if one asserts a claim against the other in the same proceeding, which created an unwaivable conflict of interest.

A jury convicted Marlon Johnson of two counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2); and unlawful discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 3). The jury found true that regarding counts 1 and 2, Johnson: (1) personally used a firearm (handgun) within the meaning of sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and 12022.53, subdivision (b); (2) personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm (handgun) within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c); and (3) personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm (handgun) proximately causing great bodily injury and death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Regarding count 3, the jury also found Johnson personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm (handgun) proximately causing great bodily injury and death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).

The parties stipulated that the facts from the probation report formed the factual basis for defendant’s plea. In summary, an officer confronted defendant regarding an outstanding warrant and defendant dropped his child to the floor during a struggle with two more arriving officers. Defendant struck one officer in the face and a second officer sustained a knee injury.
In July 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), resisting an executive officer (§ 69), and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a charge in a separate case; the parties agreed defendant’s sentence would not exceed seven years eight months. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years eight months in prison that included a six-year upper term for child abuse.

Defendant’s convictions arise out of a carjacking in which defendant and three codefendants, Alex Santana, Jose Rivera, and Ted Santos, stole a car during a test drive from a car dealership; Santana shot and killed a car salesman during the drive. (People v. Rivera (Sept. 28, 2004, C042375) [nonpub. opn.].) The day of the murder, the four drove to the dealership and discussed their plan to take a car from the dealership for a test drive, force the salesman/victim out of the car, and take the car. (Ibid.)
The victim agreed to take defendant and Santana on a test drive of a Camaro. The three went to a nearby gas station first to purchase gas for the car. Defendant then drove the car onto the highway, with the victim in the front passenger seat and Santana in the rear passenger seat. Santana shot the victim and defendant pulled over to the side of the highway to throw the victim out of the car. Defendant then drove away. (People v. Rivera, supra, C042375.)

In the driving under the influence case (case 21F-04501), the court sentenced Dunn to the lower term of 16 months in state prison, doubled for a prior strike for a total of two years, eight months. In the probation violation case (case 20F-00015), the court imposed a concurrent prison sentence of two years.
We appointed counsel to represent Dunn in this appeal. After counsel examined the record, he filed an opening brief that raises no arguable issues. On May 10, 2022, appointed counsel advised Dunn by mail that he had 30 days within which to file a supplemental brief. We have not received a response.
We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Dunn’s attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-443.)
The judgment is affirmed.

In July 2021, Dunn drove the wrong way on a one-way street. His blood alcohol level was .269 percent. The prior strikes were based on a 1994 conviction for robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and a 2013 conviction for criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422).
The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the strikes. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) The court sentenced Dunn to the lower term of 16 months in state prison for driving under the influence, doubled for a prior strike for a total of two years, eight months. The court imposed a concurrent prison sentence of two years for violating probation in case 20F-00015.
We appointed counsel to represent Dunn in this appeal. After counsel examined the record, he filed an opening brief that raises no arguable issues. On May 10, 2022, appointed counsel advised Dunn by mail that he had 30 days within which to file a supplemental brief. We have not received a response.

Lation Brown appeals an order of the superior court committing him for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2960.) He waived his right to a jury trial. At trial medical experts and Brown testified. The court found Brown met the statutory requirements for an MDO commitment.
We appointed counsel for Brown on this appeal. After reviewing the record, Brown’s counsel filed a brief under People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304, and stated he was unable to raise any arguable issues for this appeal. Brown was notified of his right to file his own brief.

Because the sole issue raised in mother’s appeal is ICWA compliance, we focus primarily on the facts and procedural background relevant to that issue. Shortly after minor’s birth in October 2019, she was detained from parental custody based on domestic violence between mother and J.B. (father). Mother denied any Indian ancestry, and both parents filed ICWA-020 forms that did not provide any information regarding Indian ancestry. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in January 2020, the court noted parents’ prior responses on the ICWA-020 forms, asked if there was any additional information, and not receiving any information to the contrary from either parent or their counsel, found no reason to believe or know that the case was covered by ICWA. Minor was placed with paternal aunt, and remained there throughout the dependency proceeding.

