CA Unpub Decisions

After the minor D. J. admitted to one count of misdemeanor unlawful taking or driving a vehicle, the juvenile court ordered him jointly and severally liable for $10,000 in victim restitution. On appeal, the minor challenges that restitution order arguing no evidence indicated he took anything from the victim’s home or truck. The People agree and ask that the restitution order be vacated. We concur and will vacate the order.

A jury found defendant Sergio Gutierrez Licon guilty of numerous crimes and found true several firearm enhancement allegations under Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 36 years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant raises a single issue: he contends that he is entitled to benefit from the recent changes to sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 giving trial courts the discretion to strike firearm enhancements. He therefore asks us to remand this matter to allow the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion. The People concede the issue.

In October 2014, defendant Jason Scott Harsin killed another driver in a head-on car collision while driving under the influence of alcohol. A jury found him guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury to another person (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and causing bodily injury to another person (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b)). The jury also found true the allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a nonaccomplice. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7.) The trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life in prison.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant Sean Michael Hansen pled no contest to carrying a concealed firearm upon his person and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance: methamphetamine. He also admitted he had a prior concealed weapon conviction. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years with various terms and conditions, including the condition he serve 120 days in county jail.
On appeal, defendant’s sole contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jason Quon McClain appeals from a judgment sentencing him to six years in state prison upon his plea to one count of taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10851 subdivision (a) and his admission of one prior serious felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.12. We remand with direction as to the calculation of the defendant’s presentence custody credits, but otherwise affirm the judgment of conviction.

Julius Sanders appeals from a judgment resulting from a plea agreement. He contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to continue his sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jorge Mario Godoy was convicted by a jury of second degree murder with a firearm use enhancement. Sentenced to 25 years to life in prison, Godoy appeals. He contends the trial court made instructional errors, requiring reversal, and the matter must be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement pursuant to recently amended Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h). We affirm Godoy’s conviction, but remand the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion and determine whether to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement.

Appellant Raphael Metzger (Raphael), former husband of Tammy Metzger (Tammy), appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set aside an order entered on the parties’ stipulation that Raphael pay $500,000 in attorney’s fees to Tammy’s counsel and $75,000 to counsel for the couple’s daughter out of his 401(k) and law firm’s profit sharing plans. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because Raphael failed to demonstrate mistake or that the trial court coerced him into entering into the stipulation. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

Sofik Tsaturyan, Sarkis Tatevosian, Manvel Hunanyan and Anna Guyumdzhyan each started taking Avandia, a drug manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline LLC (formerly SmithKline Beecham Corp.)(GSK) to help adults with type 2 diabetes control their blood sugar, between 2002 and 2007. Each of them was diagnosed with cardiovascular injury before or during 2007. In 2011 Tsaturyan, Tatevosian, Hunanyan and Guyumdzhyan sued GSK for failure to warn of Avandia’s alleged cardiovascular risks, asserting causes of action for negligence, strict liability and fraud. In January 2016 the trial court granted GSK’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the publicly available information regarding Avandia and any associated cardiovascular risks was sufficient to put Tsaturyan, Tatevosian, Hunanyan and Guyumdzhyan on notice of possible causes of action against GSK no later than December 31, 2007.

L.W. appeals from a juvenile court order declining to dismiss his wardship petitions pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 and declining to seal his juvenile record pursuant to section 781. His attorney has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the appellate record, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), to determine whether there is any arguable issue on appeal. We find no arguable issue and affirm.

J.K. appeals from an order declaring her a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) J.K. was charged with misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)), for punching a hole in her bedroom wall. She contends the juvenile court failed to properly consider her motion to suppress her statement under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). She further argues her counsel was ineffective for failing to argue her statement was involuntary. Finally, she argues the probation condition prohibiting her from using non-prescription or illegal drugs is unconstitutionally vague. We modify the probation condition, but otherwise affirm the disposition order.

The main issue on appeal involves the admissibility of statements obtained from defendant Jimmy Matusalem Garcia during questioning by police prior to advising him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Defendant also asks that we review the school materials he subpoenaed and which the trial court reviewed and did not disclose to the defense. The Attorney General has no objection to this court reviewing the subpoenaed materials. We find the trial court did not err in admitting defendant’s confession into evidence. We reviewed the subpoenaed school records and found the defense should have been given access to the school records. Because we cannot determine on this record whether the failure to reveal that information prejudiced defendant, we will conditionally reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

At a joint six- and 12-month review hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivisions (e) and (f), the juvenile court terminated reunification services to Nikki H. (mother) and D.C. (father). Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition and petition seeking to reinstate reunification services. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) provided reasonable reunification services to mother. Mother further challenges the juvenile court’s finding that there was not a substantial probability the children could be safely returned to mother’s custody within the time frame of the dependency process. We find the juvenile court’s orders supported by substantial evidence and deny mother’s petition for extraordinary writ relief.

Petitioner, Roy N., is the biological father of now seven-month-old Jessica N. Following a contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof under Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.) that he qualified as Jessica’s presumed father, denied him reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (a) and set a section 366.26 hearing for May 8, 2018. Petitioner filed an extraordinary writ petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452), seeking a stay of the section 366.26 hearing and an extraordinary writ directing the juvenile court to deem him Jessica’s presumed father and order reunification services. We deny the petition and request for a stay.