CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Matthew Lopez pled guilty in case No. INF1403282 and was placed on probation. A petition to revoke his probation was filed concurrently with an information containing charges against him in case No. INF1501059. A trial court subsequently found defendant in violation of his terms and revoked his probation, and a jury found him guilty in case No. INF1501059. The court sentenced him in both cases on the same day and imposed a term of five years in state prison in case No. INF1501059 and a consecutive three years in case No. INF1403282.
Defendant filed notices of appeal in both cases. We affirm.

On September 16, 2015, a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) alleged that minor and appellant C.V. (Minor) used force and violence on her father under Penal Code section 242, and willfully and unlawfully exhibited a weapon other than a firearm in a rude, angry, and threatening manner in the presence of her father under Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(1).
On October 22, 2015, Minor admitted the Penal Code section 242 charge, and the juvenile court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(1) charge. The court adjudged Minor to be a ward of the court, committed her to juvenile hall for 16 days with credit for time served, and released her into her parents’ custody with various terms and conditions.

Pedro Daniel Rocharuiz appeals his conviction of one count of misdemeanor domestic battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) for abusing his cohabitant. We reject his contention the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior acts of domestic violence against the same victim. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).)

Pursuant to a plea to the court, defendant and appellant, Fernando Garcia, pled guilty to felony vandalism (count 1; Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)) and unlawfully challenging a person to fight in public, a misdemeanor (count 2; § 415, cl. (1)). Defendant additionally admitted he personally used a dangerous weapon in his commission of the count 1 offense (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)), suffered two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of nine years.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erroneously believed it lacked discretion to strike the personal use of a weapon enhancement. Thus, defendant maintains the judgment must be reversed and remanded for resentencing. We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for resentencing.

Plaintiff and respondent, William Blasser, is an attorney and sole practitioner who sued his former client, defendant and appellant, Larry Hudack, in this action for unpaid legal services rendered to Hudack, plus deposition and other costs Blasser incurred to third parties. Blasser obtained Hudack’s default and later obtained a default judgment against Hudack for over $20,000. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.)
Hudack claims his default and the default judgment are void and must be set aside for several reasons, principally because the clerk entered the default after Hudack filed a motion to stay the proceedings pursuant to section 404.5. We conclude the default was properly entered and that Hudack’s additional grounds for challenging the judgment also lack merit. We affirm the default judgment, as the trial court ordered it amended to exclude $2,299.58 in authorized attorney fees.

Plaintiffs and appellants, Lindsey Financial, Inc. and its owner, William Lindsey (collectively Lindsey), purchased a “Life Insurance Agents Errors and Omissions” policy of insurance from defendant and respondent, American Automobile Insurance Company (AAIC). Lindsey’s clients, the Walkers, paid Lindsey $115,000 for financial planning advice and sued Lindsey after they discovered the Internal Revenue Service had identified Lindsey’s recommended financial plan as a tax avoidance scheme. AAIC refused to indemnify or defend Lindsey against the Walker complaint.
In this action, Lindsey sued AAIC for (1) breach of the AAIC policy and (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or bad faith. The trial court granted AAIC’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of AAIC. Lindsey appeals, claiming AAIC had a duty to indemnify and defend Lindsey against the Walker complaint. We affirm.

Plaintiff Linda Wright alleges that her neighbor, defendant Lloyd Robinson, has persecuted her: “I have been threatened, [subjected to] a false citizen[’s] arrest, my property destroyed, my property taken over, my good name slandered . . . .” We caution, however, that Robinson has not yet had an opportunity to tell his side of the story.
Wright obtained a default judgment against Robinson. On Robinson’s motion, the trial court vacated the default judgment. On Wright’s motion, however, the trial court reinstated the default judgment. Finally, on Robinson’s motion, the trial court once again vacated the default judgment.
Wright appeals. We will hold that the trial court’s last order — vacating the default judgment — was supported by substantial evidence. We will also hold that the trial court’s earlier ruling reinstating the default judgment did not preclude it from once again vacating the default judgment. In addition, we will reject Wright’s claim that t

Police officer John Mejia was convicted of falsely reporting to his department that his personal car had been stolen. (Veh. Code, § 10501, subd. (a).) He, his wife (Crystal Mejia), and his father (retired police officer Robert Mejia) were also convicted of presenting a false claim to an insurance company. (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court placed defendants on probation for three years, and imposed various custody terms to be served through work release or electronic monitoring.
On appeal, defendants contend the trial court erred by denying Robert's Batson/Wheeler motion, which he asserted after the prosecutor used four of his first five peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors. Each defendant also contends insufficient evidence supports his or her conviction on the insurance fraud count. We agree insufficient evidence supports Crystal's conviction, and reverse it on that basis. As to John and Robert, we affirm in all respects.

V.S. (Mother) appeals the denial of her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and the termination of parental rights over her daughter, D.R., under section 366.26. She argues the juvenile court erred by denying her request for reunification services and by terminating her parental rights. She also contends the court and the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) To the contrary, however, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the court's findings and that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion. We likewise find no error with respect to the ICWA. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff and respondent Nicosia Consulting International, LLC (NCI) sued a former employee, defendant and appellant Harrison Rees, for damages on theories of defamation and intentional interference with contractual relations. NCI alleged that during his employment, Rees submitted a report to the Chula Vista Fire Department (the fire department) about his belief that NCI had installed some compressed natural gas fittings known as weld tees ("weld tees") at a Republic Services facility in Chula Vista, even though those weld tees were not in compliance with applicable manufacturing standards.
In response, Rees brought an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike the complaint, alleging his reporting conduct was protected or privileged. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 395 (Baral) [proper inquiry is whether plaintiff's claims allege protected activity for the purpose of asserting them as grounds for relief].)

On January 11, 2017, Ryan Curtis determined someone had broken into his employer’s business and stole about $15,000 in items from his work truck parked there the day before. On January 13, 2017, a large box truck entered the unsecured gate of the business and the occupant stole 10 large box truck tires with an estimated value of $2,500. Curtis reported to police on January 15 that he saw a vehicle that looked like the one associated with the theft. The following day, deputies responded to the address and contacted defendant Jason Brett Fowles, who was standing in the driveway. Defendant was on searchable probation; he admitted owning the truck and consented to it being searched. Methamphetamine and a glass smoking pipe were found on defendant, and deputies also found items associated with the thefts.

“On November 4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47), which went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) Proposition 47 created a resentencing provision, codified at Penal Code section 1170.18, which provides that a person currently serving a sentence for certain designated felonies may petition for recall of the sentence to reduce felonies to misdemeanors. Defendant Danielle Demartini appeals from orders denying her petitions to reduce convictions from felonies to misdemeanors.
Defendant’s petitions for resentencing were denied upon a determination that she was not eligible for relief because the commitment offenses were violations of subdivision (a) of section 530.5, unlawful use or transfer of personal identifying information, which is not among offenses eligible for relief pursuant to Proposition 47.

Defendant Robert Stephen Hopkins pled no contest to a domestic violence charge. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in issuing criminal protective orders in favor of his wife, M. H., and their son, J. H., who was seven years old at the time of the incident. He further argues the trial court erred in imposing a $500 domestic violence fee, and the People agree with this argument. We strike the $500 domestic violence fee and otherwise affirm the judgment as modified.

A jury convicted Vincent Valencia of furnishing marijuana to a minor over the age of 14 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Valencia to three years in state prison. Valencia’s appointed counsel on appeal filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.