Joaquin Castaneda died from a point blank shotgun blast to his head on the evening of November 13, 2005; the shot cup was embedded in his skull. Leading away from his body were bloody tire tracks and bloody footprints. He wore a Pinkerton Security uniform shirt. His back pocket was pulled out and his wallet, identification and cell phone were missing.
The shooting occurred in a poorly-lit industrial area in Oxnard. A witness, Frank Ramos, heard people arguing in a car parked directly behind his van; a man yelled, “[G]et the fuck out” followed by the sound of a heavy gauge gunshot. Ramos next heard two men next to his van whispering, “Come on. Hurry up. . . . Let’s go. Let’s get the fuck out of here.” A third man calmly replied, “Hold on.” Ramos heard car doors shutting, looked out, and saw two cars driving away from the scene. Ramos found Castaneda on the ground behind the van.
Another witness, Victor Ortiz, heard arguing and a gunshot come from a car.

Maria P. and her five minor children, including Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, lived in an apartment in Ventura. Licona dated Maria P. and later moved into the apartment with the family.
When Jane Doe 1 was 11 or 12 years old, Licona began to touch her breasts and buttocks. He also touched her groin area over her underwear. On two occasions, Licona took Jane Doe 1’s hand and placed it inside his pants on his penis. The molestations occurred generally between December 2009 and December 2012, a three-year period. Following the final touching, when Jane Doe 1 was 14 years old, she telephoned the police department and reported the molestations (counts 9 through 14).
Jane Doe 2 testified that on one occasion, she saw Licona “hump[]” Jane Doe 1 as she was sleeping. Maria P. also testified that she saw Licona attempt to touch Jane Doe 1’s chest as he closed a nearby window. Licona admitted to his coworker that he had touched Jane Doe 1’s breasts.

Erick Gust attacks the sufficiency of the evidence for his commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) Gust’s admission of watching child pornography, his convictions for lewd conduct with children, and his long-lasting compulsion to make reams of drawings of children having sex provide ample evidence for the judgment. We affirm.
I
In 2009, Gust pleaded no contest to two counts of lewd or lascivious acts with children. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) We call these his qualifying offenses.
The victims, a nine-year-old boy and an eight-year-old girl, came to Gust’s home to play with his children. Gust was 41 years old.
In May 2008, Gust showed the boy magazines with naked women. Gust touched the boy’s hips or buttocks over his clothes approximately 10 times. He texted the boy photos, including a photo of a naked child urinating. Gust asked the boy if he would ever take a photo like that.

In 2019, appellant (born in April 2004) was charged in section 602 petitions with burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), robbery (id., § 211), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, petty theft, and battery on a girlfriend. The juvenile court subsequently declared a doubt as to appellant’s competency and suspended the proceedings. Following a competency hearing, the court found appellant competent to stand trial and proceedings were resumed.
At the September 23, 2020 disposition and adjudication hearing, appellant admitted the assault, petty theft, and battery allegations. The court sustained the admitted allegations, declared appellant a ward, and ordered him placed in a closed facility. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from the dispositional and jurisdictional orders.
On March 19, 2021, appellant was placed home on probation and his placement in a closed facility was terminated. On April 30, 2021, the court found appellant in violation of his probation.

The Union serves as the collective bargaining unit for the Agency’s corrections officers. The MOA governs labor relations between the Agency and the Union’s members. The MOA includes a grievance procedure “intended to create an orderly and fair method for processing grievances and resolving disputes.” Complaints may be filed by individual members as well as by the Union itself. Member complaints are resolved in four steps. The member must first discuss it informally with their immediate supervisor. They may appeal the supervisor’s decision to the Division Head (the second step) then to the Agency Head (the third). The fourth and final step is submitting the complaint to a mutually agreeable arbitrator, or, if the Agency and member cannot agree, to one selected from a list provided by the California State Mediation and Conciliation Service.