CA Unpub Decisions

In 2012, the juvenile court found Tyler W., then six years old, qualified as a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, and ordered him removed from parental custody. The child’s father, appellant Gregory W., had his reunification services terminated at the twelve-month review hearing. Four years later, Gregory W. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 requesting that the court reinstate his reunification services. The juvenile court denied Gregory’s petition, but invited him to renew his petition after he had completed additional services. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Juan Pablo Melendez of methamphetamine possession for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) The trial court found true allegations that defendant had a prior first degree burglary conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and had served a prior separate prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to four years in state prison.
Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting that we independently review the entire record to determine if there are any arguable issues. On February 1, 2018, we notified defendant that appointed appellate counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and defendant had 30 days within which to independently brief any grounds for appeal, contentions, or arguments he wanted us to consider. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant.

In a November 7, 2016, petition filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, it was alleged that William J. (minor) committed three batteries upon three police officers. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b).) On November 7, 2016, minor admitted the allegation of one of the counts; the other counts were dismissed; minor was placed home on probation.
On April 12, 2017, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a second petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that minor committed three counts of threatening a public officer (§ 71; counts 1-3) and three counts of battery on a school employee (§ 243.6; counts 4-6). Minor denied the allegations.
After a contested adjudication, the juvenile court found the allegations as to counts 1, 4, 5, and 6 true. It dismissed counts 2 and 3 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1.

The juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over an infant after finding she was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm due to her parents’ ongoing domestic violence. Her father appeals this finding as well as the court’s subsequent order removing the infant from his custody. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) cross-appeals the court’s dismissal of two alternative statutory grounds for dependency jurisdiction based on the parents’ same conduct. The juvenile court’s orders were supported by substantial evidence, and we accordingly have no occasion to reach the Department’s cross-appeal. We affirm.

C.F. appeals a juvenile court’s probation condition that he attends counseling at a batterer’s treatment program (Pen. Code, § 1203.097), following the sustaining of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition finding that he committed battery on his girlfriend. (§ 243, subd. (e)(1).) We conclude, among other things, that the court did not err by imposing a batterer’s treatment condition. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Michael David Ikeler abducted two-year-old Stacie and sexually assaulted her. A jury found him guilty of one count of a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 and two counts of sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger. On appeal, Ikeler contends that the trial court erred by admitting statements allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda and by imposing consecutive sentences on those counts. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury found Manuel Zatarain, Jr. guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that he personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that he committed murder for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
Zatarain contends the trial court erred when it imposed and stayed a 10-year sentence for the gang enhancement because the appropriate punishment was a minimum parole term of 15 years. He also argues we should remand the matter for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under new legislation which ended the statutory prohibition on a trial court’s ability to strike the firearm enhancement in this case. The Attorney General agrees.
We remand for resentencing and order the abstract of judgment modified, but otherwise affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Armond Ruel Person appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession for sale of a controlled substance and misdemeanor possession of a smoking device entered after a jury trial. His sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike his prior conviction for attempted robbery for purposes of sentencing under the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Person’s motion to strike his prior conviction, and affirm the conviction.

Amir Elsamny, a resident of Illinois, sued Kurt Tandoc for personal injury in 2015. In 2016, Tandoc filed a motion to compel discovery, which the court granted. When Elsamny failed to comply with the court’s order, Tandoc moved for terminating sanctions. The trial court granted the motion, and dismissed the case; Elsamny appealed. We affirm.

Four years after plaintiffs and respondents Craig Watts (Watts) and Tolanda McKinney (McKinney) filed their wage-and-hour class action complaint against defendant and appellant U.S. TelePacific Corp. (TelePacific), TelePacific filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied TelePacific’s motion on the ground that it waived its right to compel arbitration by waiting too long to file it. TelePacific appeals, contending that it could not have waived its right to compel arbitration as to the unnamed class members because they were not parties to the lawsuit before class certification; therefore, it could not have brought its motion to compel arbitration until after a class was certified, making its motion timely.
We cannot adopt TelePacific’s position. If it wanted to arbitrate this dispute, it should have moved to compel arbitration at the outset of this litigation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Chris Ferreira appeals the denial of his petition under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18), to reduce his conviction for driving or taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), to a misdemeanor. The trial court ruled that Ferreira’s felony conviction did not qualify for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. Since the trial court issued its ruling, however, our Supreme Court in People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page) held that convictions under section 10851 are eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 if (1) the vehicle was worth $950 or less, and (2) the sentence was imposed for theft of the vehicle, and not post-theft driving. (Page, supra, at p. 1188.) However, a defendant has the burden to establish his or her eligibility for resentencing. (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1188.) Because Ferreira failed to meet this burden, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Brandon Lee Colbert of one count of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of possession of ammunition. As to counts 1 and 4, the jury found true the great bodily injury enhancement. As to count 1, the jury also found true various firearm enhancements. As to counts 4 and 5, the jury found true one firearm enhancement. Defendant admitted three prior prison allegations.
Defendant was sentenced to a determinate prison sentence of 22 years eight months and an indeterminate prison sentence of life plus 25 years to life. He was awarded 397 days of custody credit. Various fines were also imposed.

A jury convicted Oscar Higueros, Jr. of seven counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code § 261, subd. (a)(2), counts 1-7); six counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1), a lesser included offense of counts 19-24); forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C), count 25); dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1), count 28); two counts of trafficking of a minor for a sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1), counts 29 and 30); possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, count 34) and possession of cocaine (id., § 11350, subd. (a), count 35). As to the rape and forcible oral copulation counts, the jury found that each count was committed on a separate occasion. (§ 667.6, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced Higueros to 167 years 8 months to life in prison. We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Detrick Walker, Jr., guilty of, among other things, attempted murder, carjacking, and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to hold a second competency hearing, conducting proceedings in his absence, and misinstructing the jury on aider and abettor liability. We vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for reconsideration of the sentence under recently enacted Senate Bill No. 620, but we otherwise affirm the judgment.